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Abstract 
 
 
 
The White Terror in Taiwan was a 43-year period during which the Kuomintang 
(KMT) regime, with significant support from the United States during the Cold 
War era, persecuted its political opponents, imprisoning tens of thousands of 
people and executing some 1200. In the wake of democratisation since the 
1980s, Taiwan has instituted a scheme of transitional justice to acknowledge 
and atone for the past political oppression and to promote national 
reconciliation. As this initiative was undertaken by the same regime that 
perpetrated the White Terror, questions of objectivity and transparency arise. 
Accordingly, this thesis aims to assess the progress of transitional justice in 
Taiwan by examining the official discourse on the subject and also analysing 
the non-official discourses amongst survivors of the White Terror in present-day 
Taiwan. Tensions between the different discourses are identified.  
This thesis focuses on the construction of the past in the present, which 
refers to contestation of the past in the context of present-day society in Taiwan. 
Drawing on discursive analysis of Taiwan’s transitional justice initiatives since 
the late 1990s, as well as in-depth interviews with 24 former political prisoners, 
it discerns how the official transitional justice discourse is circumscribed and 
limits our knowledge of the White Terror.  
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Since the implied fall of communism, the aim of reconciliation has not 
embraced the former socialists and communists at the global level, enabling the 
KMT government to elude accountability in its transitional justice efforts by 
rationalising the White Terror in the name of anti-communism. As a result, 
Taiwan’s socialist dissidents remain stigmatised in the official discourse, which 
offers redress only to those individuals who disassociate themselves with 
subversion and identify as ‘political victims’. This restriction in the official 
discourse suggests that the government wishes to reconcile only with those who 
were ‘innocent’ of treason. By the same token, the identity of White Terror 
victims is de-politicised, distorting the content of their trauma and shame and 
their survivorhood in present-day Taiwan.  
Informants’ non-official discourses, which point up the contradictions in 
the government discourse, reveal that survivors tend to feel profound shame 
owing to the failure of their political projects, viewing themselves as inept 
revolutionaries. Much of their interest in transitional justice lies in seeking 
opportunities to advocate for the causes to which they still adhere. Thus, their 
identity as survivors is focused less on persecution than on sustaining their 
political activism in the era of reconciliation. Thus, the tension between the 
official and non-official transitional justice discourses in Taiwan is not only a 
contestation of the past but, more profoundly, a contestation of the vision for the 
nation’s future. 
 
 
Keywords 
transitional justice, White Terror, post-Cold War Taiwan, memory studies, 
reconciliation, survivorhood, political enemy   
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Glossary of Acronyms  
and Abbreviations 
 
 
Acronym/Abbreviation Official Name in Chinese or English  
228 Act 228 Incident Disposition and Compensation Act 
⼆⼆八事件處理補償/ 賠償委員會 
228 Foundation 228 Memorial Foundation 
⼆⼆八紀念基⾦會 
228 IPP 228 Incident Peace Promotion  
⼆⼆八和平⽇促進會 
AAA American Anthropological Association  
 
AIT American Institute in Taiwan 
美國在台辦事處 
Article 100 Article 100 Criminal Law 
刑法⼀百條 
CCP Chinese Communist Party 
中國共產黨 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
Compensation Act Compensation Act for Wrongful Trials on 
Charges of Sedition and Espionage during the 
Martial Law Period  
戒嚴時期不當叛亂暨匪諜審判案件補償條例 
Compensation 
Foundation 
Foundation for Compensation for Improper 
Verdicts on Sedition Cases during the Martial 
Law Period  
財團法⼈戒嚴時期不當叛亂暨匪諜審判案件補償
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基⾦會 
DPP Democratic Progressive Party 
民主進步黨 
HDCP  
 
Historical Data Collected on Political Cases 
during the 1950s Martial Law Period in Taiwan  
臺灣地區戒嚴時期五〇年代政治案件史料彙編  
Huzhuhui 台灣地區政治受難⼈互助會 
ICTJ International Centre for Transitional Justice 
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia 
IGOs Intergovernmental institutions 
KMT Kou-Min-Tong  
中國國民黨 
MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group  
美軍顧問團 
MSF Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without 
Borders)  
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Persecution Victims 
Care Association 
Taiwan Association for Care of Victims of 
Political Persecution during the Martial Law 
Period 
五 O 年代⽩⾊恐怖案件平反促進會 
PTSD Post-traumatic stress disorder 
PRC People’s Republic of China 
中華⼈民共和國 
ROC Republic of China (also known as Taiwan) 
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中華民國  
ROCMA Republic of China Military Academy 
黃埔軍校 / 中華民國陸軍官校 
The Mutual Security 
Act of 1951 
The Mutual Security Act of 1951 
1951 年共同安全法 
TMO The Struggle between Memory and Oblivion: A 
report on transitional justice in Taiwan 
記憶與遺忘的鬥爭：台灣轉型正義階段報告 
TPA Taiwan Party Affairs 
台灣黨務 
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
TPECR Temporary Provisions Effective during the 
Period of Communist Rebellion 
動員戡亂時期臨時條款 
TRA Taiwan Relations Act 
台灣關係法 
TRCT Taiwan Association for Truth and Reconciliation 
台灣民間真相與和解促進會 
Treason Reporting Act 
of 1946 
懲治漢奸條例 (1946 年) 
 
TVCA Taiwanese Victims of the Martial Law Care 
Association 
台灣戒嚴時期政治受難者關懷協會 
TUT The Undelivered Testimony: A memoir of those 
who fell in the age of terror 
無法送達的遺書：記那些在恐怖年代失落的人 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
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UN United Nations 
UNAMA UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
UNHCHR UN High Commissioner for Human Rights  
USAID United States Agency for International 
Development 
USIS United States Information Service 
USRR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
 
WTVA 1950s White Terror Vindicated Association  
五○年代白色恐怖案件平反促進會 
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Note on Chinese Words and Names 
 
 
I have preserved Chinese name order throughout the thesis. Translation of 
most Chinese words and proper nouns follows the Wade-Giles system, except 
for the names of those well known in the West, such as Chiang Kai-Shek. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
 
 
Memory is not an instrument for surveying the past but its theatre. 
It is the medium of past experience, just as the earth is the 
medium in which dead cities lie buried. He who seeks to 
approach his own buried past must conduct himself like a man 
digging. 
—Walter Benjamin, Berlin Childhood around 1900 
 
 
Research questions 
Memory is always about the past. And the past can only be contemplated 
through the lens of the present. Thus, the meaning of the White Terror in 
Taiwan—a time of intense political repression under the Kuo-Min-Tong 
(hereafter, KMT) regime from 1948 to 19911—can only be unravelled in its 
aftermath. Since the end of the White Terror, Taiwan has experienced 
significant democratisation. One of the corollaries of this process is that 
survivors of the White Terror—former political prisoners—have mobilised to 
demand that the government come to terms with this shameful period in the 
nation’s history. Among other things, they have formed various associations, 
calling for social rehabilitation and compensation for their injuries. 2 
Accordingly, a Taiwanese society witnessed a gradually increasing demand 
for transitional justice. 
On a practical level, the term ‘transitional justice’ refers to a range of 
measures—judicial and non-judicial—that may be implemented to deal with 
                                                
1 Ongoing debate over the timeframe of the White Terror continues in Taiwan to this day. As 
some would have it, the White Terror began when the ROC government officially relocated 
to Taiwan in 1949 and ended with the annulment of martial law in 1987. I have chosen in my 
research to define the duration of the White Terror as the statutory period during which the 
Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of National Mobilisation for the Suppression of the 
Communist Rebellion, were in force: for 43 years, from 1948 to 1991. See further discussion in 
this chapter. 
2 Various associations were formed at various times by different factions of survivors. See 
discussion in chapter 5. 
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the legacy of large-scale human rights abuses committed in a previous 
political setting. (Roht-Arriaza et al. 2006; Stan 2009; Teitel 2000). As set forth 
by the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), these measures 
may include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations 
programmes, and various kinds of institutional reforms. 3  The aim of 
transitional justice, as explained by the ICTJ, is to redress the past human 
rights violations and prevent further rights violations. Thus, transitional 
justice not only creates accountability for past atrocities but seeks to heal and 
stabilise the nation going forward. 
From a perspective of global politics, the demand for transitional 
justice in Taiwan can be viewed as part of a global wave of transitional 
justice in post-conflict societies. As Teitel (2000) observes, in recent decades, 
societies throughout Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa have 
overthrown military dictatorships and totalitarian regimes for freedom and 
democracy. In the course of these democratic transitions, efforts to redress a 
repressive past and provide credibility for a newly democratic government 
have proved challenging. Amongst the emerging democracies, Taiwan’s path 
was not typical, however, as it achieved democratisation without removing 
the KMT regime. Although the Republic of China (ROC) officially entered 
into its phase of political change in 1991, the KMT was able to prevail in the 
first democratic elections, held in 1996, and so continued to hold power until 
the 2000 election, when it lost to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). 
Accordingly, the former perpetrator of abuse and repression, the KMT, was 
the same regime that initiated Taiwan’s scheme of transitional justice. In 1998, 
the KMT government enacted the Act on Compensation for Wrongful Trials 
on Charges of Sedition and Espionage during Martial Law Period (in Chinese, 
戒嚴時期不當叛亂暨匪諜審判補償條例, hereafter, Compensation Act) as the 
ever first institutional arrangement for accounting  for the White Terror. 
Given the Act, the term ‘wrongful trials’ refers to former defendants, i.e., 
former political criminals, who had not been involved communists or any 
stance of anti-KMT regime, yet accused of treason during the White Terror. 
At this point, the Compensation Act defines the term ‘political victim’ as 
                                                
3  See the introduction to transitional justice on the official web site of ICTJ: 
https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice 
 16	
former political criminals who had been wrongfully accused. The definition 
thus raises a question: will a former defendant be recognised as ‘political 
victim’ if he or she, in effect, had involved the conspiracy of anti-government 
and insurgence during the White Terror? In this awkward and paradoxical 
situation, there was inevitable tension between the regime and the survivors 
of the White Terror; in particular, the extent to which the formerly abused 
individuals could be vindicated in the scheme of transitional justice was 
problematic. 
A critique of transitional justice scheme is Taiwan therefore forms a 
compelling approach in discerning the contestation of the past in the current 
political condition. Issues of the extent to which both past political vestiges 
and current political needs of the powerful come to limit or broaden the 
potential of revisiting past political wounds of one society shall be examined 
with the approach. To anchor the research, the following questions are raised: 
 
1. To what extent have the political conditions described above 
constrained the implementation of transitional justice, including 
such aspects as vindication and compensation?  
2. How did the KMT regime develop the official transitional justice 
discourse in Taiwan? Also, how do the current Taiwanese 
authorities reconcile the White Terror?  
3. As Teitel (2000) and many other scholars argue (De Brito et al. 2001; 
Huyssen 2011; Lambourne 2009), transitional justice in the post-
Cold War period aims at achieving reconciliation. How does this 
reconciliation proceed in Taiwan where the scheme was initiated 
by the former perpetrators?  
4. How do the survivors consider the White Terror and why? That is 
to say, what are the non-official transitional justice discourses in 
Taiwan?  
5. What versions of the past continue to be silenced in the scheme of 
transitional justice? To put it plainly, why is there no mention of 
political dissidence in the scheme of transitional justice?  
6. What do the shifting roles of political victim and political dissident 
have to show us about the meaning of survivorhood? 
 17	
 
Starting from these questions, this thesis aims to examine how those afflicted 
by the conflict view transitional justice in the context of peacebuilding after 
mass violence. By exploring the official and non-official transitional justice 
discourses, this thesis not only studies the discrepancy amongst different 
discourses in current Taiwan but, more profoundly, examines the tension 
among the varying viewpoints of the past maintained by the authorities and 
individual survivors. Here, I would like to clarify two points: First, I do not 
propose to show an explicit contradiction or opposition between different 
transitional justice discourses. To the contrary, I aim to explore potential 
tensions that may indicate discrepancies, inconsistencies, or contradictions 
among them. That is to say, while I acknowledge the possibility of conflict 
existing, I am staying open to all possibilities before developing my 
arguments. Second, I would like to emphasise that the survivors’ viewpoints 
are the most important part of my research. By exploring their complicated 
perspectives on the past, I not only analyse how the meaning of the past is 
shaped by current political conditions but, even more intriguing, I explore 
how my interviewees have developed their interpretations of survivorhood. 
The way in which they conceive their lives at present, and how they position 
themselves in the scheme of transitional justice, reflects not only their 
response to the past but also their reaction to the current programme of 
transitional justice and their experiences in the wake of mass violence. Hence, 
it is a study of making the past in the present. Also, it is a study of the 
tension among different viewpoints of the White Terror in Taiwan unravels 
how different discourses, especially the official and non-official ones come to 
cooperate or compete over the power of defining the White Terror.  
 
 
The architecture of the research 
The structure of the thesis reflects the main phases and tension in the 
progress of Taiwan’s transitional justice scheme since the 1990s. The 
following section of this chapter discusses Taiwan in the Cold War era and 
the afterwards with an interpretive approach, emphasizing the salience of US 
dominance in defining the image of primary political enemy and the identity 
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of political victim during Taiwan’s political transition. Under the US political 
protection in the Cold War era, the KMT regime secured its authority by 
targeting socialists as the main enemy of the KMT-US alliance in Taiwan. The 
advent of the post-Cold War did not come with an embracement of socialist, 
yet with an overwhelmingly victory of US and the Western allies. The extent 
to which would transitional justice scheme break through the political legacy 
of the Cold War era, recognizing socialist as political victim needs further 
elaboration. The articulation shall fundamentally envisage how the global 
wave of transitional justice of the post-Cold War fashions Taiwan’s scheme 
of transitional justice is conditionally in a more of political and conditional 
situation.  
Chapter 2 focuses on theoretical framework and methodology, 
especially the details of my fieldwork with the survivors of the White Terror 
in Taiwan, including ethical issue. Hitherto transitional justice has been 
widely recognised as an approach in recounting past wrongdoings and 
securing a peaceful future. The approach thus inevitably touches on the 
tension of different versions of the past, referring to who were the 
perpetrators, who were the persecuted ones, the context of the persecution 
and so forth. By drawing attention to the tension or differences between the 
official and the survivors’ discourses, suffice to say that the main theoretical 
attention draws to the politics of memory. That is, a study on transitional 
justice scheme is about how memory is emerged, grounded and then widely 
accepted in the power relations of one society. A Foucauldian approach on 
the politics of memory shall be elaborated and developed for the following 
analysis of the research. 
 Chapter 3, 4 and 5 form the central analysis of the research. Chapter 3 
addresses Taiwan’s official remorse of the White Terror in a chronological 
order from the late 1980s to 2016. As described in previous, Taiwan’s 
transitional justice scheme was initiated without an alternation of the 
government. The logic and development of Taiwan’s official transitional 
justice discourse is therefore substantial in examining the potential limit and 
challenge to the scheme and the objective of reconciliation between the 
formerly opposing sides under the KMT regime.   
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With person-centred approach, chapter 4 and 5 focus on how the 
survivors of the White Terror situate their own past, especially with respect 
to the episodes that would have been excised from the official narrative. 
Chapter 4 studies the survivors’ memories by focusing on the hidden context 
of silence. By rejecting the stance of silence as a passive outcome, survivors’ 
silence on their own past is seen as an ongoing political practice in response 
to the developing transitional justice scheme. The emotions of trauma and 
shame at the heart of survivors’ silence at this point reflect how they define 
their past and their current lives. In the era of reconciliation and victimhood 
recognition, survivors’ emotions assist in examining, in effect, what kind of 
past is haunting themselves or remains to be excluded from Taiwan’s 
transitional justice scheme.  
Chapter 5 turns to focus on survivors’ way of engaging in the official 
discourse in striving for a space of utterance, and keeping developing their 
competing discourses in current Taiwan. The White Terror in Taiwan was a 
time of severe political oppression onto socialists under the KMT regime 
with respect to the global confrontation of the Cold War era. Survivors in this 
regard exist as the living evidence of the past conflict and atrocities. By 
studying survivors’ engagement of Taiwan’s transitional justice scheme both 
at individual and collective levels, the approach sheds light on the tension of 
defining the past and picturing of a certain future between the official and 
their competing discourses.  
The last part, conclusive chapter, focuses on bringing theory and 
analysis back to a more of solid order. Survivors of the White Terror are of 
the most salience in this research. Through a close-up study on these 
individuals with respect to Taiwan’s transioanl justice scheme, a critique of 
the how memory locates and develops in a certain way in the face of the 
tension of different transitional justice discourses shall be spelled out. 
Memory has power, and survivors’ words are weapons. If the post-Cold War 
refers to a peaceful political life, this research seeks to explore to what extent 
have the survivors been guaranteed a secure and democratic future by 
Taiwan’s transitional justice scheme after the prolonged violent conflict, 
overcoming chasms of hatred and voicing out their true voices.    
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The rise of the Cold War and its operation in Taiwan 
Let us back to the 1940s. Just prior to the end of the Second World War, the 
Allied powers convened a follow-up conference to Yalta, the Potsdam 
Conference, from 17 July to 2 August 1945, primarily to redraw the borders 
of Europe but also to demand the surrender of Japan. From this meeting 
emerged the Potsdam Declaration,4 which effectively released Taiwan from 
five decades of Japanese colonial rule and restored it to China. At first, 
people in Taiwan welcomed the retrocession and the rule of China’s 
nationalist KMT regime with open arms.5 However, peace was not to be. On 
the mainland, a protracted ideological conflict between the KMT-led central 
government of the Republic of China (ROC) and the forces of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) had existed since the 1920s,6 leading to civil war 
from 1927 to 1937.7 Confronted with a Japanese invasion in 1937, the two 
factions had declared a ceasefire and unified in a coalition against Japan, as 
China officially became a participant in the Second World War in East Asia.8 
Once Japan surrendered, however, the conflict between the ROC and CCP re-
emerged and intensified. The civil war resumed in 1946, and nationalist KMT 
forces began using Taiwan as a defence base.  
Intent on suppressing the growing presence of Chinese communists in 
Taiwan, the KMT administration in 1946 promulgated Article 100 of Criminal 
                                                
4 The final document of the Potsdam Conference, entitled Proclamation Defining Terms for 
Japanese Surrender, issued on 26 July 1945 by President Truman (US), Prime Minister 
Churchill (UK), and Chairman Chiang Kai-Shek (China).  
5 As part of Taiwan’s retrocession after the end of the Second World War, the KMT sent its 
political elite to establish a temporary local government, named ‘The Governing Council’, on 
1 September 1945, which lasted until 22 April 1947.  
6 After the October Uprising in Russia of 1917, the wave of socialism spread from Russia to 
Eastern Europe and China. As the Russian Civil War resulted in the creation of the Soviet 
Union, the Chinese Communist Party was also founded in China, with Soviet Union support, 
in 1921. In addition, the CCP passed a resolution to join International Communism, guided 
by the Soviet Union, in July 1922. The CCP, in this sense, undoubtedly became a threat to the 
KMT. 
7 When the founder of the KMT, Sun Yat-Sen, died in 1925, the tension between the KMT and 
the CCP greatly increased, leading to the outbreak of the first civil war in 1927. To cope with 
the exigencies of Japanese invasion, the civil war was suspended in 1937 through the 
formation of a temporary coalition between the opposing sides. 
8 Generally speaking, the Pacific War was mainly fought between Japan and the US between 
1941 and 1945, following the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1940. From the 
viewpoint of China, however, the Pacific War began with the invasion of Japan in 1937.  
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Law in Chinese: 刑法 100條） and the Treason Reporting Act of 1946 （in 
Chinese: 懲治漢奸條例 ）. According to Article 100, citizens who were found 
to be attempting to subvert the government would be charged with treason 
and subject to imprisonment for a term of seven years to life. Meanwhile, the 
Treason Reporting Act required citizens to report potential political threats 
observed in their community. As a result, the whole of Taiwanese society 
became preoccupied with the search for potential traitors, especially 
communists. Thus, Taiwan not only became a base for armed KMT troops 
fighting communism on the mainland but its rulers were also at the front line 
of resistance against communists within the society. Anti-communism 
therefore emerged as a dominant feature of the political situation there. 
Taiwan’s citizens were disappointed to be dragged once more into 
war, and widespread corruption among the KMT administrators aroused 
profound resentment, especially as the civil war was damaging the local 
economy. This increasing resentment culminated in February 1947 in the 
anti-government uprising known as the 228 Incident.9 Between 28 February 
and 4 March, the uprising spread from Taipei along the west coast to Tai-
chung, Chia-yi, and Kaoshiung10 and was violently suppressed by KMT 
troops. Thousands of people were killed or went missing. 11  The two 
legislative enactments described above, and the aftermath of the 228 Incident, 
thus marked the dawn of the KMT’s brutal oppression, which sowed the 
seeds of resistance, especially the political cause of pro-independence among 
the Taiwanese (Fleischauer 2007). As a result, the 228 Incident was later 
known as the very first massive political oppression under the KMT regime 
                                                
9 On 27 February 1947, the arrest of a Taipei cigarette vendor by an officer of the Tobacco 
Monopoly Bureau gave rise to a violent clash in which a bystander was shot and killed by 
the officer. This incident triggered several days of civil unrest, beginning the next day (28 
February, hence ‘2-28’), spreading from Taipei towards southern Taiwan, mainly in the cities 
and towns. At the beginning of March, KMT troops marched into Taipei from Keelung in the 
north. Thousands were publicly executed, while scores of others went missing.  
10 Confined by its geographical location, the west coast of Taiwan has enjoyed the majority of 
development since Japanese rule. In this sense, the cities of Tai-chung, Chia-yi and 
Kaoshiung are the major metropolitan areas on the west coast, where the uprising was at its 
strongest. 
11 The precise number of casualties of the 228 Incident remains disputed to this day.  
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in Taiwan, and was later known as the very first incident deserved to be 
remembered in Taiwan’s transitional justice scheme.12  
As the KMT lost ground in the civil war on the mainland, it attached 
increasing importance to Taiwan as a stronghold. Having begun its 
campaign of brutal oppression in 1947, the KMT promulgated Temporary 
Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion (hereafter, TPECR; 
in Chinese, 動員戡亂時期臨時條款) for Taiwan on 10 May 1948, reflecting 
Chiang Kai-Shek’s intention to drive out the communists once and for all. 
Operating essentially as a foreign dictatorship with an urgent desire to 
consolidate control over Taiwan, the KMT, under the leadership of Chiang 
Kai-Shek and his son, Chiang Ching-Kuo, imposed martial law on 19 May 
1949. Seven months later, the Chiangs and their supporters fled the ruins of 
mainland China, relocating the ROC government to Taiwan in December 
1949. This historic withdrawal left Taiwan in the grip of the KMT for nearly 
four decades, until the annulment of martial law in 1987, which is now seen 
as the starting point for democratisation in Taiwan. During the second 
longest period of martial law in the history of the world, Taiwan remained 
under KMT control as the ROC maintained its opposition to the so-called 
‘red force’13—the Chinese Communists—and, on that pretext, perpetrated 
systematic atrocities against the Taiwanese people. 
 
US-KMT relations in the early 1950s 
In the late 1940s, the political conditions outlined above were making it 
difficult for the KMT to govern Taiwan comprehensively. The KMT feared 
losing Taiwan as its last remaining territory. Accordingly, the regime 
counted on support from the US as the only competent authority that could 
restrain the Sino-Soviet bloc in East Asia. However, a secret report prepared 
by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1949 and declassified in 1978 
shows that the US administration hesitated. Perceptions of the inept 
governance and corruption of Chiang Kai-Shek’s government resulted in 
military inaction on the part of US military authorities, even when the CCP 
                                                
12 See further discussion in chapter 3. 
13 Taiwan’s martial law period, for many years the world’s longest, was subsequently 
surpassed by that of Syria (1963 to 2011). 
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claimed victory over the KMT in October 1949.14 Nonetheless, CIA reports 
from 1949 and 1950 indicate that the US authorities were keeping the 
situation in East Asia under close observation and had an agenda for Taiwan: 
‘We must conceal our wish to separate the island from mainland control’, 
declared Secretary of State Acheson in private.15 The US thus assumed the 
position of ‘a silent but sober lion’ towards the thorny political situation in 
Taiwan (Roy 2003). 
Meanwhile, the US continued to attempt to normalise relations with 
the Chinese Communists until February 1950 when China—that is, the 
People’s Republic of China (hereafter, PRC)—and the Soviet Union signed 
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance to resist 
the US alliance. Once Mao had made it clear that China was aligned with the 
Soviet Union, US President Truman was willing to set aside his mistrust of 
Chiang Kai-Shek and his cronies and consider military intervention in order 
to contain the Sino-Soviet influence in Pacific Asia. 
The outbreak in 1950 of the Korean War dramatically altered the 
KMT’s status in Taiwan. As Wallerstein (2010) puts it, the Korean War made 
the Cold War ‘hot’ in Asia. Confronted with this prospect, Truman 
immediately dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to forestall 
any military action on the part of the communists. Truman announced that 
‘the neutralisation of the Straits of Formosa (Taiwan)’ was in the best 
interests of the US. For the time being, although mistrust persisted between 
Chiang Kai-Shek and Truman, the US authorities would effectively shore up 
the KMT regime’s governance of Taiwan. The global confrontation thus 
secured the KMT authority in Taiwan. 
 
                                                
14 For instance, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson states in a personal memo: ‘Mr. Little 
expressed his opinion that we were taking the worst of both possible courses by continuing 
to support Chiang Kai-shek, diplomatically and economically’ (1950.02.17). After the 
outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, similar notes were discovered. Also, the CIA 
(1949) Probable Developments in Taiwan contains similar comments regarding the KMT in 
Taiwan. A detailed discussion can be found in D. Roy (2003), Taiwan: A Political History. 
Cornell University Press. 
15 Dean. G. Acheson (17th February 1950) 66-5_38. The documentation can be found on the 
Truman Library and Museum’s official web site: 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/acheson.htm. Acheson served as Secretary of 
State from 1949 to 1953. 
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Security of the KMT regime under the changing politics  
An exhaustive historical review of how the KMT regime was sustained in 
Taiwan by the US during the Cold War lies outside the scope of this paper. 
However, the extent to which the US was responsible for maintaining the 
KMT regime for years as the sole legitimate representative of the Republic of 
China at the United Nations, and for its replacement by the PRC in the 1970s, 
bears examination.  
The Cold War in East Asia was a time of changing geopolitics among 
the PRC, the ROC, and the US. The US enacted the Mutual Security Act in 
October 1951, committing to provide Taiwan with various types of assistance, 
both military and economic.16 The protection and support of the US in turn 
bolstered the KMT regime politically and economically. Taiwan became one 
of the most attractive developing countries in East Asia. Meanwhile, the PRC 
struggled in protracted ideological debates with the Soviet Union17 until a 
1969 crisis in the Sino-Soviet bloc transformed the geopolitics of East Asia 
from a standoff between two superpowers into a triangular tension between 
the PRC, the USSR, and the US.18 This shift made it advantageous for the US 
to establish better relations with the PRC. 
This dramatic shift gave rise to a siege mentality on the part of the 
ROC. The first blow it suffered was when the UN, while continuing to 
acknowledge China as a founding member of the world organisation and a 
Permanent Member of the Security Council, denied the authority of the ROC 
                                                
16 When the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty came into force in 1954, Taiwan became an 
official ally of the US in the Cold War framework, enabling it not only to purchase military 
equipment and weapons but also to receive technical guidance. For instance, by establishing 
the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), the USAID programme introduced 
training courses for conventional armed forces in Taiwan. In terms of the economy, the US 
funded the Military Construction Commission of the Ministry of National Defence (MCC) to 
cover most of the items envisaged by the USAID programme, from military assistance and 
development to economic reform. From 1951 to 1954, the US allocated some $7.5 billion 
worth of assistance among 55 allied countries; $400 millions of this went to Taiwan. See H.H. 
Chou (Ed.) (1995). Documentary Collection on US Aid to ROC, 1948-1965 (Vol. I). Academia 
Historica, ROC. 
17 The ideological conflicts were partly due to the PRC’s tendency to consider the USSR as 
standing for imperialism rather than socialism, as the USSR demanded that the PRC accept 
its leadership in the Sino-Soviet alliance. Such issues led to Sino-Soviet border conflicts in 
1969. For further discussion, please see L. M. Lüthi, (2010). The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in 
the Communist World. Princeton University Press. 
18 The two most important border conflicts between the PRC and Soviet Union were the 
Zhenbao Island and Tielieketi Incidents. Due to these conflicts, border demarcation began in 
1969, continuing into the 1990s, until a final agreement was signed by the PRC and Russia on 
14 October 2004.  
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to represent China. In February 1971, US President Richard Nixon proposed 
the idea of two Chinas, with the hope of allowing the ROC to retain its seat at 
the UN while allowing the PRC to obtain its own. US Under-Secretary of 
State Robert Murphy was sent to Taiwan to persuade Chiang to accept this 
solution so that the ROC could retain its seat in the global body.19 But Chiang 
rejected the proposal. Despite the US’s intention that bringing the PRC into 
the world organisation would not come about at the ROC’s expense, the UN 
General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758 on 25 October 1971, recognising 
the PRC as the only lawful representative of China and expelling the ROC. 
Thus, the PRC was authorised to take over the ROC's UN membership.20 
The situation worsened for the KMT when the US yielded to the 
PRC’s demand to be recognised as the sole legitimate representative of China. 
The US officially broke off diplomatic relations with the ROC in Taiwan on 1 
January 1979, commencing relations with the PRC on the same day. 
Despite the diplomatic policy shift and the ROC’s loss of legitimacy, 
the US maintained its support for the ROC. In March 1979, the US Congress 
passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which entered into force on 10 April 
1979.21 Under the TRA, although the ROC no longer enjoys official diplomatic 
relations with the US, economic and cultural ties, and the supply of military 
equipment, remain in place. Relations of the two political units have 
remained constant ever since. The changing politics of the Cold War 
continued to secure the KMT authority in Taiwan. 
 
 
Problematising the Cold War standoff 
The Cold War, as an intense rivalry between the post-war allies of the US and 
Soviet Union respectively, seemed to be synonymous with the polarity 
between capitalism and communism. That is, it was a time of military 
competition and ideological conflict. However, from a post-structuralism 
perspective, Campbell (1992) invites us to rethink the Cold War. Regarding 
                                                
19 http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/print/2007/11/01/2003385749 
20 https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf 
21 A complete version of the Articles can be found at: http://www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-
relations-act.html.  
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the US’s identification of a threat posed by the Soviet Union, he claims that 
this threat was not an objective condition but, rather, relied on its interpretive 
basis. Interpretation, Campbell explains, is the way in which particular 
modes of representation crystallise around referents that are marked as 
dangers (ibid.: 1–15). Nothing is intrinsically dangerous to one political 
community. In this regard, US foreign policy during the Cold War served to 
demonstrate how the US differentiated the Soviets as ‘alien others’ that 
imperilled the American identity. The socialist nations of Eastern Europe did 
not constitute threats by their very nature, but emerged as such due to the 
process of differentiation that played down or stigmatised them from an 
ideological or national security perspective in order to consolidate the 
national identity and social order of the US. 
Arguably, the Cold War was not exceptional, since the interpretive 
process of consolidating a political community’s identity takes place 
continually with respect to such issues as gender, public health, or ethnicity. 
Hence, while we assume that the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, 
Campbell argues that, despite the collapse of communism and the fact that 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union removed it as a ‘plausible candidate for 
enmity’, the ‘entailments of identity’ that it served remained unchanged 
(ibid.: 195; Hurst 2005: 144). To reproduce and secure the American identity, 
the US is inclined to seek to produce further hostility, because the rivalry of 
international politics is indispensable for strengthening its national identity.  
Suffice to say, Campbell rejects the assertion that the Cold War was 
based on the objective character of the Soviet Union. He infers his 
interpretive approach from reviewing how the US has defined its ‘security’ 
since the nineteenth century by ‘reproducing’ threats to evoke and 
consolidate so-called American values or American identity. That is, to 
Campbell, the political situation does not come about all of a sudden. Even 
though the building of the American empire had been underpinned by the 
economy of slavery, it was a nation that insisted on ascribing the 
characteristics of repression and exploitation to the Soviet Union. By the 
same token, as Campbell emphasises, the flashpoint was not the Soviet 
Union, but antipathy towards communism, whose existence predates and 
exceeds the existence of the former (1992: 159). For that matter, the antipathy 
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towards communism was not based on its objective character being 
inherently harmful to society. Rather, communism was interpreted as 
‘harmful’ in order to secure the private ownership of property, that is, the 
private enterprise economy under capitalism and its social order (Campbell 
1992).  
Thus, the ROC under KMT direction was recognised during the Cold 
War period as a paradigm for US allies in respect of culture, economy, and 
politics. This not only promoted the formation of a cultural framework for 
consolidating American security in Taiwan. It also, in effect, enabled the 
prolonged political atrocities carried out by the KMT with the acquiescence 
of the US authorities. Campbell’s interpretive approach explains how the 
Soviet Union came to occupy the position of ‘primary threat’ to the US and 
its allies, including the ROC, during the Cold War. It also shows how the 
Soviet Union was deprecated in accordance with the development of the 
American identity. From Campbell’s perspective, how should we understand 
the meaning of the Cold War in Taiwan? Or, to frame it in his terms, how did 
the KMT government construct and reconstruct its security to satisfy the 
political needs of the US during the Cold War? 
First of all, the process of defining national security and identity in 
Taiwan had an objective basis in respect of the military threat from the Sino-
Soviet bloc. As historically articulated, the outbreak of the Korean War and 
the existence of the Sino-Soviet bloc placed the ROC in dire peril. The historic 
juncture at which the KMT in Taiwan was taken under the protection of the 
US may be seen as a process of reinforcing American identity but a more 
powerful reason was provided by the strength of the military threat posed by 
the Sino-Soviet alliance.  
To adopt a geopolitical perspective, the Cold War in Taiwan was not 
merely associated with the ideological competition between communism and 
capitalism, or the consolidation of American identity. It was more a function 
of the military conflict between the US and its allies and the Sino-Soviet bloc, 
as the emergence of this conflict was the juncture at which the ROC was 
recruited as part of the front line for US allies in East Asia. However, for the 
KMT, the Cold War was a political situation that enabled it to retain control 
of Taiwan. Accordingly, during the Cold War, any political cause in Taiwan 
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that was defined and interpreted as a ‘threat’ by the KMT was designated as 
undesirable. Threats to the KMT overlapped to some extent with threats to 
the US; some threats to the KMT potentially contradicted the American 
identity, whereas others did not. In Taiwan, the Cold War was a time of 
evolution for both the American and the ROC identities, although the two 
might contradict one another at times. 
Consider the independence movement in Taiwan during the Cold 
War. To the KMT regime, the focal point of this movement was to reject the 
assumption that Taiwan was part of China, regardless of whether China was 
ruled by the PRC or ROC. Unlike left-wing pro-unification advocates, the 
pro-independence cause did not violate the so-called American identity from 
a US perspective, because its supporters did not embrace socialism but 
shared more common viewpoints with capitalist democracy. During the 
immediate post-war period, the CIA (Moody 1977) even prepared papers on 
the possibility of Taiwan independence being beneficial to US interests. But 
once the Cold War was under way, any political cause in Taiwan that 
opposed the KMT would be labelled as a threat to those interests—even one 
that potentially replicated the American identity. While there was a tension 
between the two identities, it did not affect relations between the US and the 
KMT in Taiwan. After all, it was US support that underpinned the KMT’s 
authority. Suffice to say, during the Cold War period, the alliance was 
designed not only to satisfy the need of the US to reproduce a national 
identity and social order but also to serve the KMT’s need to eliminate any 
potential political threat to its authority. 
Hence, US-ROC relations during the Cold War were defined primarily 
by the way in which the two political communities sought to develop and 
manage mutually-beneficial diplomatic relations. In that context, the 
significance of the Cold War was less about securing a specific political 
identity, and more about reinforcing the KMT’s authority, which gave a 
unique significance to the Cold War in Taiwan. At the national security level, 
the Cold War hinged on the brinksmanship practiced by the PRC and the 
ROC, and the confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. At the 
cultural level, this manifested as a project of developing and promoting 
American identity. The period was also defined by the ROC’s insistence on 
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being seen by the world as the only spokesman for the one true China. Thus, 
the Cold War in Taiwan was a state of political tension and political and 
cultural establishment. 
Accordingly, the Cold War was framed in Taiwan as a prolonged 
political conflict, not simply an ideological clash and a drive to wipe out the 
forces of communism. It was more about eliminating any political threat, 
regardless of ideology, to the KMT regime. Involvement in the ideological 
conflict between the US and Soviet Union was not the only factor sparking 
the prolonged conflict in Taiwan. The KMT’s determination to consolidate its 
control over Taiwan broadened the range of political actors that were 
considered threats. While the Chinese communists posed the primary 
political threat to the KMT, the latter viewed pro-independence socialists and 
centre-left agitators as equally inimical to its rule. Reviewing the political 
verdicts under the KMT regime in Taiwan, one finds that, while most of the 
convictions during the late 1940s and early 1950s were associated with 
Chinese communism, the political criminals of the 1960s and 1970s were 
more diverse, as some were socialists who favoured independence, others 
were pro-independence but rejected socialism, and some were simply anti-
KMT without adhering to a specific political ideology. Arguably, the Chinese 
communists in Taiwan bore the brunt of KMT oppression during the 
beginning of the Cold War but they were all but eliminated by 1955.22 By the 
late 1950s, the cause of independence had become the KMT’s primary 
political enemy of the KMT. Out of a total of 16,132 individuals convicted of 
political crimes in the 1950s, 9478, that is, 58% were convicted of treason in 
the 1950s. Of that number, more than half were identified as Chinese 
communists; the rest were mainly pro-independence socialists and KMT 
soldiers and officers charged with treason or desertion. Through the 1960s, 
independence was the single most prevalent cause espoused by those 
labelled as political criminals.23 The diversity of ideologies posing political 
threats complicated the picture of the KMT’s battle against political enemies, 
                                                
22 See further information in  人權之路小組 (2008)《人權之路 2008 年新版》頁 64。台北: 陳文
成基金會.  
23  人權之路小組 (2008)《人權之路 2008 年新版》頁 70-71。台北: 陳文成基金會. 
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as the KMT’s desire to secure its authority at all costs and against all comers 
formed the basis of the White Terror.  
Thus, the KMT dictatorship did not approach the governance of 
Taiwan purely from an ideological perspective, as it terrorised socialists and 
communists indiscriminately during the 1950s. The need to beat back all 
challenges took precedence over the goal of cooperation with the US or the 
battle against Chinese communists. It was a campaign of all-pervasive 
governance that precluded threats from all possible sources, including 
socialism, the cause of independence, and any other anti-KMT factions.  
 
 
Transitional justice in the post-Cold War Era  
The post-Cold War is generally known as an era of post-conflict. Transitional 
justice then becomes the vital approach to pursue democracy and peace 
inside transitional countries. ‘Transitional justice’ is a broad term. Legal 
scholars use it to refer to a conception of justice which, during periods of 
political change, is characterised by legal responses to the wrongdoings of 
repressive predecessor regimes (Teitel 2003: 69). To Roht-Arriaza, transitional 
justice is a ‘set of practices, mechanisms and concerns that arise following a 
period of conflict, civil strife or repression, and that are aimed directly at 
confronting and dealing with past violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law’ (2006: 2). Despite variations of approach, it is sufficient to 
suggest that transitional justice refers to a set of institutional arrangements in 
post-conflict societies that are devised to remedy the effects of past 
repression, conflicts, or wars. Law plays an important role in transitional 
justice, whether the focus is on reconciliation and compensation (restorative 
justice) or accountability and punishment (retributive justice).,Unlike 
traditional retributive justice, which seeks to impose punishment that is 
proportionate to the wrongfulness of the act committed, restorative justice 
emphasises redressing the harm caused by criminal behaviour and tends to 
come about through cooperative processes that include all stakeholders. 24 The 
                                                
24 According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015), not all wrongdoing justifies a 
punitive response; the dimension of morality, the legal system, and the conditions and 
outcome of the wrongdoing must all be taken into account. However, this is a topic that lies 
outside the scope of this research. Suffice to say, at a practical level, the two types of justice 
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latter approach lends itself to reconciliation between the perpetrators of 
persecution and their victims.25 Either way, according to the UN’s definition 
in What is Transitional Justice? A Backgrounder: 
 
Transitional justice is an approach to systematic or massive 
violations of human rights that both provides redress to victims 
and creates or enhances opportunities for the transformation of 
the political systems, conflicts, and other conditions that may 
have been at the root of the abuses. A transitional justice 
approach thus recognizes that there are two goals in dealing 
with a legacy of systematic or massive abuse. The first is to gain 
some level of justice for victims. The second is to reinforce the 
possibilities for peace, democracy, and reconciliation. To 
achieve these two ends, transitional justice measures often 
combine elements of criminal, restorative, and social justice 
(2008: 1).26 
 
In addition, according to the UN Secretary General’s 2004 Report on the Rule 
of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, transitional 
justice is, in practical terms, an endeavour that ‘may include both judicial and 
non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement 
(or none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, 
institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof’. As 
employed in this thesis, the term ‘transitional justice’ refers to steps taken by 
a transitional democracy to redress past human rights violations when faced 
with an express need to consolidate its authority.  
To capture how the transitional justice discourse became Western-
centric during the post-Cold War era, it must be traced back to its origins in 
the tribunals that took place immediately after World War II. Teitel (2000; 
                                                                                                                                     
reflect the two main missions of contemporary transitional justice: punishing the 
wrongdoers and providing solace for those injured.  
25 See http://restorativejustice.org/. 
26  See full article online at: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/justice_times_tran 
sition/26_02_2008_background_note.pdf.  
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2003) recalls that in this phase—of which the most widely recognised 
symbols are the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals run by the 
Allied Forces—retributive justice was the primary medium by which the 
desire for justice was actualised. It was only recently—since the 1980s, that 
the concept of justice was expanded to include ‘forgiveness and 
reconciliation’.  
 
Transitional justice is itself political  
Arguably, transitional justice is not only a legal process, but also a political 
one. Not only because it typically deals with political issues but, more 
essentially, because it is often undertaken in specific political situation. When 
the WWII war crimes trials were carried out under the aegis of international 
law, they derived their legitimacy from a particular transnational political 
alliance—the Allied forces—that provided the political basis for holding 
them (Teitel 2003: 70). The post-war punitive legal process was thus ‘victors’ 
justice’. However, the subsequent rivalry between the US and the Soviet 
Union obstructed the further application of transnational justice, as both 
sides focused on securing their political boundaries and consolidating their 
own interests. As a consequence, not every member of the Waffen-SS faced 
prosecution for the actions of his Nazi past (Plesch 2015). In fact, during the 
first two decades of the post-war period, more than half of the employees of 
the Ministry of the Interior of the Federal Republic of [West] Germany were 
former Nazis.27  
This political fact echoes Campbell’s argument (1992). As shown, the 
US continued to ground its diplomatic policies during the Cold War period 
in a connection between the ideal of democracy and its national identity. 
Securing West Germany, in which some Nazis were integrated, was part of 
the projection of a united front to withstand the Soviet bloc. 
Politics continued to have an impact on the conduct of transnational 
justice in the post-Cold War period. However, it was the global political 
situation during that period that largely dictated nations’ various responses 
to their repressive legacies. It was the ideological triumph claimed by the 
                                                
27  For further information, see: http://www.dw.com/en/the-nazi-legacy-of-the-german-
interior-ministry/a-18829144 
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West in the late 1980s that encouraged Eastern European countries to adopt 
lustration laws to impose accountability for objectionable aspects of their 
communist past and prevent their recurrence (Stan 2009: 247–270).28 The 
desire to unravel the truth of past atrocities, many of which were committed 
in secret, was another feature of the fall of the socialist regimes. That is to say, 
global political conditions encouraged the projection of transitional justice in 
the post-socialist nations. 
South Africa’s celebrated Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 
which operated from 1995 to 2002, offers telling evidence of the political 
nature of transitional justice. Through the institutionalised arrangement of 
the TRC, South Africa prioritised the need to reconcile the nation. It was a 
model that was followed in dozens of countries; thus, during this period, 
traditional justice was often waived in favour of peace and reconciliation 
(Teitel 2003: 73–83). As Nancy Scheper-Hughes characterises this approach: 
 
Those seeking truth in South Africa today do not want the 
partial indeterminate, sifting truths of the postmodern… 
Instead, they desire the single, sweet, ‘objective’ truth of the 
moralist and, with it, a restored sense of wholeness and a taste 
of justice. Yet [quoting South African freedom fighter and 
Constitutional Court judge Albie Sachs] …South Africans are 
willing to settle for an agreed-upon, a ‘good enough’ truth 
(1998: 127). 
 
                                                
28 Stan (2009) observes that lustration laws became the primary way for these countries to 
address the atrocities of their former communist regimes, especially with respect to the role 
of intelligence and state security forces, such as the secret police and other domestic 
repression branches. However, she remarks that the extent to which such laws were 
implemented depended upon how these countries shaped their transitions. For instance, 
Hungary and Bulgaria took the lead in making a transformation to democracy. The 
lustration law, aimed at preventing resurgence of past repression, failed to disclose its 
details. Stan adds that the enactment of such laws in the Baltic states may be the exception 
rather than the rule, as these states were the only ones to screen their post-communist 
political class for ties with the former communist intelligence services, whereas the other 
independent republics either did not consider lustration seriously or their parliaments failed 
to endorse it (Ibid.: 254–255).  
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Although South Africa’s TRC was not entirely unprecedented,29 its innovation 
cannot be underestimated. The call for justice reached from the illumination 
of individual cases to reconstructing a picture of the past that was accepted 
by the former victims, perpetrators, and perhaps the whole of society. It was 
not only about uncovering and denouncing past actions, but also about 
shaping an acceptable version of the past. As Sachs maintains, an agreed-
upon and ‘good enough’ truth was the accepted outcome of transitional 
justice in South Africa. From such a process, a dichotomy between truth and 
justice emerges. Truth no longer exists as a monopoly; that is to say, there is 
no longer a truth that is absolutely objective beyond any perspective within a 
society. By contrast, truth exists as negotiated, as truth reflects the power 
relations in a society. The purpose of this truth is to provide an account of the 
past that can be shared by the majority of the population, which is especially 
desirable for building bridges between mutually hostile subgroups of a 
society. Thus, if the achievement of reconciliation must be based on a ‘good 
enough’ truth, then both justice and truth are political, in the interest of 
reconciliation. 
By asserting that transitional justice is political, I mean that it does not 
operate outside a given nation’s political context. Changing politics reshape 
the political relations of different nations. Recognising a need to secure a 
stable and prosperous Germany as they rallied to confront the threat posed 
by the Soviet Union, the US and UK prevailed on Greece to join the countries 
signing the London Debt Agreement of 1953, which cancelled 50 percent of 
Germany’s debt. In so doing, Greece abandoned half of its claim for war 
reparations. Germany was enabled to embark on national reconstruction, 
while Greece, as a Nazi-occupied nation, was not able to claim its full 
measure of justice from Germany. Thus we see how transitional justice 
sometimes serves to satisfy particular political needs.  
 
                                                
29 Although Argentina and Chile were transitional democracies whose TRCs preceded South 
Africa’s better known example, their work resulted only in condemnation of the former 
regimes rather than redressing the brutality of dictatorship. In this case, the TRC in South 
Africa is seen as exemplary for its determination to shine a light on the brutality of its 
apartheid period. See Acuna, C. H. (2006), ‘Transitional Justice in Argentina and Chile: A 
Never-Ending Story’. In Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to Democracy (pp. 206–
238). Cambridge University Press. 
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Transitional justice is Western-centric 
Locally as well as globally, the deployment of transitional justice is both 
political and contextualised. When the Cold War ended, Western capitalism 
became the prevalent global political condition and, inevitably, this 
perspective would be reflected in the global transitional justice.  
For instance, as noted above, various lustration laws were enacted in 
some Central and Eastern European countries (hereafter CEECs, in 
accordance with OECD terminology) at the time of their political transition. 
In that context, transitional justice served to hasten the embrace of capitalism 
and, as Lavinia Stan would have it, enhance the hegemony of the Western 
powers (Stan 2009). That is, the CEECs undertook their transitional justice 
projects in the context of rejecting their socialist past. In this case, the aim of 
transitional justice was not focused on rapprochement of former enemies and 
was distorted by the influence of the winner of the Cold War—the US and its 
allies. Hence, the CEECs were geared to compromise with the fact of US 
domination.  
Understanding how the US and Western nations continue to exert 
dominance in defining justice in the aftermath of political repression or war-
torn societies is of salience in studying the role of US and Western nations in 
the post-Cold War era. Atanasoski (2013) is keen to explore the issue. By 
analysing US military interventions in the former Yugoslavia and the Middle 
East, including Afghanistan and Iraq since the late 1980s, she deconstructs 
the global wave of humanitarianism to demonstrate how the US has 
positioned itself and its Western allies as the best arbiters of justice through 
the commission of what she calls ‘humanitarian violence’ (ibid.: 5–27). For 
instance, NATO bombings during the Kosovo war in 1998–1999 were 
conducted in the name of humanitarianism (ibid.). However, the failure of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia to investigate 
alleged violations of international humanitarian law committed by NATO 
during its bombing campaign in Kosovo (Nagy 2008) supports Nagy’s claim 
that victors’ justice prevails in the ICTY, due to Western dominance. While 
the nominal aim of transitional justice is to redress all past human rights 
abuses, it may nonetheless be subject to political conditions at the practical 
level. 
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Transitional justice is always conditional. As Teitel (2005: 860) argues, 
the trials of Milosevic and Saddam were not undertaken solely in the interest 
of restoring peace in their regions. Rather, ‘there is a vivid, more complex 
role to these trials that goes to the broader problem of legitimacy and law's 
relationship to the use of force.’ The civilian casualties of the NATO 
bombings during the Bosnian civil war show us that not every life lost due to 
political conflict has an unconditional claim on transitional justice. As long as 
a war is waged in the name of humanitarian intervention, some people’s 
lives, especially the people who live in the zone of battle, are liable to be 
excluded from the realm of transitional justice. 
Accordingly, the political conditions of the post-Cold War era imply 
how transitional justice could be skewed by Western dominance. As noted, 
the term ‘transition’ when used in the context of a so-called transition to 
democracy, not only refers to the situation of post-socialist nations after the 
end of the Cold War, but also describes an era in which Western political and 
economic discourse has become the norm. However, there were various US 
client nations in the Cold War era, including the ROC, that had practiced 
state-level terrorism against socialists and other political enemies with US 
acquiescence during the Cold War era. That is, systematic politically-based 
violence did not happen only in socialist nations. However, in the face of 
Western-centric transitional justice in the post-Cold War era, it becomes 
problematic for the ROC come to terms with the White Terror. After all, 
however susceptible transitional justice is to manipulation by Western 
political interests, its theoretical aim is to provide redress for victims of 
massive political repression, regardless of the political orientation of the 
oppressors. Strictly speaking, transitional justice is West-centric not only in 
its conceptual origins but in its susceptibility to influence by West-centric 
global politics, which have affected the way successive Taiwanese 
governments have confronted past wrongdoings that were committed 
during the Cold War era with US acquiescence. 
Currently, Taiwan continues to enjoy ‘special but not official 
diplomatic relations’ with the US under the terms of the latter’s Taiwan 
Relations Act of 1979 (TRA).  The TRA effectively prolongs the rivalry of the 
Cold War era: First, according to this text, the US commits to sell defensive 
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military equipment to Taiwan. Second, it commits the US to resist any resort 
to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the 
social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan. Third, it sets forth the 
nature of the special military relations existing between the two countries: 
 
3-1. In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, 
the United States will make available to Taiwan such defence 
articles and defence services in such quantity as may be 
necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defence 
capability. 
3-2. The President and the Congress shall determine the nature 
and quantity of such defence articles and services based solely 
upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance 
with procedures established by law. Such determination of 
Taiwan's defence needs shall include review by United States 
military authorities in connection with recommendations to the 
President and the Congress. 
3-3. The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly 
of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of 
the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the 
United States arising therefrom. The President and the 
Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional 
processes, appropriate action by the United States in response 
to any such danger.30 
 
Arguably, the US continues to play a key role in Taiwan, especially in cross-
strait affairs between the ROC and PRC. In political terms, the TRA 
formalises the continuation of the Cold War ‘friendship’ between the ROC 
and the US. By the same token, as long as tensions between the PRC and 
ROC persist, those persecuted under the KMT may find it difficult to 
challenge the premise of the White Terror. Because it was unleashed not only 
to secure the KMT regime but, as the TRA reveals, to sustain US dominance 
in East Asia.  
                                                
30 See TRA in complete version: http://www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html 
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Certainly, the KMT party-state in Taiwan was not the only right-wing 
dictatorship that was a client of the US during the Cold War era. The military 
dictatorships of Pinochet in Chile and Videla in Argentina are two 
noteworthy examples. Both of these countries, once their dictators had been 
ousted, resorted to TRCs to publicise the plight of victims and investigate 
individual crimes. The dissipation of the rivalry between the US and the 
Soviet Union in the post-Cold War did not negate the associations of evil and 
brutality that had been attached to communism since the end of WWII. 
Accordingly, nations such as Chile, Argentina, and Taiwan are predisposed 
to focus on individual atrocities rather than addressing the injustice at a 
collective or transnational level. 
An examination of the transitional justice discourse in Taiwan reflects 
the extent to which, at the global level, transitional justice is under the 
dominance of Western powers, which places the victims of the White Terror 
at a disadvantage by offering them recognition with limited vindication. 
When socialists were not the only target under the KMT regime in Taiwan, 
the diverse stances of the victims potentially complicate Taiwan’s scheme of 
reconciliation at certain level. An in-depth critique of the survivors’ varying 
situation in the face of seemingly unsolved tension at the global and 
domestic levels shall envisage the case of Taiwan does not passively exist as 
an episode of the global trend of transitional justice. It sheds lights on how 
has the changing domestic politics helped to develop a unique scheme of 
transitional justice without thoroughly rejecting the past wrongdoings yet 
continuing to pursue a full reconciliation in Taiwan. 
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Chapter 2 
Framing the theory and research methods 
 
 
An examination of the application of transitional justice in Taiwan is of 
salience to the question of what has been transformed during 
democratisation, and what has not. As the transitional justice scheme is 
focused on developing a discourse to reconcile Taiwanese society with its 
repressive past, a study of the politics of memory in Taiwan helps to sheds 
light on the process. As this is sociological research, this thesis does not 
investigate factual details of the past but, rather, addresses the way in which 
the past is presented and interpreted in the present, especially in the context 
of current power relations.  
 
 
A study on the politics of memory 
As observed earlier in this thesis, the past can only be studied in the present, 
and we only begin to develop the meaning of the past in its aftermath. To 
study the construction of the past in the present is to study the politics of 
memory, i.e., the role and construction of memory in power relations.  
 
Memory 
To study memory at the societal level, one is compelled to explore how 
memory is collectively developed, processed, and even contested. The 
current discourse on ‘collective memory’, a topic that has attracted wide 
attention in the fields of psychology, sociology, anthropology, and the social 
sciences in general, is largely traceable to Maurice Halbwachs’s landmark 
study, On Collective Memory (1992), in which he argues that memory is itself 
both social and collective.  
Halbwachs refuses to consider memory as an individual process of 
reflecting on the subjective mind (Bergson 2011).31 Rather, says Halbwachs, 
                                                
31 Durkheim fails to discuss the notion of collective memory directly, but touches on the 
notion of collective consciousness in his insightful study Elementary Forms of the Religious Life 
(1954), in which this phenomenon continues to influence how the members of a group or 
 40	
‘[i]t is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in 
society that they recall, recognise, and localise their memories’. 32  To 
Halbwachs, remembering is a social practice that relies on the dynamics of 
groups. That is to say, it hinges on the way in which group members interact 
with each other. Here, the term ‘group is being used in a flexible sense, to 
include both face-to-face societies and societies most of whose members 
cannot know each other personally. In this regard, the collective nature of 
memory does not pertain only to the way a group of people, such as the 
members of a family, school, or organisation, share their common lived 
experiences. The significance of the ‘collectiveness’ of memory lies in the way 
in which it determines how a sense of belonging operates among the 
members of the group. As Halbwachs suggests, all memories are framed and 
organised within a collective context, which guides group members towards 
a specific way of remembering their past and constructing their self-
identification.  
Ostensibly, individuals cannot be viewed in isolation from society, as 
Durkheim states: 
 
Of course, it is a self-evident truth that there is nothing in 
social life which is not in individual consciences. Everything 
that is found in the latter, however, comes from society. The 
major part of our states of consciousness would not have 
been produced among isolated beings and would have been 
produced quite otherwise among beings grouped in some 
other manner (Durkheim 2013: 342). 
 
While I share Durkheim’s stance, I am also drawn to explore the potential of 
individuals’ practice of remembering in relation to memory at the societal 
level via the theory of Norbert Elias. Elias (1978) urges sociologists to view 
the individual not as a presence that is concise and isolated from society but, 
rather, as one who is continuously experiencing his/ her life within it. As 
                                                                                                                                     
community confirm their belonging and continuity. This argument forms the basis for 
Halbwachs’ discussion of the notion of collective memory.  
32 Ibid.: 38. 
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Elias sees it, Durkheim is not simply saying that a person is self-
transforming, with an emphasis on the perspective of process. On the 
contrary, Elias maintains, ’a person is constantly in movement, he not only 
goes through a process, he is a process (1978: 117–118)’. Further, Elias refers 
to sociological research as a study of ‘people in the plural’, imagining ‘a 
multitude of people, each of them relatively open, interdependent processes’ 
(1978: 120). 
According to Durkheim and Elias, one’s inner self-consciousness and 
external structure are interdependent. As such, a study of a group of people 
is not only a study of ‘the informants with whom I had direct contact’. Rather, 
it is a study of pattern. The pattern with which this study is concerned is that 
of how and why the survivors of the White Terror in Taiwan choose to recall 
the past in a certain way. Hence, if we view people as ongoing processes and 
as interdependent with society, the study of ‘collectivity’ seeks to identify the 
patterns that such people are currently experiencing, as opposed, for 
example, to seeking to examine the largest possible number of interviewees. 
The method best suited here, in other words, is one of qualitative and not 
quantitative research 
The adopted method is also, therefore, one which emphasises the 
interdependent relations between individual and society, rather than an 
individualistic approach. This is based on the working premise that collective 
memory is not an aggregated outcome of individual memory. Collective 
memory refers to how a certain socio-political framework comes to define the 
features of a shared memory of a group, and how a group of individuals 
continues to re-consolidate and secure the boundary and content of their 
group memory and sense of belonging (Assmann 2008; Halbwachs 1992; 
Olick 2007). It is not just that we remember as members of groups, but also 
that we constitute those groups and their members simultaneously in the act, 
thus ‘re-member-ing’ (Olick 2007: 29). This dialectical relation between the 
individual and collective aspects of the formation of collective memory thus 
justifies the salience of individual narratives in the study of collective 
memory. 
In fact, it is argued, such narratives are not only about an individual’s 
personal life; they reference the socio-political framework by which the 
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individual’s knowledge and perspective have been shaped and consolidated. 
As such, narratives can play a vital role in de-individualising that which is 
personal and private. Thus, narratives function not only as a means by which 
individuals breathe public life into personal experience, but also as one of the 
primary tools with which they recognise and affirm themselves as members 
of a group, thereby acting as a catalyst for the raising of political 
consciousness (Andrews 2007).  
The salience of individual narratives further evinces that research on 
collective memory cannot rely solely on objective archival materials as such, 
for example, because these materials too are produced in a certain social 
context (LaCapra 2001). Thus even ‘objective’ materials are susceptible to the 
influence of individuals—artificially and socially produced, conveyed, and 
preserved as they are. Both objective materials and individual narratives are 
the media of memory. Yet, when it comes to the politics of constructing the 
recent past in the present, survivors are both witnesses to, and living 
evidence of it, with the potential to reinforce or challenge the dominant 
viewpoint of the past. While there is an extent to which collective memory 
has a life of its own and a degree of autonomy, which may in turn affect how 
those who hold memories think about and recollect the past, I would 
nonetheless argue that the existence of survivors and their narrations works 
to mirror the selection of remembering and forgetting in a given socio-
political structure, as follows. The past is fluid, not fixed: both the narratives 
of events and the meanings given to them are in a constant state of 
transformation (Hodgkin and Radstone 2003: 28). Memory is itself an 
ongoing process of selecting past episodes; then individual narratives, 
especially those which are opposed to the version of the past that is shared 
inside a group, come to shed light on traces of the past, erasures, losses, and 
heterotopias. Suffice it to say, then, that memory implies the tendency of the 
past and present to conflict with one another. This tension and potential for 
conflict that memory implies is not only about the different perspectives that 
may arise; it also concerns how the past may be obscured, or narrated, and 
how this may become contentious in the context of the current political 
situation. We develop the meaning of the past in the present, but the present 
can never guarantee that the past will be represented faithfully (Walsh 1992). 
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In this regard, a piece of research such as this one, concerning the contested 
past of the White Terror in Taiwan, is also bound to explore the past ‘against 
the present’, that is to say, that version of the past which may be excluded 
from the current collective memory of Taiwan.  
Certainly, the contestation of a political past often reveals how 
memory serves to satisfy specific political purposes in a given society. With a 
particular focus on the issue of ‘whose memory is it’, Alon Confino (1997) 
points out that the problem of defining memory in terms of politics or 
political use is that it is often constructed by leading agents such as 
intellectuals and politicians, and, as such, a form of memory that ignores the 
category of social (1997: 1393).  This results in a form of collective memory 
that is a limited, largely public one; often official, and narrowly political. 
Here, two points of Confino’s argument are illuminating for us, as follows. 
First, that memory that exists for a certain political purpose is predictable in 
its content, and that what is predictable about it is that while some part is set 
up to be remembered, another part is intentionally excluded and forgotten in 
its turn. Its logic of remembering and forgetting thus reveals the leading 
agents’ hidden political desire. Such a collective memory of a political past 
thus foresees and tries to forestall by its ‘burying’ a potential contestation of 
that past. 
Second, that a political memory narrated by politicians and 
intellectuals inevitably fails to provide a comprehensive picture of the past. It 
ignores the construction of popular memories of one political event and their 
links to the everyday level of experiences (Confino 1997: 1394-1395). This 
point arguably justifies the salience of a person-centred approach in 
collective memory studies. By looking into individuals’ ways of constructing 
their perspectives on their pasts in terms of their day-to-day lives, we may 
come to capture the episodes and viewpoints which are excluded from the 
state-generated political memory. Such an emphasis on individual memory 
at the level of ordinary life not only reveals a discrepancy or tension between 
different levels and perspectives of the memory, but, more importantly, 
allows us to envisage the context of power relations in which different 
perspectives on a past come to interact with one another in the process of 
constructing that past. 
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The operation of remembering or forgetting is not an unconscious 
process (Connerton: 2008; 2009). Rather, it is based on deliberate selection—
that is to say, we decide what to remember and what to forget—and it is 
dictated to a large extent by power relations. Tony Judt (1996) explicitly 
suggests that forgetting is, de facto, a political issue; he points to the memory 
of post-1945 Europe, as at once intertwined with the transnational interests 
that emerged from the Cold War, and with the desire to restore human rights 
that had been violated. In Judt’s view, during the late 1940s, the rivalry of the 
Cold War aroused a respective desire, on the part of both Eastern socialist 
and Western governments, to forget the recent war and forge a new society. 
This demanded that some of the crimes of the Nazis be forgotten, as 
confirmed by the work of Dan Plesch (2015), who, in his recent examination 
of former secret archives disclosed by the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission, has found that some former Nazi officers who were accused of 
crimes against humanity were released by the UK under pressure from the 
US.33 Although researchers have yet to clarify the logic by which some Nazis 
were released while others were convicted, it is clear to Plesch (2015) that the 
need to rebuild Germany—as an ally in the US effort to resist Soviet 
expansion—took priority over other missions, including that of prosecuting 
Nazi war crimes. Thus, the rivalry of the Cold War forced Western Europe, 
which was allied with the US, to opt for political and judicial amnesia: In the 
name of constructing ‘liberal frontiers’, these recent crimes had to be buried 
and forgotten.34 
                                                
33 According to Plesch’s research, 16 states, including the UK and US, worked together in 
London on the investigation of more than 36,000 international criminal cases between 1943 
and 1948. Some of the detainees were released, according to Plesch, because of their potential 
contribution to rebuilding Germany, which was the priority at the time. There was Oskar 
Gröning, for instance, whose file 4771/P/G/139–137 shows that this former SS 
Unterscharführer and Auschwitz staff member was arrested by US troops at the end of WWII 
and subsequently sent to the UK, awaiting trial. In the end, however, Gröning was released 
despite fierce opposition by countries such as Polish and Yugoslavia. Plesch claims that 
rebuilding Germany in order to enlist its aid in resisting the communist threat became a 
mission that took priority over holding Nazi government actors accountable for crimes 
against humanity.  
34 Space does not allow for a full articulation of the way in which the US induced southern 
European countries to yield some of their rights to serve the project of German rehabilitation. 
The Marshall Plan conducted by the US in 1948 provided funds to rebuild Western Europe 
from the debris of wartime. However, in the interest of rebuilding the German economy, the 
US invited Greece to sign a treaty at London Conference of 1953 agreeing to cancel 50 per 
cent of Germany's debt. Meanwhile, although Greece had been one of the countries most 
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As for the memory of Taiwan’s White Terror, when memory recalls a 
violent society, what is remembered inevitably poses a challenge to that 
society. Accordingly, researchers should scrutinise any silence that is 
seemingly tacitly shared across a society with an awareness of the potential 
influence of power politics. By taking an approach that focuses on the 
survivors’ narratives and their competing transitional justice discourses, this 
research aims to bring to light the fundamental socio-political framework by 
which some voices or perspectives of the White Terror in Taiwan are ruled 
out from the state-sponsored transitional justice scheme. These individuals 
are the living evidence of this politics of memory. 
 
Memory and power: A Foucauldian perspective   
To study the politics of memory of this violent and complicated past, I have 
chosen to take up Foucault’s distinctive insights on the issue of power. 
In Foucault’s view (2000a),35 in order to study power, one has to study 
the power relation itself. Tracing a genealogy of the exercise of power in the 
Western world, Foucault examines the changing forms and techniques of 
power practiced in the West in one of his best known works, Discipline and 
Punish (1991). In this work, he argues that the exercise of power in recent 
times has shown a tendency towards individualisation, in which a new 
economy of power has emerged in line with investments in new modalities 
of power that are both far more efficient (1991; 2000: 120). Here, one should 
be aware that Foucault’s use of the term ‘individualisation’ does not seek to 
emphasise the element of violence or repression. Rather, what Foucault 
emphasises is how individuals are made subjects in a process of 
objectification (2000: 326–327). If one were to focus only on the aspect of 
repression, one would likely conduct the analysis from a legal perspective, 
which could tend to define the exercise of power solely as a relationship of 
dominance-obedience—and this is precisely the aspect that Foucault would 
prefer us not to focus on.  
                                                                                                                                     
ravaged by German aggression in WWII, Germany received four times the funds that Greece 
did from the Marshall Plan. 
35 Foucault (2000) ‘Society Must Be Defended’. In P. Rabinow (Ed.), Essential Works of 
Foucault 1954-1984: Ethics (pp. 59–66). London: Penguin Books. 
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For Foucault, ‘the form of power that applies to everyday life in ways 
that categorise the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches 
him to his own identity, and imposes a law of truth on him that he must 
recognise and others must recognise in him’ (2000c: 331). The mechanisms of 
institutions, knowledge, language, legal systems and so forth are all 
embedded in power relations, in which we all act in accordance with 
‘individualised’ techniques of governance. In this respect, the analysis of 
power considers not only repression and violence, but also the question of 
capacity (2000c: 337). The term ‘capacity’ concerns how one can exercise 
power over other individuals, which is not merely about structure or the 
mechanisms of power. Foucault emphasises that such structures or 
mechanisms merely touch on the fact of certain people exercising power over 
others. In his view, the exercise of power can be understood as a set of 
actions upon other actions (ibid.: 340–342), as a way in which certain actions 
may structure the scope of other possible actions (ibid.: 343).  
In Foucault’s view, structuring the scope of other possible actions is an 
issue of how individuals or groups may be directed. In short, it is a question 
of government. Here, ‘government’ not only refers to political institutions or 
to the management of nations but describes the action of controlling the 
possible field of action of others. Issues of violence or confrontation between 
two adversaries are thus less crucial to Foucault’s analysis of power, which 
focuses on such power relations. For instance, Foucault’s theory would 
suggest that the actions of a survivor of the White Terror in relation to their 
witnessing of the period, whether by verbalising or remaining silent, may be 
analysed as a subject of power relations, because it is power relations that 
implicitly and sometimes explicitly direct their actions in the power relations 
in the form of repression, negotiation, confrontation or so forth. We thus 
come to analyse the embedded power relations that determine the impact of 
a set of actions upon other actions in terms of defining the possibility of 
further actions, not only overt repression or constraint. Thus, a study of 
power and power relations is also about resistance against different forms of 
power. Foucault’s approach is concerned with struggle, which is not limited 
to the borders of countries and disputes of governments, but is found in 
everyday life. This is a realm where individuals encounter conflicts over the 
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privileges associated with knowledge, and over representations that are 
imposed upon them. In other words, struggle unravels how individuals are 
categorised and stereotyped and thus become subject to others in the power 
relations of a given society. Such power relations can include the power that 
men exercise over women or the power that governments exercise over how 
people live. Hence, in Foucault’s view, power relations are deeply rooted in 
the social nexus rather than being a supplementary structure of society. 
Power relations are intrinsically a social practice that is not confined to the 
operation of the state apparatus in the daily lives of citizens (2000c). 
Foucault’s works inform this research in the following two respects:  
First, his works justify my analysing the politics of memory based on 
the everyday political life of survivors, rather than merely studying policy-
making, as, without a doubt, both society and memory are steeped in power 
relations. Memory, whether collective or individual, does not exist per se, but 
is, rather, a process of interaction among different forces, and never a 
representation of the pre-representational past (Olick 2007: 87–99). The logic 
of the mnemonic practices of remembering and forgetting thus reflects the 
kinds of knowledge of, and perspectives on the past that are generated by 
and operative in present-day political relations. Beyond the competition and 
even contestation between divergent views of the past with which this study 
is concerned, its further, Foucauldian viewpoint is that any privileged 
account of the past is produced in the course of negotiation, contestation, or 
repression in power relations. That is, there is no single truth of the past and, 
usually, many accounts of the past are produced. By the same token, conflicts 
over which discourse of the White Terror should be privileged are 
intrinsically rooted in power relations in Taiwan. Thus, to approach this from 
a Foucauldian viewpoint, we must ask: what kinds of power relations would 
cause the White Terror to be seen in a particular light? Put another way, what 
kind of power relations would cause a particular discourse of the White 
Terror to be privileged? Conversely, in order to address this politics of 
memory—that is, to study how power exerts its influence on the memory—
the privileged discourse on the memory of the White Terror thus provides an 
analytic basis for scrutinising the relevant power relations, as it mirrors the 
very process of the exercise of power.  
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Second, the exercise of power concerns how human beings become 
subjects through the process of objectification. In the context of this study, 
this entails that the identity of ‘the survivor’ must be problematised, in the 
sense that no one is inherently a survivor. This identity must therefore be 
identified and constructed in the context of current political conditions. Also, 
a historical approach is required when one is to study how identity develops 
or shifts to a certain state. As explained earlier, those currently identified in 
Taiwan as political victims were in the past defined by the KMT party-state 
as political enemies, deemed to be ‘unwanted’ and ‘outsiders’. Here, we 
observe a shift in the political identity attached to these individuals, from 
that of political criminal to that of victim, as they are transformed into 
subjects that demand vindication and justice. Regarding a shift of focus on a 
violent past, Andreas Huyssen (2003) observes that there was a global boom 
in memories of wartime,36 especially the Holocaust, as the 1990s witnessed a 
shift from holding individuals accountable for war crimes to recounting 
survivors’ traumatic experiences. The focus thus shifted from the 
commission of atrocities to the experience of persecution. Assmann also 
observes this shift from the punishment of perpetrators to appreciation of the 
perspective of Jewish victims (2012: 61). It was not a matter of forgetting the 
crimes of the Nazis but, rather, of embracing the perspective of victimhood.  
For the Taiwanese transitional justice scheme mentioned in chapter 1, 
the memory of the White Terror is itself a site of power relations and the 
exercise of power. In addition, the former enemy of the state, i.e., the KMT 
regime, has subsequently been transformed into a subject of vindication. This 
drastic shift indicates the inevitable controversiality of the memory of the 
White Terror. The era of reconciliation is fraught with conflict, and the 
identity of survivors is inevitably political, especially in light of the fact that 
the identity of ‘political victim’ is seemingly limited, according to the rigid 
Compensation Act promulgated by the KMT authorities in 1998. Thus, it 
behoves us to explore how it is that, in the course of political change in 
                                                
36 Huyssen (2003) claims that the term ‘Holocaust’ has become a metaphor and universal 
trope for a traumatic past, especially with respect to political atrocities, in accordance with 
the transnational memory discursive movement of the 1980s. According to Huyssen, the 
term, in a sense, has lost its quality as a descriptor of the specific historical events of the Nazi 
death camps. 
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Taiwan, individuals who were previously imprisoned and labelled as 
‘political insurgents’ have now become ‘survivors’ of victimisation. 
 
 
Published studies on the White Terror and Transitional 
Justice in Taiwan 
Since Taiwan underwent its democratic transition in the late 1980s, calls for 
redress of the wrongs committed during the White Terror have grown 
stronger, and literature on the subject has begun to proliferate. A survey of 
the White Terror literature reveals a number of studies and publications that 
fall into two categories: those that focus on depictions of persecution, and 
attempts to delineate the identity of the insurgents. Echoing Huyssen’s 
observation (2003) on the global memory boom in accounts of trauma and 
victimisation, the former perspective prevails among publications.   
Amongst the publications focused on past persecution and 
prosecution, the number of state-sponsored and local government-hosted 
oral history projects has increased since the late 1990s (Academia Historica: 
1998; Academia Sinica: 1999; Kaohsiung County Government: 1997; Taipei 
Provincial Literature Council: 1998; 1999),37 most of which focus on the life 
trajectories of persecuted political victims and details of state atrocities. In the 
case of those victims who perished during the White Terror, those bereaved 
by their deaths show up as the representatives of the deceased, sharing their 
episodes of suffering under the KMT regime (Hsiao 2009). For instance, 
Chang Yen-Hsien (1947-2014) was the pioneer in conducting official-
sponsored oral histories with survivors of the White Terror in Taiwan (1998; 
2000a; 2000b; 2002a; 2002b; 2003). With Chang’s determined pro-
independence stance, Chang’s works mainly refer to cases of pro-
independence and survivors who now support Taiwan independence (2000; 
2002; 2003). Also, the perspective of victimhood pervades his works, but 
whoever testifies in these state-sponsored publications, readers encounter 
difficulties in exploring the episodes of insurgence therein. It seems that all of 
those who have testified were wrongly convicted, as barely even one of them 
                                                
37 See Appendix II for the details of publication. 
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claims to have had any connection with the conspiracy against the KMT 
regime. In chapter 3, I will decipher the hidden political configuration that 
has resulted in the seemingly singular perspective on the White Terror that is 
represented in the official discourse.  
In a review of the following studies on memory of the White Terror 
and transitional justice in Taiwan, however, a slightly different perspective is 
revealed. In 2015, the most representative non-governmental organisation—
the Taiwan Association for Truth and Reconciliation (in Chinese: 台灣民間真
相與和解促進會; hereafter TRCT),38  published a three-volume anthology 
critiquing the progress of transitional justice in Taiwan. Given the 
Compensation Act, TRCT (2015) argues that the White Terror has not yet been 
fully described, as many stories remain untold. This anthology also suggests 
that the past is more complicated than the public has been led to believe, and 
that the White Terror was not merely a period of state terror or ideological 
conflict. This supports my own observation that this period of state violence 
was also a time of intense conflict among ordinary people and between 
different political ideals. A perspective on the past conflict in which survivor-
victims may be viewed as former insurgents therefore emerges. Feuchtwang 
(2011) and Shih (2011; 2014) share the stance held by the TCRT, and deliver 
an even stronger argument on the incomplete vindication of former political 
prisoners, especially communists, here in relation to their co-fieldwork on the 
Luku Incident (in Chinese: 鹿窟事件) and its aftermath.39 As a survivor of the 
Nazi, Feuchtwang concerns how the political configuration comes to shape 
the content of trauma, i.e., survivors’ persecuted mental life. By regarding 
Luku as a site of memory, Feuchtwang addresses the survivor-victims with 
whom he talked, showing their reluctance to recall the past as a proof of the 
existence of continuing anti-communism. In this regard, without full 
recognition of the victims, and taking into account the generation gap, 
                                                
38 The TRCT was founded in 2008 by a group of Taiwanese academics and independent 
researchers, including legal scholars, political scientists, sociologists, historians, and writers. 
39 The village formerly known as Luku has since been renamed as Kuan-Ming-Li (光明里) 
after the KMT regime brutally arrested more than 200 villagers and socialists who hid in the 
village and executed 35 individuals between late 1952 and 1953. The event was later known 
as the Luku Incident, which was one of the most serious episodes of the White Terror. See 
further discussion in 張炎憲、高淑媛 (1998)鹿窟事件調查研究。台北：台北縣文化中心 and
張炎憲、陳鳳華 (2000) 寒村的哭泣：鹿窟事件。台北：台北縣文化中心 
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annual official commemorations are, effectively, a means of forgetting (2011: 
119-121). In short, the transitional justice scheme in Taiwan is now pursuing 
justice with only partial truth and reconciliation (Shih 2011).  
Lan Po-Chou, the most famous independent researcher on the White 
Terror in Taiwan, takes up both perspectives, that of persecution and that of 
conflict. Yet he emphasises the need of recognition of the past insurgence. As 
a pro-unification leftist,40 Lan contributes to the discourse on the identity of 
insurgents by addressing the White Terror as part of a larger account of the 
communist revolution against the US-ROC alliance in the post-war era. Lan 
(1991; 1993; 2001a; 2001b; 2007; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2015) focuses on the life 
trajectories of the communists of Taiwan’s past, especially those involved in 
resistance.41 Here, the reader must bear in mind that some of Lan's works are 
fictionalised (Lan 2001a; 2007; 2010; 2014; 2016), although arguably these may 
still claim equal footing with written history, since it too is "never a mirror 
but a construction, congeries of data pulled together or 'constructed' by some 
larger project or vision or theory that may not be articulated but is 
nonetheless embedded in the particular way history is practiced” (Lin 2004: 
60).  
Here, Lin Yi-Hsuan’s study (2012) on the logic of Chinese communist 
recruitment in 1950s Taiwan supports Lan Po-Chou’s assertion that his 
research participants were former political insurgents. However, a question 
arises as to how this discrepancy between the official and non-official oral 
histories of the White Terror is possible in present-day Taiwan? 
In his own research, delving into the life trajectories of former socialist 
political prisoners under the Taiwanese KMT party-state over many years, 
Lin Chuan-Kai (2014) has interviewed hundreds of socialist survivors. Lin 
observes that the Cold War stand-off and the subsequent state terror of the 
                                                
40 It is not that Lan’s works have a pro-unification theme, as he has emphasised (2007) that his 
goal is to unravel the formerly repressed past, that is, the still inconvenient history of Taiwan. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that Lan’s own political convictions direct his concern towards the 
history of communism in Taiwan rather than that of any other movement or faction.  
41 I can only touch briefly here on Lan’s work by referring to his latest publication (2015), a 
detailed historical review of the student movement in Taiwan from 1945 to 1949. Drawing 
on his own in-depth interviews conducted over more than a decade, as well as collected 
documentation and archives, Lan investigates the historical context of how students and 
intellectuals emerged as the nucleus of communism in post-war Taiwan, and, over the next 
five years, proliferated from the capital to the rural areas. With this account, Lan has become 
the most prominent of the independent researchers on the White Terror in Taiwan. 
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KMT continue to haunt his informants, as evidenced by the fact that his 
informants, especially those who had been accused of being socialists or 
communists, only feel secure enough to narrate the aftermath of their 
imprisonment in public. Suffice to say that the survivors’ silence has its roots 
in both state terror and past political contentions. Nonetheless, the power 
relations that channel survivors of the White Terror toward narrating their 
revolutionary and persecuted past in a singular and limited manner in 
present-day Taiwan require to be scrutinised further.        
Thus, as we have seen, Feuchtwang, Lan, and Lin observe the impact 
of the legacy of the Cold War on the recounting of the White Terror in 
Taiwan. While a number of other researchers challenge the progress of 
transitional justice in Taiwan, most do so without deconstructing the politics 
of the process. For instance, Wu Nai-Teh (2005; 2006) emphasises the 
importance of truth-seeking, especially regarding the fact of atrocities and 
the identity of their perpetrators. Wu maintains that the current 
implementation of transitional justice in Taiwan does not heal the wounds of 
survivors, their families, or the society as a whole, but, rather, operates 
perfunctorily without acknowledging that atrocities were an inherent feature 
of the past for which there can be no excuse. Wu’s viewpoint is widely 
accepted by others researching Taiwan’s transitional justice process, such as 
Chiang (2007), Chen and Chung (2016), Hwang (2016), and Stolojan (2017). 
For his part, Chen Fang-Ming indicates that the major opposition party in 
Taiwan, the Democracy Progress Party (in Chinese: 民主進步黨; hereafter 
DPP), had little potential to introduce a full reconciliation into Taiwanese 
society, and instead merely carried on the project after they themselves came 
to power in 2000. Yet, Chen fails to elaborate the political configuration that 
has led to the consequence of the reconciliation process remaining seemingly 
unfinished. That is to say, despite the fact the scholars cited here approach 
the topic with an awareness that transitional justice is intrinsically political, 
their failure to invoke the geopolitical fact and salience of the Cold War in 
East Asia means that such studies necessarily non-challenging nature of the 
already limited transitional justice scheme during Taiwan’s three-decade 
democratisation. In short, both the ‘already limited scheme’ and its potential 
challenge deserve a thorough examination.  
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In addition to addressing the salience of the Cold War stand-off in 
Taiwan, as articulated in Chapter 1, a number of the existent studies on the 
White Terror have addressed how the KMT party-state rallied the whole of 
society against not just the threat of Chinese communism, but also pro-
independence activism and other political causes that were designated 
unwelcome by the government in the name of the Cold War (Chen 2008; 
Chiou 1997; Su 2013). Arguably, this too reflects the necessity of taking into 
account the Cold War legacy as well as the predominance of global 
transitional justice discourse whilst critiquing Taiwan’s transitional justice 
scheme. As noted in Chapter 1, ‘the end of the Cold War’ refers to the victory 
of the Western powers, rather than any kind of reconciliation of the former 
stand-off. Thus, in comparison to those studies featured in the state-
sponsored oral history volumes, whose research is overwhelmingly focused 
on the aspect of suffering (Lin 2007; Tsao 2011), and stories of wrong 
conviction and innocence, the work of researchers such as Lan Po-Chou, Lin 
Chuan-Kai (2014) and Lin Yi-Hsuan (2012) contributes evidence of the 
identity of insurgents to the discourse, thus introducing the very suggestion 
of the actual existence of episodes of insurgence, especially the socialist 
adversaries against the KMT regime in Taiwan.  
In short, the perspective of victimhood has occupied the official-
sponsored oral histories (Chang 1998; 2000a; 2000b; 2002a; 2002b; 2003), 
while a self-sponsored writer, Lan Po-Cho (2010; 2014) has continued to 
accumulate his publication, focusing on the perspective of insurgence. 
Amongst the two perspectives, Feuchtwang (2011) chooses to embrace both 
the perspectives, denoting the legacy of the Cold War remains its influence in 
present-day Taiwan. In this regard, Lan view the legacy of the Cold War 
merely as the evidence that attests to the long-lasting political tension of the 
Cold War. Feuchtwang steps forward, demonstrating the meaning of the 
legacy of the Cold War complicates meaning of survival as survivors are 
both insurgents and victims. In this regard, Feuchtwang (2011) echoes my 
stance as both viewpoints serve to scrutinise how the two perspectives have 
come to shape survivors’ political identity in transitional Taiwan. 
Confronting the fact that the current perspective of persecution 
obscures actual episodes of insurgence requires a reconsideration of the 
 54	
hidden geopolitical configurations and domestic power relations that have at 
once informed the initiation of Taiwan’s transitional justice scheme, yet 
continue to delay the progress of reconciliation in Taiwan. This undertaking 
will enable us to unravel the politics of the reconciliation process in 
transitional Taiwan. Further, I will seek to explore how, in this complicated 
political circumstance, survivors of varying political stances deal with their 
identity as a former political enemy or insurgent and witness to the atrocities. 
Given research that mainly focus on the life trajectories of socialist insurgent 
survivors in post-war Taiwan, such as Lan Po-Cho (2010; 2011; 2014), Lin Yi-
Hsuan (2012), the ways in which other survivors of pro-independence 
activism, etc. recount their past in terms of transitional justice is also 
explored in this research. Altogether, a thorough deconstruction of the 
memory of the White Terror shall be attempted here.  
 
 
A tripartite discourse analysis 
As noted at the beginning of this thesis, to examine the contested memory of 
the White Terror in Taiwan is to study the ways that different transitional 
justice discourses, both official and non-official, interact in the power 
relations of present-day Taiwan.  
 Regarding discourse analysis, Foucault seeks to trace the emergence of 
particular discourses, arguing for how particular discourses have become 
privileged and powerful at particular moments in history (1972; 1973; 
2000d).42 Throughout Foucault’s works, especially with respect to the issues 
of discipline and power, he remarks on how discourse is materialised, at the 
socio-political level, through various non-discursive practices, including via 
institutional arrangements and policies, and laws and institutions as a whole.  
As such, this aspect of Foucauldian discourse analysis thus focuses on the 
way in which specific discourses come to regulate individuals. One of 
Foucault’s own main areas of focus is on the medical discourses that 
discipline the boundary between the normal and the abnormal (1973) via a 
                                                
42 Foucault (1972) calls this the ‘archaeological’ method. In his later work, Madness and 
Civilisation, Foucault (1973) studies how the medical discourse governs the category of 
‘patient’ and ‘physician’, ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’, etc.  
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series of institutional arrangements, laws and so forth that are embedded 
within a specific socio-political context. In short, this work of Foucault’s 
concerns how the ways in which a society is shaped by language sheds light 
on its existing power relations. 
 As elaborated in the previous chapter, the deployment of transitional 
justice is more of the Western-centrism that failed to bring about a 
reconciliation between the Western powers and former Soviet Union. In 
critiquing Taiwan’s transitional justice scheme from a Foucauldian 
perspective, the main objective is to elucidate the way in which the 
dominance of the Western powers and Taiwan’s domestic politics came 
together to shape Taiwan’s reconciliation scheme.  At the practical level, in 
considering already accomplished reconciliation schemes worldwide, such as 
those in former Central and Eastern European Countries (hereafter, CEECs) 
and South Africa (Kriesberg 2004: 83–86, 2007: 252–256; Lambourne 2009; 
Moon 2008), along with Taiwan’s own transitional justice scheme, I have 
developed a tripartite analytic framework, as shown here in table 2-1:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2-1: Analytic Framework 
Aspect Medium Function 
Justice  legislation, prosecution, 
amnesty, reparations,  official 
(governmental) legitimacy, 
(individual) rehabilitation, 
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apologies, Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions 
(TRCs) 
(societal) reconciliation 
Truth  archives, oral history,  
historical analysis 
knowledge, consensus  
Ethos commemoration, 
exhibitions and museums, 
memorial sites 
representation, solace, 
healing and regard,  
security 
 
 
Justice connotes the juridical process employed in the pursuit of justice and 
reconciliation. Generally speaking, the juridical process is regarded as one of 
the most effective approaches to transitional justice. Legal proceedings 
provide a mechanism for transitional justice to enable a society to redress the 
atrocities of the previous era and consolidate democracy during its transition. 
The juridical process not only issues official apologies and assigns 
accountability for human rights abuses, but may also order financial 
compensation for victims and their families. As such, it may be used to effect 
both retributive and restorative justice. The term ‘retributive justice’ refers to 
the traditional model whereby those who have committed crimes or 
perpetrated acts of injustice are punished (Kriesberg 2007). Punishing 
individuals for past violations of human rights is a way of identifying 
individual responsibility and avoiding the attribution of collective guilt. 
However, no amount of punishment can restore past losses. Restorative 
justice, on the other hand, attempts to restore what was lost due to the bad 
acts that were committed and, in some situations, seeks to rehabilitate 
offenders. In the case of Taiwan, the Compensation Act of 1998 is viewed as 
the starting point of the pursuit of restorative justice, the emphasis of which 
has been on redress, including financial compensation to victims—that is, the 
victims of wrongful convictions.  
As Nobles (2008) suggests, although the exact form will vary 
according to the situation, all apologies ‘require judgments and reflection, 
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both ideational and moral, on what the apologies are being asked for and on 
what the expected consequences of the apologies are’. In other words, 
political apology is itself the most salient factor in constituting new moral 
orders (Moon 2008: 22). Hence, the extent to which the Taiwanese 
government has developed a culture of contrition attests to the depth of the 
roots of the transitional justice project in Taiwan.  
The juridical approach thus defines the concepts of atrocity, human 
rights violations, victimhood, and the identity of political victim, which are 
the very basis of the deployment of a transitional justice project. As such, it 
functions to shed light on the official transitional justice discourse of a society, 
and the hidden power relations that underpin the discourse.    
 
Truth, as it relates to past political repression, entails access to archives and 
documentation, which serve as evidence for forensic investigations by 
juridical tribunals or inquiries by Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
(hereafter TRCs). In the pursuit of the truth, the ability to access formerly 
secret documents is fundamental for many transitional nations. In this light, 
truth consists, in the reconciliation context, of the recognition by members of 
the group that inflicted injury of those whom their actions hurt (Kriesberg 
2007).  
Truth, as such, is not constitutive of a group of facts. Unlike facts, such 
truth must be shareable, as formerly opposing sides reach understandings 
about who has suffered, or continues to suffer, by whose acts. Truths may 
vary in how widely they are shared within and between adversarial parties. 
Only certain groups within the opposing sides may know certain truths 
(Kriesberg 2004: 83). For Foucault, truth is not prevalent and universal but, 
rather, an instrument for achieving partisan victory. Foucault is adamant that 
the subject of truth is inextricably intertwined with power relations: The 
politics of truth is not about forms of power practice, such as domination or 
obedience. Rather, it is about how the power relations of one society 
formulate a series of rules, which individuals sometimes obey but sometimes 
manage to manipulate to serve their own ends. In the case of Taiwan, a 
Foucauldian approach would explore how survivors of the White Terror 
develop their truth while confronting unfriendly legal and political 
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arrangements. Truth, in this case, does not exist objectively, but is 
determined by how individuals cope with specific power relations. 
According to Foucault (2000d; 2000e), the centrality of truth 
production is ‘confession’. When exploring how truth has developed and 
emerged in one society, Foucault claims that the obligation to confess has 
been transformed from a moral requirement, which had no legal force, in 
Ancient Greece, into a general social requirement during the Christian period, 
due to the prevailing asceticism of the latter (2000b: 225–234). In the modern 
era, Foucault argues that although modern societies have discounted the 
force of the church, their heritage of obligation toward self-knowledge and 
truth-telling (confession, i.e.) has given rise to a process whereby the subject 
that is engaged in self-examination is objectified. For instance, the truths told 
to the prosecution by former perpetrators on the occasion of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa were designed to be 
forgiven and reconciled. Although the ‘truth’ that emerged from the TRC in 
South Africa has been hailed as a role model for transitional countries, all we 
really know about it is that it was ‘good enough’ to be accepted by the 
majority of people during the post-apartheid period (Scheper-Hughes 1998). 
The possibility remains that a number of people and their pasts in South 
Africa were not embraced or recognised by that truth (Moon 2008). 
Arguably, truth is always to some extent contested and controversial. 
When a transitional society recounts its past, different societal members and 
organisations come to contribute what they know about that conflictual or 
repressive past. Negotiations and/or controversies occur during the process 
of truth-seeking. Where the aim of reconciliation is concerned, it is better that 
‘the truth’ not trigger new controversies, contradictions, or tensions amongst 
individuals in a given society. Thus, while there may be more than one 
version of the truth of the past in a transitional society, among them will be 
one dominant truth that is supported by the new democratic authorities. 
Methodologically speaking, our concern with this truth-discerning process is 
not about the content of the materials, such as archives and testimonies, but, 
rather, with the ways that these materials are utilised, transcribed, and 
interpreted by different sides in the process of developing a shareable 
version of the past. Accordingly, we may expect oral history, understood as a 
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confessional approach, to yield a perspective on the past that is different to 
the versions promulgated by the authorities or even by academics or 
independent reporters in Taiwan. Competing discourses are thus to be 
expected from White Terror survivors in Taiwan. Taking all of the above into 
account, we must take care to problematise what is perceived as ‘truth’ in 
recognition of its genesis in the need to sustain a specific view of the past.  
 
Ethos, in the literal sense, suggests the characteristic spirit of a culture, era, or 
community as manifested in its attitudes and aspirations. ‘Ethos’ refers to a 
set of rules, especially with respect to the social relations of one society in a 
specific era. Here, in relation to critiquing the general ideal of how post-
conflict or war-torn societies might be reconciled that is most prevalent in the 
post-Cold War era, we can say that ‘regard’ and ‘security’ are the two most 
prominent dimensions of its ethos. ‘Regard’ refers to the consideration 
accorded by members of a community towards each other. This entails their 
recognition of their shared humanity and the human rights of former 
opponents (Fischer 2011; Kriesberg 2004; 2007). ‘Security’ means ensuring 
that former adversaries feel a minimum of trust and are given ‘reason to 
believe they can look forward to living together without one side threatening 
the other’ (Kriesberg 2007: 253). In short, the dimension of ethos is about 
projecting a future with new moral orders of security and regard as defined 
here, on the basis of the reconciliation of the past, with which the dimension 
of justice is focused on reckoning. In this context, state-provided museums 
and exhibitions of the past are not only about how authorities remember past 
atrocities and wounds, but also about projecting a future that is based on 
reconciliation. More importantly, a critique of state-projected museums and 
exhibitions may attest to what kinds of perspectives of the past are left out or 
obscured as overlain by the dominant perspective, insomuch as specific 
perspectives and their advocates may not be embraced by the reconciliation 
project in question.  
Andreas Huyssen (2003), for example, examines ‘the meaning of 
Berlin’ through the lens of the memory of its period of division. As a literary 
critic, he conceives of Berlin as a palimpsest that has been written and 
rewritten in the context of different power relations. This is more than just a 
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metaphor, in terms of the attachment of various meanings to the city itself, as 
both its historical background and the demands of the current political 
situation have a bearing on how Berlin is represented in the present day. 
Huyssen’s finding is that the sites of memory in Berlin provide focal points 
for different political agents striving to find, and give voice to, their voices. 
Meanwhile, in Taiwan the era of democratisation has seen historic sites, such 
as ruins, former prisons, and execution grounds, feature as the palimpsest of 
the reconciliation process. Potentially contradictory voices compete for the 
power to interpret and represent the pasts of these sites to the public. In 
addition, all of these different voices are striving to arrive at a definition of 
reconciliation and the future that shall be truly accepted by the formerly 
opposing sides in their present day-to-day lives. 
Certainly, the three aspects of the reconciliation-seeking process 
shown in table 2-1 are interrelated, although justice and truth seem to play 
the most important roles. To what extent a shared truth can be achieved 
among different individuals and groups in a society may depend on the 
degree to which expressions of regard and security are able to be 
consolidated. Reconciliation—understood as a process in which various 
groups of people engage in dialogue and compete for the power of utterance 
in order to reach a widely accepted consensus on the past, present, and 
future of a post-conflict society—is thus desirable.  
As previously noted, a political discourse analysis is not a study 
which merely looks into statements or words that have been produced and 
delivered.  It is an approach that encompasses all discursive and non-
discursive practices, to unravel the socio-political context and hidden power 
relations that shape a specific discourse or perspective into a dominant form. 
Hence, as shown in table 2-1, institutional arrangements, such as juridical 
processes, state-projected researches, exhibitions, and museums, are included 
in the analysis. By the same token, non-official practices, both discursive and 
non-discursive, are also given major consideration in comparison with the 
official discourse. In this regard, discourse analysis is not only about the 
words that have been said; it is important also to scrutinize what kind of 
non-discursive practices exist in relation to the contested memory of the 
White Terror in Taiwan, so as to explore what has not yet been verbalised.  
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The following section thus articulates the details of this study’s 
collection and coding of research materials, and its person-centred narrative 
approach to participant survivors of the White Terror in Taiwan.  
 
 
Research methods and materials 
In investigating the politics of memory of Taiwan’s transitional justice 
scheme concerning the White Terror, based on the analytic framework set 
out in table 2-1, I have relied on two research methods: person-centred 
participant observation and documentary analysis.  
As noted in chapter 1, the primary mission of this study is to delve 
into the ways in which survivors of the White Terror recall and define their 
own past, in the face of the official transitional justice scheme in Taiwan. To 
do so, I undertook in-depth individual interviews with 24 survivors of the 
White Terror in Taiwan, conducted between October 2012 and May 2013, and 
between October 2013 and December 2013, over a total period of 10 months.  
Ostensibly, person-centred participant observation is more of an 
ethnographical approach. According to Clifford Geertz (1973), the 
importance of an ethnographic account in the study a culture or a group of 
people does not rest on its author's ability to capture ‘primitive’ facts in 
faraway places and carry them home like a mask or a carving, but on the 
degree to which he is able to clarify what goes on in such places, to reduce 
the puzzlement to which unfamiliar acts emerging out of unknown 
backgrounds naturally give rise— “what manner of men (sic) are these?”  
(1973: 16).  For Geertz, culture is public because meaning is. This connotes 
that to study a flow of behaviour is to explore the socially established codes 
that are hidden behind social actions. At this point, as Geertz argues, it is 
impossible to develop an insightful perspective on the social actions that 
researchers have observed without a ‘process of textualisation’. That is, for 
Geertz, a culture is a text that can be viewed as a collection of various 
symbols and the hidden meaning. The process of textualisation is an 
approach that seeks to unravel the hidden meaning of the research object 
with knowledge of ethnography and close-up participant observation. Hence, 
an ethnographic account as an approach is characterised by ‘thick 
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description’. It is interpretive of the flow of social discourse, and the 
interpreting involved consists in trying to rescue the ‘said’ of such discourse 
from its ‘perishing occasion’s and fix it in ‘perusable terms’ (1973: 19-28). 
To conduct a study via an interpretive approach, in-depth interviews 
are not only about recording the words verbalised. Participant observation is 
also imperative to analysing the ‘text’ or the ‘socially established codes’ 
embedded in an informants’ life, for it takes time and space to develop an 
understanding of the socio-cultural framework shared by the informants.  
Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis are strongly underpinned by this 
approach. As noted, a perspective of victimhood prevails among the research 
on survivors of the White Terror in Taiwan and their families. The silence of 
survivors is generally viewed, in this light, as an outcome of their past 
persecution (Chiu 2009). In this study, however, with an awareness of the 
possibility that survivors may also be former insurgents, I have attempted to 
rethink survivors’ silences over their pasts, again via the techniques of in-
depth interviews and close-up participant observation. In listening to their 
narratives, it became apparent that what had been left out was just as 
important as what had been verbalised, and further, as I will argue in this 
thesis, that the logic of my participants’ silence and verbalisation of 
narratives each constitute evidence of the employment of specific power 
relations in Taiwan. This microscopic focus on interactions between 
individuals, as between individuals and more macro-political configurations 
of power, has proved indispensable to this research. 
In addition to individual interviews with survivor-victims of the 
White Terror, during my field research in Taiwan, I also attended private 
gatherings of my research participants with other of their fellow victims, as a 
participant observer. Without a formal interview structure, this could 
sometimes take up a whole day at a time, yet the value of this strategy was 
that it allowed me to look into the ways in which these survivors interact 
with each other, and how they refer to their shared past together, using their 
own established social codes. This approach of participant observation thus 
allowed me to develop an understanding of their common codes, and so to 
unravel the ‘text’, i.e., the socio-political configuration, that shores up their 
ongoing silence over specific aspects of their past.  
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It should also be said here that while an ethnographical approach is 
microscopic in its attention to detail, this methodological feature does not 
preclude this approach for the purposes of undertaking an expansive scale or 
level of analysis, as small facts may speak to large issues. Further, in 
examining and contextualising the materials collected via the ethnographic 
approach undertaken in this study, I have also taken a documentary analysis 
approach to declassified official documentation and published statements 
and reports on the White Terror, and examined institutional arrangements, 
as follows.  
 
Material for documentary analysis, and its access 
This area of research touches on one of the most sensitive issues in present-
day Taiwan, and	as	such	as	it	is	challenging	to	access	documentation,	for	hitherto	
the	documentation	has	not	been	fully	declassified. Such material as I was able to 
access may be categorised as follows, and the degree of access I was able to 
achieve is also described below:  
 
Declassified official archives: here, that which I was able to access mainly 
consisted of my research participants’ indictments, verdicts, and 
imprisonment records. According to the Archives Act which came into force 
in 2002,43 researchers can apply to the National Archives Administration, 
founded in 2000, for access to the archives mentioned here. However, 
according to the Archives Act, only the survivor, i.e., the criminal, and their 
immediate family members could access the record of interrogation. And 
only the families of the victims could access the photo of pre-execution and 
its aftermath. Researchers can only access the photos of pre-execution of the 
already executed ones. In addition, no applicant, including the victims 
themselves, can access the original, but only photocopied or scanned copies. 
During my field research, I applied for access to the indictments and verdicts 
of my participants from the National Archives Administration, and studied 
these before conducting formal interviews with them. Despite the fact that 
these verdicts are not fully reliable as sources, this documentation was the 
                                                
43 See detailed discussion on the political context and its implications of the act in Chapter 3. 
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very basis from which I embarked upon the conversations I had with them 
and investigations of their past. Readers may find the declassified verdicts 
and related archives to which this research refers in the bibliography of this 
thesis. See also the official publications of declassified verdicts and related 
documentation which are categorised case by case by in Appendix III.  
 
Official statements, oral histories, periodicals, and newspapers: these were 
the other main source for documentary analysis in the course of this research. 
To study the progress of the transitional justice scheme in Taiwan one must 
rely on official statements and and	the	way	in	which	they	relate	to	the	project. 
The official statements demonstrate how a democratic government comes to 
recount the atrocities committed by the former authorities, and it is done via 
a politics of remorse. I collected every official statement that has been made 
by the Taiwanese authorities since the mid 1990s on the occasion of 
commemorating either the 228 Incident or the White Terror. These 
statements are listed on the official website of the Office of the President (of 
the ROC). An examination of state-sponsored oral history publications has 
also been central to my exploration of the official transitional justice 
discourse, with particular attention to how those interviewed for these 
official oral history projects think back to their past persecution. Readers may 
find a detailed list of these in Appendix II.  
Up until the early 1990s, the United News is recognised to have been 
the most KMT regime-friendly newspaper. During the early stage of the 
White Terror in Taiwan, the KMT authorities published political propaganda 
in the United News in forms of bulletins, prose and so forth, targeting and 
threatening individuals not to overthrow the government. In addition, the 
United News issued bulletins covering every political prisoner executed 
during the 1950s. Since the end of White Terror, the United News is no longer 
the official voice of the ROC, yet remains active in advocating for the cause of 
pro-unification. As such, it is imperative for its news coverage of everything 
about the White Terror and transitional justice to be included in this analysis. 
The Japanese newspaper Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News was published 
weekly from 1895 onwards before being taken over by the KMT in 1949, 
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prior to the latter’s retreat to Taiwan, and transformed into a bilingual 
Chinese/Japanese newspaper. During the 228 Incident, both the director and 
Japanese editor of that newspaper Juan Chao-Jih (in Chinese, 阮朝日) and 
Wu Chin-Lien (in Chinese, 吳金鍊) were arrested and executed by the KMT, 
as part of the new administration’s first political purge. Once the ROC was 
established in Taiwan, Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News became the official 
sponsored newspaper and remained so until it was privatised in the late 
1990s. Apple Daily is another important example of print media in democratic 
Taiwan, because its comment forum has become one of the most mainstream 
platforms for readers to debate public affairs in Taiwan. Both members of the 
TRCT and those bereaved during the White Terror submit their opinions for 
publication to Apple Daily. This material has thus been selected for analysing 
the ongoing contestation of the understanding of the past in Taiwan. Another 
two periodicals, Ren-Jian Magazine and Hai-Xia, were established in the late 
1980s by a group of left-wing, pro-unification survivor-victims of the White 
Terror. By far the best known left-wing survivors’ association, named 
Huzhuhui (in Chinese, 互助會), was also established by these men, and these 
two publications became the most representative means for them to voice 
their political agenda. As such, an analysis of these two publications is salient 
to exploring how left-wing survivors contemplate the past in present. Then, 
last but not least, Formosa, a periodical that survived for less than a year in 
1979, was the first periodical to recognise political prisoners under the KMT 
regime as ‘political victims’, i.e., the first to bear witness to the state-level 
atrocities. Thus, without precedent, Formosa was the first publication to 
introduce the idea of ‘human rights’ to Taiwan with respect to the political 
conflicts between the dictatorship and its people. I will discuss this periodical 
further at the beginning of Chapter 3, and a list of official documentation can 
be found in Appendix I. 
 
Documentaries and films: these can be categorised into official and non-
official kinds. Here, the term ‘official documentaries’ refers to state-
sponsored videos of interviews, in which survivors are filmed recounting 
their own persecution to camera. For those of my research participants that 
had participated in these official video projects, the potential discrepancies 
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between my interviews with them and the narratives they had offered in 
these official documentaries offered a profound opportunity for analysis. 
Then there are the non-official documentaries, mainly produced by the left-
wing survivor-victims’ association Huzhuhui. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, the famous writer Lan Po-Cho has also been cooperating with 
Huzhuhui to produce documentaries in which Huzhuhui members recount 
the past from a politically contentious perspective, completely different from 
the official discourse of persecution and victimhood. These materials will be 
discussed in Chapter 3, where I will explore the official transitional justice 
discourse, and in Chapter 5, where I discuss the competing discourses of 
survivors. a list of official documentation can be found in Appendix I.  
 
The in-depth interviews undertaken with the 24 survivors 
Having articulated the analytic framework and listed the materials collected 
for this research thus far, in framing the interviews conducted with research 
participants, let it be stated that this research concerns how Taiwan’s 
transitional justice scheme turns ‘survivors of political imprisonment’ of the 
White Terror into ‘surviving political victims’, with no mention of the 
contentious politics to which they may have previously adhered. I focus on 
the extent to which their previous persecution might be recognised or eased 
by previous oral histories which mentioned in the section of literature review 
of this chapter. And, in effect, what kind of ‘past episodes’ that had been 
perpetrated upon my participants? In sum, this research draws attention to 
White Terror survivors’ self-reflections; how they are narrated and 
constructed, and how they figure in the specific context of power relations of 
Taiwan. With this in mind, I employed an in-depth individual interview 
technique with close-up participant observation, as detailed in Appendix V. 
I began my study of the memory of the White Terror in autumn 2008, 
when I was writing my master’s thesis, which deals with the suffering of 
those bereaved by the White Terror in Taiwan. Before embarking on my 
doctoral research in Cambridge in 2012, I was engaged in the country’s 
official oral history project in 2010 and 2011.44 Using the contacts I developed 
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during these years, I was thus able to identify and interview former political 
prisoners from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s for this thesis. I approached 
potential participants according to the technique of snowball sampling, 
which connotes random selections, and with an emphasis on my own 
accumulated social capital. 
 To develop mutual understanding with participants, I chose not to 
make audio recordings during our first encounter with one another. Rather, I 
would introduce myself and have a relatively casual talk with them. I regard 
this as a necessary process in order to secure a more stable and smooth 
relationship, with my participants, leading to better interviews. To enhance 
the reliability of my interviews, I interviewed each participant three to four 
times at least.    
Nonetheless, I did encounter some challenges and frustrations during 
my field research in Taiwan. As noted in chapter 1, underpinning the 
memory of the White Terror is a pervasive antipathy towards communists 
that has existed since the 1950s in Taiwan and, even after the end of the Cold 
War, continues to this day, given the current political tension between China 
and Taiwan. This manifests as mistrust between those who were formerly 
accused of communist sympathies, and Taiwanese society in general. This 
political situation affects the way in which survivors in Taiwan situate 
themselves in relation to both the official and non-official discourses in 
Taiwan, which is the main topic of chapter 5. As a researcher relying on 
fieldwork, I found that this political situation constrained me from 
approaching specific groups of survivors, such as pro-unification leftists. 
Many pro-unification survivors feel too uneasy to recount their past to 
someone with whom they do not share a common political cause, or of 
whom they do not know enough. Some of them consider that only those who 
share their political stance should be eligible to learn about the past from 
them. I also had only 10 months in which to conduct my field research in 
Taiwan.45 Thus, while, a few communist survivors, especially those from the 
                                                
45 The Taiwanese researcher Lin Chuan-Kai’s doctoral research (due to be completed in 2017) 
focuses on the communist resistance against the KMT from the late 1940s to the early 1950s. 
Over a period of eight years, Lin has interviewed some 200 communists who survived the 
White Terror in Taiwan. I was fortunate to have him to introduce me to potential 
interviewees; however, given my time constraints, I was able to meet with only four 
communists who had been accused of treason in the 1950s.  
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1950s, were willing to share their life stories with me,46the majority of my 
interviewees (18 out of 24) were advocates of Taiwanese independence, 
ranging from socialists to democrats. During the White Terror under the 
KMT regime, pro-unification communists and pro-independence socialists 
alike both equally fit the KMT regime’s profile of its political enemies in Cold 
War Taiwan. Notwithstanding the KMT’s significant success in eliminating 
Chinese communists in the 1950s, socialism was not wiped out in Taiwan, 
and, in time, came to realise a new potential in relation to the cause of 
independence, in the wake of the collapse of Chinese dream, i.e., to be united 
with Mainland China. The way in which my pro-independence socialist 
interviewees (16 out of 24) recounted their past insurgency and current 
political life thus assumes significance in this context.  My field research in 
Taiwan yielded narratives by 25 informants, including one expert who has 
cooperated with an authority-sponsored transitional justice project since the 
late 1990s.  
As noted in the introduction of chapter 1, the KMT regime has not 
been formally accused of committing political repression in any tribunal or 
related legal context. The political situation made the smooth conduct of 
interviews difficult in many ways: apart from the difficulty of approaching 
pro-unification leftist survivors, the other major challenge lay in the way in 
which my informants tended to view their past, which could affect the depth 
of the conversation between us. During my interviews, I often came to 
discover that they viewed their past more as a time of insurgence than a time 
of victimhood. In particular, the former socialists were most cautious about 
sharing their past, especially its insurgent aspect. Issues related to their 
organising and conspiring against the KMT remain sensitive to them.  
As one of my informants, JC, expressed, “I never want to betray my 
associates”.47 This forms a central issue of the thesis:48 To what extent and why 
do my informants still feel insecure or uneasy about speaking of their 
                                                
46 The political repression of communists in Taiwan during the White Terror was most severe 
from 1949 to 1954. For further discussion, see Chapter 3. 
47 Transcript of JC 2013, 10. 
48 As I have stated, the ways in which the former political criminals of the White Terror 
conspired against the KMT lie outside the scope of this research. Nevertheless, I will briefly 
discuss how my informants conspired against the KMT in Chapters 4 and 5. For a detailed 
study of this topic, see Lan’s works, as mentioned in the previous section of this chapter. 
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insurgent past? Why does the concern over betrayal, including being 
betrayed by former comrades and betraying others, remain an issue in the 
era of reconciliation, especially when the White Terror is over? These issues 
are salient to the analysis. To protect the privacy of my interviewees, their 
details and narratives are presented anonymously. A list of narrators cited is 
presented in table 2-2. The codes identifying them were produced randomly. 
To provide an in-depth profiling of my participants, readers may find a 
sketch of each of them below table 2-2. 
 
Table 2-2 List of Individual Interviewees (including one non-political 
victim)  
Year of 
Conviction 
Year of 
Birth 
Gender Identifying code Sentence (years) 
1950 1929 M DT 10 
1930 M VT 
 
10 
1927 M VC 15 
1953 1925 M JC life sentence 
(commuted after Chiang 
Kai-Shek passed away in 
1975) 
1957 1927 M WL 10 
1927 M JH 10 
1958 1930 M HC 7 
1962 1926 M SY 15 
1927 M BY 7 
1931 M SC 5 
1933 M KY 10 
1936 M JR 5 
1937 M CH 7 
1938 M RJ 5 
1963 1939 M WR life sentence (commuted 
after Chiang Kai-Shek 
 70	
passed away in 1975) 
1940 M JL 15 
1940 M MO 15 
1941 M FC 12 
1965 1943 M CP 6 
1966 1947 M AN 7 
1968 1939 M PH 10 
1969 1937 M TZ 8 
      1988 7 (commuted after Lee 
Teng-Hui promulgated 
amnesty in 1990) 
1973 1954 M KN life sentence 
(commuted to 15 fifteen 
years after Chiang Kai-
Shek passed away in 1975) 
1974 1942 M TJ life sentence 
(commuted to fifteen years 
after Chiang Kai-Shek 
passed away in 1975) 
 1955 M Tsao (The expert)  
 
DT was born in Anhui, China, in 1929. Prior to his being accused of treason 
in 1950, he served as a Navy sergeant for the ROC in China. Unlike the 
general perception of a soldier, DT is small and always wearing black boxy-
framed glasses. To me, he looks more like a writer than a sergeant. During 
DT’s naval service, he specialised in telecommunications which enabled him 
to enhance his foreign language abilities, especially in English. Within 
months of the army’s retreat, to Taiwan in 1949, after which DT had been 
stationed at the Zou-Ying military base, he was arrested, under accusations 
of being involved in insurgent activities against the government, along with 
some of his army comrades. Upon his release in 1960 after 10 years in prison, 
DT came to Taipei, as a mainlander, without knowing anyone. He even 
became a vagrant during the first months of his stay in Taipei. Later, DT 
finally had a chance to establish a career as a translator, running his own 
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translation office in Taipei. He got married and had two beautiful children, 
whom he supported in their pursuit of a future in the US.  And it was not 
until, having reached his adolescence, one of DT’s children, discovered his 
father’s past, that DT spoke of his past with his family at all. I have known 
DT since 2008. We have kept in contact for years, even though I have been 
living overseas. Until this day, DT insists on his innocence, claiming that he 
had nothing to do with the insurgence of which he was accused by the KMT 
party-state.  
 
VT was born in Taichung, Taiwan, in 1930. Before the Japanese rule of 
Taiwan ended in 1945, VT had completed his junior high school education, 
and was about to embark on pursuing his senior high school. VT‘s father was 
a successful businessman. As the youngest child of the family, VT enjoyed a 
fortunate and advantageous childhood and adolescence while most of the 
Taiwanese were rather poor and unable to pursue higher education. Partly 
because of his well-protected childhood, VT has always kept his sense of 
humour and romantic view of life, even after his own subsequent and severe 
life experience. VT was accused of treason for supporting Chinese 
communism and propagating the political cause with his friends from his 
senior high school. He spent 10 years in jail on Green Island from 1950 to 
1960. The very first time I met VT was in 2008. It was a public occasion upon 
which VT, as a convener, portrayed his past persecution to researchers and 
college students. VT stood there like a slender statue; he almost burst into 
tears while speaking of his father’s death during his captivity. He continued 
to insist upon his innocence during his speech. However, when I approached 
VT in 2012 with my own question of, “what, in fact, have you been ashamed of? 
A past of insurgence, or a past of persecution?”49 VT started to narrate his past 
from quite a different perspective. Again, he cried tears as he related this 
version; only this time, it was not only about his past persecution, but also an 
unspeakable episode of insurgence.  
 
VC was born in Gigi, Nantou, in 1927, and moved to Xindian, Taipei, at the 
age of 7. As a man who has lived under colonial Japanese rule, VC has 
                                                
49 Transcript of VT 2012, 11. 
 72	
sought for the meaning of what it is to be a Taiwanese and a liberal man. 
During wartime in 1944, VC was recruited to serve as a soldier on a defence 
base in southern Taiwan. In 1949, VC started to work at the Taipei Post Office, 
the largest branch of the postal service in Taiwan. In the year of 1950, VC was 
arrested for treason, accused of advocating communism, and sentenced to 
fifteen years. Amongst my participants, DT, VT, and VC were the very first 
group of political prisoners imprisoned on Green Island, the place where the 
KMT regime established its biggest ever political prison in the 1950s in 
Taiwan. VC said that life on Green Island was almost like life at a 
concentration camp. Prisoners had to build the cells and so imprison 
themselves. Prisoners had to cultivate crops for their own livelihood. After 
his release, VC settled down in Taipei and had a hard time, struggling under 
severe surveillance by the government for years. The first time I had a formal 
talk with VC was at his place, accompanied by JC, in 2012. During our 
conversation, VC shared many historical materials with me, especially 
declassified photos of executions of the victims of the 1950s. VC told me, “it 
was to remember those [who were] sacrificed.50” However, when I attempted to 
inquire into VC’s insurgent past, he held back. According to VC’s verdict, his 
executed co-defendant was truly a communist, a member of the CCP in 
China. VC neither denied his involvement in the ‘communist conspiracy’, 
nor claimed his ‘innocence’ of attempting to overthrow the authorities in 
1950, as he was accused of doing. Over the three times at which I interviewed 
him, VC only touched on the ‘insurgence episodes’ a few times. Despite the 
fact that he is currently a pro-independence advocate in his nineties, the 
reasons he held back from describing his communist past deserve in-depth 
contemplation in the following analysis.  
 
JC is one of my informants who, while he is still positively engaged the in 
state-run transitional justice scheme in Taiwan, continues to maintain his 
silence on his revolutionary past. JC was born in Tainan, Taiwan, in 1925. His 
long-legged and serious appearance leads people to regard him as more like 
a sergeant than a small business owner, even in his early nineties.  JC was 
accused of treason in 1953 for his (alleged) adherence to Chinese communism. 
                                                
50 Transcript of VC 2012,11. 
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Before his arrest, JC had visited China once in 1947, to learn about 
Communism. In the present day, however, JC regards himself as a pro-
independence activist. The discrepancy of his political stance before and after 
his persecution puzzles me, especially as JC continues to deny his communist 
past in public. After our interactions had been ongoing for nearly 3 years 
since 2010, JC once showed me a photograph of himself with a former 
communist guerrilla in Vietnam, which was taken in the late 1990s. I was 
told by him that he visited the former communist guerrilla to learn some 
knowledge and skill of ‘insurgence’. As of now, JC reiterates his ideal of 
building a nation with fairness and dignity, and even has become a 
columnist, writing of his past persecution in the Japanese magazine, MOGU, 
since 2012. For the Taiwanese authorities, JC has been a most cooperative 
survivor, helping strengthen the official transitional justice discourse. I will 
elaborate on how JC engages in the official transitional justice discourse in 
chapter 5. In addition, it is thus profoundly valuable to explore that of his 
perspective on the past which is left outside the official discourse and his 
public narratives.  
 
WL may be the one among those I interviewed who had experienced the 
most complicated past. WL was born and raised in Hsinchu, Taiwan. Six 
months after the outbreak of the 228 Incident in 1947, WL applied for the 
Republic of China Military Academy (in Chinese: 黃埔軍校;  hereafter, 
ROCMA), and enrolled in the autumn of the same year. He thus became a 
member of the only class of ROCMA which was ever recruited from Taiwan. 
WL got on board, and received intelligence training in Sichuan, China. It was 
during the time at which China was suffering the second civil war between 
the CCP and the KMT; however, the academy did not send WL and his 
comrades to the battlefield. On the contrary, WL stayed in the academy for a 
training programme which was convened by both the ROC army and US 
intelligence. After Chiang Kai-Shek retreated to Taipei in December 1949, WL 
too went back to Taiwan and was soon appointed as an intelligence officer of 
the ROC Security Department in 1950. That is, WL was himself a member of 
the party-state, the so-called authoritarian regime. Yet, he was later accused 
of treason for Taiwan independence, attempting to overthrow the KMT 
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government with his comrades in the army in 1957, and was imprisoned for 
10 years in Taipei and Tai-yuan Jail in Taitung. After his release, WL lost his 
military status and became a small business man in Taipei. WL is now in his 
nineties. He always wears glen plaid tweed on public occasions, and only 
feels free to mention the details of his insurgent past when I visit him at his 
home. During my field research in Taiwan, the state-sponsored documentary 
producers filmed WL, asking him to depict the details of his intelligence 
work, and especially the management of the prison in which he was confined, 
i.e., the details of his persecution. Once, when I talked to WL about the 
experience, he apparently felt uneasy to mention his ‘officer past’. Arguably, 
WL is still struggling over the complexities of his past life, even now that he 
is elderly. 
 
JH was WL’s comrade at ROCMA, but chose a completely different path 
during the Chinese civil war. When WL returned to Taiwan with ROCMA in 
December 1949, JH chose to drop out of the programme and planned to join 
the CCP army in the summer of 1949.  Yet, after witnessing the CCP’s 
brutalities on the battle front, JH changed his mind and returned to Taiwan 
at the end of the year. Despite the fact that JH chose to drop out, he and WL 
maintained a friendship. It is owing to this fact that JH was WL’s co-
defendant, and was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment in 1957. After 
JH’s release, he back to his hometown, Kaohsiung. Not finding a proper job 
opportunity himself, JH’s wife became the breadwinner. This economic 
reality frustrated JH, but he never grew tired of fighting for independence. 
For the past years since his return to society, JH has co-organised local pro-
independence groups and events, as well as victim associations and events 
seeking to vindicate political victims along with other fellow survivors, 
including WL. As of now, JH is suffering cancer, and managing his cancer 
treatment at home. As such, JH is now too weak to pursue his political ideals, 
but people still can perceive his passion from his narration. 
 
HC was accused of being pro-independence during his military service in 
Kaohsiung in 1958, and sentenced to 7 years. Before his military service in 
the ROC army, HC was born and raised in a small village of Changhua. As 
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the eldest child of the family, HC was expected to be responsible for his own 
life and that of his family. Hence, HC told me that the reason he chose to join 
the army was for making a living. During HC’s service, he secretly absorbed 
knowledge relating to Taiwanese independence from books provided by his 
comrades, and even conspired to hijack a warship in order to wage rebellion 
within the army. It was JC who introduced me to HC in 2012. We held every 
interview at his place, where just the two of us would talk in the common 
room. HC had failed to meet his financial responsibilities after returning to 
society during the 1970s. It was only in the late 1980s that HC was finally 
able to provide for his family’s livelihood as a licensed pharmacist. As of 
now, HC enjoys his old age as he lives with his beloved wife and his 
daughter’s family, including one beautiful grandchild.  
 
SY was born in 1926 and was accused of army rebellion in the name of pro-
independence during his military service in 1962. The case in which SY was 
involved, and which has become known as one of the most representative, 
involved 50 defendants in total, ranging from teachers, a local politician, civil 
servants, and servicemen, to self-employed persons, and small shopkeepers. 
Five of my other research participants, BY, SC, JR, CH, and RJ, were SY’s co-
defendants in this case. Although he walked with a crutch, SC stood tall and 
straight and always talked in a masculine tone. Yet, whenever we touched on 
his past insurgence, he lowered his voice as if something about it remained 
secret in this democratic era. Before SY passed away in 2013, we had several 
in-depth conversations, which will be depicted in the following chapters. 
 
BY is still a local politician, at the time of writing, working for the local 
branch of the DPP party in Yunlin. Unlike the general perception of local 
politicians in Taiwan, however, BY always keeps a low profile. During a 
conversation in his office in a village of Yunlin county in 2013, BY told me 
that this was partly because his past persecution had left a scar in his life. BY 
had been a private in the ROC army air force when he was accused of 
treason. During our conversations, BY hesitated over spelling out his role in 
the conspiracy. Regarding his survivorhood, BY said that he had stayed 
rather low-profile during his captivity under the KMT regime. BY shared 
 76	
evidence of his continuing passion after his release, such as photo records of 
his involvement of peasant movement and DPP election campaigns in the 
1980s.  
 
SC was born in Douliu City, a major town in Yunlin, in 1931. As a Taiwanese 
person educated under Japanese rule, SC cherishes that part of his cultural 
heritage, and always writes me letters in Japanese. Prior to SC’s arrest in 1962, 
he was formerly a serviceman and then a high school teacher in Taichung. SC 
had a hard time after his release from prison in the late 1960s. He could not 
find a proper job which resulted in his wife’s being the family breadwinner 
for years. Partly due of his past, SC lives in rather an insecure state, as I 
realised when he asked me to articulate my own thoughts about the 228 
Incident and the White Terror when we had our first meeting at the 228 
Memorial Park in Taipei. SC was also concerned with my audio recordings, 
and he often asked me not to put certain potentially sensitive parts of our 
interviews into my thesis. As a researcher, I respected his requests and 
invited him to review the transcripts of our interviews. Subsequently, we 
have developed a rather stable and trusting relationship, as he introduced 
me to my informants, CH and RJ, in 2012. I also joined their gatherings in 
Taipei or Yunlin during my field research in Taiwan. As of now, SC has 
retired from his business, and enjoys his life with his son and grandchildren. 
 
KY was born in 1933 and pursued his higher education at Hitosubashi 
University (in Japanese, Ұڮେֶ), Japan. During his stay in Tokyo, KY was 
approached by the Taiwanese overseas pro-independence campaign, Liao 
Wen-Yi’s organisation; although KY claimed that while he had intended to 
join the campaign, he had failed to do so. After KY went back to Taiwan, he 
was accused of pro-independence affiliations. In 2012, KY was the president 
of a one of the main survivor-victims’ associations, named Taiwanese 
Victims of the Martial Law Care Association (in Chinese, 台灣戒嚴時期政治
受難者關懷協會; hereafter, TVCA). KY may thus be regarded as one of the 
main public representatives of the so-called ‘survivor-victims’ of the White 
Terror. As KY’s fellow survivor, JC disdains KY for two reasons. First, when 
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KY had a hard time securing a livelihood, he had asked few of his former 
inmates, including JC, to help him found a trading company. KY’s business 
failed, however, and had no money to repay the shareholders. Second, as the 
president of a survivors’ association, KY became JC’s competitor over what I 
will call ‘the power of utterance’ in Taiwan’s transitional justice scheme, as I 
will further articulate in chapter 5. From what I have witnessed, KY is 
similarly aggressive toward JC, each jockeying for position and asserting 
their own importance in the official transitional justice scheme. This 
preliminary observation sheds light on the fact that the relationships 
amongst survivors of the White Terror is never merely about their own 
political stances; it is also about their engagement in the scheme of 
reconciliation.  
 
JR, as previously mentioned, was a co-defendant with SY et al, in a pro-
independence case in 1962. One of the youngest among his co-defendants, JR 
was born in 1938. Prior to his conviction, JR had served as Seaman First Class 
for two years in the ROC Navy in Yunlin. After JR was released from his 
five-year imprisonment, he went back to his hometown, Tainan, and later 
moved to Kaohsiung, southern Taiwan. As of now, JR works as the manager 
of a parking lot in Kaohsiung. We held our interviews at his place of work, 
during his working hours. He always puts some chairs out on the pavement 
outside the parking lot, welcoming nearby residents to come and talk or have 
tea with him. While JR never attempts to conceal his past from others, when 
he considers his persecution that had haunted his mother, he still feels regret 
over his past. 
 
CH, another of JR’s co-defendants, was sentenced to seven years of 
imprisonment at the age of 25 in 1962. Our interviews took place in 2013. 
Unlike other survivor-victims, CH was a good talker during interviews, 
especially when it came to politics in Taiwan. CH has been a determined 
supporter of independence since the late 1950s. Unlike other survivors, who 
tended to be more cautious about interviewers and researchers, once he had 
confirmed to his own satisfaction that the interviewer supported the same 
political cause that he did, CH spelled out his past persecution and persistent 
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political ideals. Suffice it to say that I passed the qualification, owing to the 
fact that I was introduced to him by SC, one of his former fellow inmates. 
However, interviewing with CH was also challenging, as he never stopped 
censuring my political stance. As he told me, “my life is an enduring war for 
Taiwan’s independence. I only talk to people with whom I share common political 
ideals. It is all about my political ideals”.51 Arguably, CH tends to regard himself 
as a political activist, as per the words cited here. With CH, as with the others 
interviewed in the course of this research, the issue of how they deal with, or 
balances the identities of ‘victim’ and ‘insurgent’ remains salient, and is 
addressed in chapters 4 and 5. 
 
RJ is the youngest of the co-defendants in the pro-independence case of 1962. 
As a man who, at the age of 9, witnessed the scene of Taiwanese elites being 
executed in front of Chiayi’s railway station during the 228 Incident in 1947, 
the seeds of anti-KMT regime sentiment were sown in RJ’s mind from his 
childhood.  RJ’s connection with insurgents began in 1960 when, at the age of 
22, he was introduced to the secret project of insurgency by Chan Yi-Jen, then 
the owner of a photo studio in Yunlin, later one of his RJ’s co-defendants. RJ 
was very aggressive in conspiring to revolt. Nonetheless, when asked 
whether he had been concerned for his life’s safety whilst conspiring against 
the dictatorship, RJ stated, “I have never escaped from the fear of being arrested 
again after I was imprisoned by the KMT regime in 1961”.52  According to the 
verdict, RJ was sentenced to five years of imprisonment in Xindian Military 
Prison (in Chinese: 新店軍⼈監獄), which is now known as Jingmei Human 
Rights Park （in Chinese: 景美⼈權園區）.53 Owing to RJ’s cooperative 
attitude and behaviour, he was given the chance to labour outside of his cell 
as a laundry worker. After his release, RJ fought for years to make a 
livelihood, in the face of strict surveillance by the KMT regime during the 
White Terror. Finally, RJ settled down with his beloved family in his 
hometown, Yunlin, in the late 1980s. To this day, he is still very keen to 
                                                
51 Transcript of CH 2013, 4. 
52 Transcript of RJ 2013,4.	
53 For a more detailed discussion of Jingmei Human Rights Park see Chapter 3. 
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participate in pro-independence events. As he told me, “I will never be tired of 
fighting for my ideals”54. 
 
WR was born in 1939, in Yilan, Taiwan. WR was accused of treason during 
his mandatory service as a seaman in 1963. According to WR, he insists that 
he had no concrete project to revolt against the KMT regime, despite the fact 
that he had been a supporter of independence, and had held intentions 
toward insurgency since his adolescence. WR, too, said that he regards the 
228 Incident as the dark lesson which had enlightened his view of politics in 
Taiwan. According to WR’s own account, he and his fellows often criticised 
social inequality and soldiers’ remuneration in Taiwan during his mandatory 
service. WR said he believed that this was the main reason that he and his 
fellow seamen, JL, MO, and FC, had been accused under the KMT party-state. 
During the trial proceedings, WR appealed twice for his trial of first instance 
as fifteen-year imprisonment that led to death penalty as his retrial 
adjudication. Finally, WR had his conviction affirmed as life sentence. After 
WR was released in 1975, he went back to Yilan, yet could not find a decent 
job to pay him enough to live on. Despite these frustrations, his strong will to 
pursue his political ideals of independence and revolt against the KMT did 
not falter. “I have to admit that it was the KMT prosecution that inflamed my 
passion for pro-independence and insurgence”,55  he said. WR attributes his 
insurgent tendencies to the atrocities committed by the KMT regime. Hence, 
it is no surprise to learn that WR joined the DPP once the martial law was 
lifted in 1987, and has been re-elected as the township officer in Yilan since 
the 1990s. Our interviews were held in his office.   
 
JL was also convicted of attempting to overthrow the government during his 
compulsory military service in 1963. As a man who was born in 1940 in one 
of the poorest areas of Yunlin county, JL recalled from his childhood the first 
dark episodes of his memories of the KMT regime, such as the outbreak of 
the 228 Incident and the severe economic crisis that resulted from the 
Chinese civil war of 1949. Raised in an orphanage, it was a struggle for JL to 
                                                
54 Transcript of RJ 2013,4. 
55 Transcript of WR 2013,12.	
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pursue an education. At the age of 15, JL moved to Taipei, working as an 
apprentice in an iron factory for two years. After saving enough money for 
his tuition fees, JL accomplished his dream as he was enrolled as a student of 
the best senior high school in Taiwan, Taipei Municipal Jianguo High School. 
During his three years at high school, JL started to read the news that was 
published in English by the United States Information Service (hereafter, 
USIS), the institution of the US news and cultural division that was based in 
Taipei during the Cold War. JL stated, “Owing to the magazines and periodicals 
published by the USIS, I started to yearn for democracy”.56  The seed of insurgence 
had thus been sown. Restricted by his own economic plight, JL chose to serve 
in the army instead of pursuing higher education. It was just as he had 
almost completed his military service that JL was arrested, convicted of 
treason and imprisoned for 15 years. During JL’s imprisonment at Taiyuan 
and Green island, he had a chance to learn Japanese from JC. Hence, JL 
continued to pursue his dream of education, receiving a college diploma in 
Tokyo, Japan upon his release. As of now, JL has been settled in Taipei for 
nearly three decades. For him, it was both the political environment and his 
personal experiences that co-triggered his attempt at revolt, and more 
importantly, his pro-independence stance. 
 
MO was also convicted alongside WR and JL during his military service. MO 
was born in Tanzi, Taichung in 1940. Unlike WR and JL, who often expressed 
their passion for their shared political cause, MO has a quiet personality and 
did not talk much about his past. At the very beginning of our first interview, 
MO did not feel like talking too much about his alleged crime. When 
speaking of his beloved mother, however, MO could not hold back his 
sorrow, and burst into tears. MO only started to talk about his political stance 
of pro-independence and his hatred of the KMT regime after we had begun 
our third interview. From our conversations, it was clear that MO had 
continued to hold the same firm political convictions as WR and JL. Unlike 
those of his former co-defendants, however, he had chosen not to play a 
leading role in politics out of obligation to his family, including his mother 
and wife. The strict surveillance they experienced had exhausted almost of 
                                                
56 Transcript of JL 2013, 12. 
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all of my participants, MO not excepted. As of now, MO lives with his child 
and his child’s family in Tanzi. We held every one of our formal interviews 
at his place in Tanzi during my field research. As MO said, “It’s my hometown, 
I am glad I am still here after this difficult life”.57 
   
FC is the quietest man amongst his former co-defendants. He was born in 
Kaohsiung in 1941, and had moved to Taipei for a job before he served in the 
army. For FC, the experience of the persecution had hollowed out part of his 
heart, as the outbreak of the Taiyuan Incident (in Chinese, 泰源事件) led to a 
man who was one of his best friends during his imprisonment being 
executed by the KMT regime. The Taiyuan Incident occurred on 8 February 
1970. It was a prison mutiny organised by a group of pro-independence 
prisoners, five of whom ended up being executed as a result.58 The incident 
was later identified as a landmark event of the independence movement in 
Taiwan. “He (the executed one) was the most generous and honest man I have ever 
known in my life. His death always reminds me of the cruelty of Chiang Kai-Shek 
and his fellows”,59 said FC. The experience has also persuaded FC to keep a low 
profile, even after his release. Even now, when FC sometimes accepts 
invitations to speak in public, he always refuses to focus on his own 
experience. For him, the very reason he agrees to come to the fore is to speak 
for those who perished under the KMT regime. As he emphasised, “I am not 
that special, but I can tell people how special those executed were. That is why I 
survive”.60   
 
CP was born in China in 1942 and escaped to Taiwan in 1965, during the 
Cold War era, when the borders between Taiwan and China were closed. 
                                                
57 Transcript of MO 2013,11. 
58 Taiyuan Prison was founded in Tai-Tung, on the east coast of Taiwan, in the late 1960s, and 
was initially designed to house political prisoners. At the time, there was an influx of 
prisoners who were pro-independence and tension arose between these Taiwan separatists 
and pro-China left-wingers. The Taiyuan Incident was a mutiny that involved solely pro-
Taiwan prisoners. It ultimately failed, and the Chiang Kai-Shek administration executed five 
prisoners who had escaped. For further details, see the oral history: 中央研究院近代史研究所
《⼝述歷史》編輯委員會 (2002) 《泰源事件專輯 》。台北：中研院近代史研究所. Although 
portions of the cited narratives are open to challenge due to their tone of deference to the 
authorities, this remains a valuable reference.  
59 Transcript of FC 2013,12. 
60 Transcript of FC 2013,12. 
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Having grown up in Communist China and joined the Communist Youth 
League, he was soon charged with treason and sentenced to five years in 
prison. After his release, CP settled down in Taipei and, after 1990, 
occasionally returned to China to visit family. The very first time I met CP 
was in 2010, in Jingmei Human Rights Park. As a man who had escaped from 
the dictatorship of the PRC to pursue the cause of ‘Free China’ in Taiwan, CP 
is still finding his way of delineating his emotions toward the KMT regime. 
During our conversations, CP emphasised the importance of his having been 
granted vindication by the Taiwanese authorities. That is, he is now officially 
a survivor-victim in the eyes of Taiwan’s transitional justice scheme. 
However, the wounds of the past continue to haunt him in many ways, as 
articulated in the following chapters. 
 
AN was born in Nantou, in 1947, the same year in which the 228 Incident 
happened. Aged 20, he was convicted of treason for advocating 
independence. I was introduced to AN by JC in the autumn of 2013. AN 
currently lives in Yuanlin Town, Changhua County.  We sometimes held our 
interviews at AN’s place in Yuanlin, and held two other interviews in 
Jingmei Human Rights Museum when he came to Taipei to meet up with 
other fellow survivors, such as JC and HC. Compared to other of my research 
participants, AN is very humble and more open to talking about his past 
with researchers. He said, “I did not suffer too much; in effect, it was the KMT 
regime that made me get to know these real insurgents”.61 He said he was still 
learning about Taiwanese independence from them. After seven years of 
imprisonment, AN returned to society in 1973 and worked as a coach driver 
until his retirement in the late 1990s. He too had also experienced serious 
surveillance after his release.  
As of now, AN is very cooperative with the state-sponsored transitional 
justice scheme. Nonetheless, however, he still has some opinions on his role 
as victim of the White Terror which differ from the official discourse, as 
discussed in chapter 5. 
 
                                                
61 Transcript of AN 2013,12. 
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PH was born into a farming family in Chiayi County in 1939. After 
completing his high school education in 1960, PH initially joined the police 
academy, but within one year had left for a teacher training programme at 
the National Taipei Normal Academy (in Chinese, 台北師專, 現國立台北教育
大學; hereafter, NTNA). PH then became a teacher at a primary school in 
Taipei for a few years. During that period, PH started to learn about anti-
KMT party-state politics along with his friends from NTNA. By his 20s, PH 
was convinced that the pursuit of well-planned social reforms, such as social 
equality and economic reform, was a necessary mission for the young 
generation in the Taiwan of the 1960s. However, PH’s political thought was 
too radical for the authorities. With his own left-wing stance, PH was alleged 
of attempting to revolt against the government. Following his conviction, PH 
was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment in 1968. During his imprisonment, 
PH kept a low profile and, hitherto, has continued to keep silent on his 
political past. The very first time I got in touch with PH was in 2013, and he 
refused my invitation for an interview. Thanks to PH’s wife, I finally got the 
chance to approach PH and to learn about his past from his own perspective. 
As of now, PH is still concerned with politics in Taiwan. As he stated, “I 
cannot trust any government, I shall keep my eye on it without saying a word”.62 To 
this seventy-eight-year-old man who has survived serious political conflict 
and persecution, democracy is no guarantee of the end of political 
oppression.  
 
TZ was born in 1937 in Keelung, the biggest port of northern Taiwan. TZ had 
held strong political ideals of revolt against the KMT since his childhood, as 
he had witnessed the massacre that happened in Keelung during the 228 
Incident. Keelung was one the cities deluged by KMT atrocities during the 
Incident in 1947. With strong political intentions, TZ enrolled as a college 
student and majored in political science at National Taiwan University in the 
mid 1950s. It was a time when communists were targeted as the primary 
political enemies of the KMT regime in Taiwan. Still, TZ gained knowledge 
of left-wing and other political thought. Of these different political stances, 
                                                
62 Transcript of PH 2013,12. 
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TZ found pro-independence most compelling and chose to make it his own 
political cause, regarding it as the most urgent matter for Taiwan to be freed 
from the KMT party-state. TZ began his political career as an activist and 
secretly got in touch with an overseas pro-independence organisation which 
was based in Tokyo, Japan. The secret was discovered by the government in 
1969, when TZ was convicted of treason and sentenced to an eight-year 
prison term. After TZ was released in 1975, he continued to advocate for his 
political stance and maintained his intention to organise with other pro-
independence survivor-victims. Eventually, in 1988, TZ established a 
survivor-victim association named Taiwanese Victims of the Martial Law 
Care Association (in Chinese: 台灣戒嚴時期政治受難者關懷協會 also known 
a 台 灣 戒 嚴 時 期 政 治 受 難 者 聯 誼 總 會 ; hereafter: TCVA) that claimed 
Taiwanese independence as the association’s central value. Two points 
concerning this political action: first, it was the very first political survivor 
association to regard its members as “survivor-victims”. Second, its 
introduction of the persecution perspective did not restrict the space for 
giving voice to the insurgent past. However, TZ’s support for Taiwanese 
independence was not accepted under martial law. His  “unbearable action” 
led to TZ’s second term of imprisonment, from 1988 to 1990. I have known 
TZ since 2011, when we travelled to Green Island together to help him 
recollect his life of imprisonment. From this researcher’s perspective, TZ has 
been working very hard to try to balance his past life with his present. Just 
like my other research participants, there are certainly times when he cannot 
hold himself back from crying out for those who perished or were tortured. 
Yet, like my other participants, TZ rarely expresses this kind of reflection on 
his own experience. He is still passionate about politics, as he is currently 
writing a book of his own political thought. As in his own words, “I was a 
survivor [and a] political activist before I was persecuted”.63  
 
KN is the youngest participant in my research. He was born in Chiayi in 1954. 
It was only after KN moved to Taipei for work at the age of 16, that he began 
to learn the true colours of the KMT regime from people who he met in 
                                                
63 Transcript of TZ 2013,12. 
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Taipei. At the age of 17, KN joined a left-wing pro-independence group 
named the Taiwan Independence Party which was established by Cheng 
Ping in 1970. Since then, KN has viewed himself as a lifetime pro-
independence activist. During our interviews at his place in Taichung City, 
KN always started our conversations from the perspective of insurgence. 
“There is nothing wrong with Taiwanese independence; I was imprisoned for the 
cause, but Ching Kai-Shek had not failed me”,64 said KN. Certainly KN was 
persecuted and imprisoned by Chiang Kai-Shek’s government, yet he 
claimed that his mentality has remained strong. At the age of 19, KN was 
convicted of treason and began his lifetime sentence in 1973. Two years later, 
following Ching Kai-Shek’s death, his sentence was commuted to fifteen 
years, and he was released from the prison on Green Island in 1987, also the 
year in which Chiang Ching-Kuo lifted martial law in Taiwan. As KN 
asserted, he continued to advocate for Taiwan’s independence after 
returning to society. From late 1987 until the mid 1990s, KN engaged himself 
in every social and political event of the movement, and its preparation. He 
never put himself on the stage, however, but chose to stand behind the 
scenes. Instead, he supported “political stars” such as the later president, 
Chen Shui-Bian. KN emphasised it was best to let those activists with were 
most skilled at public speaking do so. At this point, KN spent much time in 
recollecting those “stars” he had once worked with to me. However, when I 
attempted to delve into the details of his own revolutionary past, he 
remained silent. It was only when we started to talk about the sense of 
frustration at being persecuted and the pride of being a political activist that 
KN started to drop his guard.   
 
TJ was born in Pingtung County in 1937. Before he was arrested, he was a 
professional saxophone player. At the beginning of the 1970s, TJ had the 
chance to join an orchestra that made a concert tour to the US, from east to 
west. During the US concert tour, TJ was approached by an overseas pro-
independence organisation, and was enthused by their compelling ideal of 
building a nation with dignity, equality and democracy. TJ promised to join 
the organisation and conducted membership recruitment after returning to 
                                                
64 Transcript of KN 2013,5.	
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Taiwan. However, TJ failed to recruit enough members and his project was 
discovered by the authorities. As a result, he was sentenced to life 
imprisonment in 1974. The very first time I met TJ was at the Green Island 
Human Rights Park in 2010. After narrating the episodes of his persecution, 
he asked me, “Do you believe me?”65 At that moment, TJ hesitated over 
narrating his past persecution in public. After years had passed, however, 
when I revisited TJ in 2013, he was more confident, yet was still uncertain 
whether to publicise his insurgent past or not. Thus while, during our 
interviews at his place in Kaohsiung, TJ narrated those insurgent episodes in 
a very detailed way, he nonetheless requested me not to publish those parts 
before he had passed away, stating, “I don’t want to hurt people who escaped 
from the atrocities in past years”,66 I thus promised not to expose those ‘unlisted’ 
names. The past persecution continues to haunt TJ, though on the face of it 
he appears optimistic, determined, and remains very active in local politics in 
Kaohsiung.   
 
The significance of emotion 
Memory is private, especially those memories that are never spoken of. 
Memory is also common to a group of carriers, for its hidden socio-political 
content shapes our understanding of our past, present, and future. 
 According to the basic depict of my 24 participants, as stated, most of 
them tend to hold back whilst touching on the issue of the accusation. Some 
of them denied at the first moment, others started to recollect memories in 
terms of narrating their fellow victims’ life experiences. At first place, 
researcher may readily attribute survivors’ hesitation in recollecting the past 
accusation to the past persecution. After all, the White Terror in Taiwan was 
indeed a prolonged time of state-level atrocities. However, as I have 
indicated, my participants such as VT, VC, JC, and so forth have shown their 
‘convictions’ were not fabricated out of nothing. That is, these men had once 
stood up as enemies of the KMT regime in Taiwan. That is, given the 
regulations promulgated by the Compensation Act of 1998, my participants 
may not be able to be recognised as ‘victims’ and receive financial 
                                                
65 Field research note 2010,9 
66 Transcript of TJ 2013,12. 
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compensation. However, each of them have been recognised as victim of the 
White Terror by the Compensation Act. A discrepancy thus emerges between 
their narratives with me and their role in the official transitional justice 
scheme. This forms the very central part for this research to explore. Hence, 
my participants’ silence and hesitation over explicating their past becomes 
imperative in this analysis. In this regard, their emotions may form an 
approach for researchers to study their silence and their memory in the 
present-day. 
Suffice it to say, the emotional content of the survivors’ memories 
enables researchers to discover how they recount their past, because 
emotions represent a juncture between society and the most personal realms 
of an individual's experiences (Freund 1990: 453). That is, emotions serve to 
unravel the veiled competing discourses of the past among survivors in 
Taiwan. An exhaustive examination of emotions would be beyond the scope 
of this study,67 which focuses on the relationship between emotion and 
memory as a methodological issue. 
In the field of sociology, it is generally accepted that emotions are 
socially constructed (Gordon 1990; Scheff 1983; Thoits 1989). What concerns 
sociologists is how a cultural framework forms a specific bundle of beliefs, 
rules, norms, and values in a society, and how the members of that society 
interpret their subjective experiences so as to identify and describe them. In 
sociological terms, this seemingly purely cognitive process is underpinned in 
every society by a particular socio-cultural framework, and this structural 
background serves not only to reinforce how individuals practice their 
subjective emotional lives but also guides their accounts of others in their 
social life. At this point, Erving Goffman’s (1968) dramaturgical perspective, 
which views our everyday emotional life as an ongoing performance of 
repertoires that rely to a great extent on a framework of cultural scripts, 
echoes the definition articulated here. Gordon (1990) shares a similar 
viewpoint as he observes that the ways in which we identify and express our 
subjective experiences are bounded by the given cultural framework. That is 
                                                
67 Since the 1970s, the subject of emotion has been increasingly discussed in the fields of 
neurology, psychology, and, later, sociology. For a detailed review of the sociological 
understanding of emotion, see Turner, J. H., & Stets, J. E. (2005). The Sociology of Emotions. 
Cambridge University Press; Thoits, P. A. (1989). ‘The Sociology of Emotions’. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 15(1), 317–342.  
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to say, what captures sociologists’ focus is not the individual’s personality so 
much as the unique structure surrounding, guiding, and constraining the 
individual, which means that the substance of emotions will inevitably vary 
across differing societies.  
Hence, emotions are significant to this research because they are not 
merely psychological reactions to specific events or situations but more often 
appear as a medium through which the power relations are unearthed. At an 
individual level, emotions are triggered as feedback that pervade one’s social 
life, whereby one can adjust, modify, and develop a logic for social 
interactions. At a collective level, emotions contribute towards the 
consolidation of the existing structure and context that shape how the 
emotions are perceived, recognised, and expressed. 
Similarly, emotion sheds light on the way in which memory is created 
and continues to evolve in a given society. Emotion reflects how the past is 
being constructed in the present. In this regard, this study is not confined to 
the individual level, for it concerns the historico-political situation that 
causes the survivors of the White Terror to remain in the continuous grip of 
certain emotions even as political change comes about in Taiwan. In other 
words, the core of this study’s analysis is the way in which emotion factors 
into the field of transitional justice.  
Emotions are also apropos to the study of transitional justice, 
according to Elster (2004: 216–244) who proposes that emotions shape such 
legal proceedings through a specific socio-political mechanism. Here, the 
term ‘mechanism’ implies a cultural framework that includes beliefs and the 
social relations previously existing between the perpetrators or victims of 
abuse (ibid.). Emotion is itself a prominent element in the politics of memory. 
The polarisation of the Cold War enabled the KMT regime to consolidate a 
collective antipathy in Taiwan towards the Chinese communists. As we 
unravel how the legacy of the Cold War has affected the operation of 
transitional justice in Taiwan, the issue of how the past political conflict 
shaped the White Terror survivors’ emotions is central to the analysis. In 
other words, the antipathy across society would not have disappeared all of a 
sudden, and the survivors’ emotions shape their conception of the ‘justice’ 
they desire in their current political life. Emotion in this case not only 
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supplies a connection to the past in contemporary Taiwanese society in a 
temporal sense,68 but justifies the prominence of the past in the socio-political 
analysis of transitional justice 
A methodological issue arises here: Emotions can be overtly expressed, 
but may be concealed at some point. During my field research in Taiwan, I 
frequently encountered survivors who preferred to remain silent about their 
past. While their discourse may have competed with the official one, their 
reticence made this hard to capture during interviews. However, as 
discussed in chapter 5, silence is not necessarily an impediment to our 
understanding of the non-official discourse. On the contrary, silence offers its 
own clues to unravelling that discourse.  
What we can confirm in this phase is that many researchers have been 
informed by survivors that they were innocent political prisoners, having 
entertained no explicit intention to subvert the KMT regime. It assumes that 
these survivors are experiencing trauma and shame as a response to their 
past suffering.69 However, this research aims to explore the complexity of 
their trauma and shame, which have been oversimplified in current 
scholarship. For instance, Lin (2007) views the emotions of former political 
prisoners of the White Terror as responses to repression, without considering 
the state of conflict between these individuals and the KMT authorities.  
The political conflicts existing during the Cold War era could generate 
a different picture of the White Terror survivors’ silence, for they were the 
KMT regime’s political enemies, and not just its victims, although society has 
been hesitant to embrace them as such. Furthermore, the current political 
situation needs to be problematised, for the ways in which survivors are 
guided by their emotions offer a clue for understanding their attitudes 
towards the current situation devised by the Taiwanese authorities.  
                                                
68 Regarding the awareness of changing political conditions, Peterson (2002: 17–39) applies an 
emotion-based approach to the study of ethnic violence in the Balkans. He posits that 
structural change would produce tension among the groups, or perceived threats from other 
groups, giving rise to specific emotions that would generate associated desires and 
behaviour, just as the fear of an animal attack triggers a desire for safety and the attempt to 
find it (Ibid.: 22–23). Peterson calls this process ‘belief-formation’, whereby the generated 
emotion reinforces beliefs that have already adapted in accordance with the structural 
change. Again, we observe the dynamic of emotion as a feature of sociological analysis. 
69 For a thorough analysis, see chapter 4. 
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Emotions felt by the survivors interviewed in my field research do not 
merely reflect their individual experiences, but also reflect a kind of social 
practice that implicates how the survivors present themselves and describe 
their past to the public. That is to say, their emotions mirror the society’s 
sense of ‘change’ during this transitional period, reflecting the wishes of the 
transitional authorities and survivors respectively, and the tension between 
the two. In Elster’s words, emotion is not only about one’s inner mental 
activities, emotion could shape the proceeding of justice, works of history, 
and cultural works. Also, emotions constitute a reaction to given socio-
political conditions. In this era of reconciliation, as one voice is heard, 
another voice remains silent, and this ingrained tension is the object of the 
study of the politics of memory. 
 
 
 
Ethical issues 
In accordance with the rules promulgated by the Cambridge Social Science 
Research Ethics Committee and the British Sociology Association, each interview 
undertaken in the course of this research was conducted only after obtaining 
the respondent’s prior agreement. In addition, I was obliged to describe my 
doctoral research to my interviewees before seeking their agreement. As I 
made an audio recording of all interviews, I was further required to obtain 
their agreement before recording commenced, to conduct the transcript of 
the recordings myself, and to allow them to review the transcripts before 
citing them in this research. Also, followed by my participants’ requests, the 
transcripts cited in the thesis are listed in anonymous. 
After agreeing to be interviewed, each of them narrated their life story 
to me in at least three separate sessions. Our conversations, in Taiwanese or 
Mandarin, typically lasted from two to four hours. The venues were their 
homes, offices, human rights parks, restaurant, café and so forth. Interviews 
always started during the day time, while some of which lasted until 
evenings. 
However, there were occasions, such as survivors’ dinners, or film 
screenings, that were not appropriate for audio recording; in those 
circumstances, I took handwritten notes instead. These are cited in the thesis 
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as ‘field research notes’, to differentiate them from the transcripts of audio 
recordings. 
Although I aim to understand the tension between the respective 
discourses of the survivors and authorities in the field of transitional justice, 
the life-story narrative structure matters, for this helps researchers to 
comprehend how the narrators recognise and express their past experiences. 
Person-centred narratives have the potential to bring to light the subtext that 
supports their narrative style. In this case, I minimised my role as a 
researcher in the preliminary stages of the interviews. As Thompson states, a 
good interview requires a researcher who is willing to sit quietly and listen 
(2000: 222, originally published in 1978). While I began by forming a rapport 
or relationship of trust with my informants, I then took a more active role as 
a participant observer during the interviews and at a subsequent informal 
gathering of survivors. At this stage, I often raised more specific and direct 
questions, such as: Did you think of yourself as a political dissident? How would 
you define yourself now? Such questions may appear too simple or even 
superfluous, yet they can draw out potential paradoxes or tensions that are 
rooted in the survivors’ memories. Listeners need to be aware of the extent to 
which their role constitutes an intervention of sorts in a conversation, and 
avoid ‘seducing’ narrators into giving answers that are tailored to the 
listener’s expectations. As Rosenthal (1993: 62) states: 
 
The narrator does not simply reproduce pre-fabricated stories 
from her or his life regardless of the interactional situation, but 
rather creates his or her story within the social process of 
mutual orientation according to his or her definition of the 
interview situation. […] Life stories, taken as constructs, are 
inseparable from these interactional processes; they themselves 
evolve out of the genetic process of interaction, just as their 
presentation in the biographical research interviews a product 
of the interaction between narrator and listener.  
 
Following Rosenthal’s argument, neither narrators nor listeners adopt an 
absolutely passive or active role during interviews, for they are in a 
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constantly interactive relationship with one another—a relationship that is 
underpinned by a particular socio-political context. We are all in constant 
interaction with our context in ways that circumscribe how we narrate 
ourselves, but as individuals, we seek to identify ourselves and our life 
experiences as unique. While, at the normative level, researchers must refrain 
from leading their subjects to produce storylines that fit their expectations, at 
the methodological level, they should be aware of the wider context in which 
we continuously operate, which frames the way we narrate our past 
experiences in the present.  
Certain inherent risks of field research—especially as they pertain to 
my respondents—were a matter of great concern throughout this research. 
The White Terror in Taiwan constituted both a prolonged political conflict 
and an era of extreme state repression. Interviews may lead narrators to 
recall unbearable episodes that were too private and painful for them to 
expose to others, even those closest to them. Such recollections may cause 
them to fall silent or change the subject. I learned to home in on what was 
said just before or after such an interruption, when the narrators were 
presumably drawn to relive the past once again. In Gordon’s words, it can be 
understood as ‘haunting’: 
 
Haunting was the language and the experiential modality by 
which I tried to reach an understanding of the meeting of force 
and meaning, because haunting is one way in which abusive 
systems of power make themselves known and their impacts 
felt in everyday life, especially when they are supposedly over 
and done with (slavery, for instance) or when their oppressive 
nature is denied (as in free labour or national security). 
Haunting is not the same as being exploited, traumatised, or 
oppressed, although it usually involves these experiences or is 
produced by them. What's distinctive about haunting is that it 
is an animated state in which a repressed or unresolved social 
violence is making itself known, sometimes very directly, 
sometimes more obliquely. I used the term haunting to describe 
those singular yet repetitive instances when home becomes 
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unfamiliar, when your bearings on the world lose direction, 
when the over-and-done-with comes alive, when what's been 
in your blind spot comes into view (2008: xvi, originally 
published in 1997).  
 
With this in mind, as a researcher, one can promise to avoid deliberately 
inciting uncomfortable emotions that will return to haunt the narrator, while 
recognising silences as a form of narration transcends the traditional 
approach that views only verbalised narrative as reliable evidence for 
analysis. In contrast, as explained in chapter 4, silence is itself a language, a 
practice that is adopted by narrators during interviews.  
   
 
Conclusion  
This research focuses on the ways in which the past political situation in 
Taiwan continues to shape current Taiwanese society and how, conversely, 
the present situation shapes the retrospective view of Cold War Taiwan. 
Taiwan’s transitional justice project provides a vital means for examining the 
politics of memory, on which the survivors of past political repression offer a 
unique perspective. 
To study the politics of memory is to study memory in terms of power 
relations. The Foucauldian perspective views power relations as a process of 
production, in which individuals are not merely passive. The extent to which 
the survivors’ transitional justice discourses confirm or contradict the official 
transitional justice discourse is an indication of how past and current 
political conditions have mobilised the production of particular discourses 
by survivors and by the Taiwanese authorities.  
With the proposed analytic framework, the first task of studying 
Taiwan’s transitional justice scheme is to examine how have the current 
power relations established its official discourse on defining the identity of 
political victim and the idea of persecution in Taiwan. Given the introduction 
of my 24 respondents, it is sufficient to deduce that the official discourse is 
limited yet dominant, by which my participants have not been embraced by 
a full recognition of their past in Taiwan. Context of the “dominance” that 
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lies behind expects a further elaboration. In particular, as researches (Wu 
2005; Hwang 2016) have argued the flaw of Taiwan’s transitional justice as it 
fails to make the KMT regime accountable for the past atrocities. Also, a 
tension between perspective of political conflict and persecution is 
discovered amongst researches, as some focus on facts of persecution 
without justifying the importance of the perspective of political conflict, 
when other researches emphasise the insurgent part, yet merely view the 
flaw of reconciliation scheme as the outcome of the prolonged political 
struggle between pro-unification and pro-independence. In short, without 
rethinking the legacy of the Cold War in the present-day Taiwan, already 
published critiques fail to elaborate how Taiwan’s transitional justice 
becomes this limited and biased.  
At this point, chapter 3 draws attention to the formation of the official 
transitional justice discourse, in terms of the listed archives, materials for 
documentary analysis and my field research with the survivors. As discussed, 
transitional justice has been fashion as an enterprise of reconciliation with 
respect to human rights, victimhood and democracy since the advent of the 
post-Cold War era. Official transitional justice discourse in this light 
expounds on the way in which an authority comes to terms with the past 
atrocities delivers its remorse, to achieve reconciliation with the formerly 
abused ones, insomuch the whole of society. Hence, I will start the discussion 
from reviewing Taiwan’s historic incidents that called for vindication of the 
“political prisoners” happened in the late 1970 and the 1980s, to offer a 
thorough critique of how had the KMT regime during the White Terror been 
forced to re-identify its already convicted political enemies, and how a 
specific contrition discourse is grounded and consolidated through the KMT 
regime in the early 1990s and the later three elected governments from 1996 
to 2016.   
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Chapter 3  
The culture of contrition in Taiwan  
 
 
When all are guilty, no one is; confessions of collective guilt are 
the best possible safeguard against the discovery of culprits, and 
the very magnitude of the crime the best excuse for doing 
nothing. 
 —Hannah Arendt, On Violence 
 
You think that just because it’s already happened, the past is 
unfinished and unchangeable? Oh, no, the past is clocked in 
multi-coloured taffeta and every time we look at it we see a 
different hue. 
 —Milan Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting 
 
 
Introduction 
Previous chapters emphasise the need to understand the scheme of 
transitional justice in Taiwan as a response to the politics of the post-Cold 
War era. The Cold War played out in Taiwan not only as a prolonged 
ideological battle and an epic global confrontation but also as a polarisation 
of Taiwanese society, effectively marginalising dissidents who ostensibly 
posed a danger to the KMT regime. The White Terror in Taiwan was a state 
of war that turned the whole of Taiwanese society into a battleground at the 
grassroots level (Hajimu 2015: 283). The Treason Reporting Act, promulgated 
in 1946, resulted in many citizens being recruited as informants to report 
potential traitors in their communities to the KMT regime. Also, according to 
the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and the TRA of 1979,70 the White Terror took 
place with significant support from the US against the backdrop of the Cold 
War, which lasted from the late 1940s to the early 1990s. By utilising the Cold 
                                                
70 See further articulation in chapter 1. 
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War paradigm of socialism versus capitalism, the KMT regime persuaded 
citizens that there was an urgent political need to eliminate communists 
within Taiwan.71 The term ‘political need’ denotes how the KMT regime 
rallied society to combat supposed political threats, including the left wing 
unification and pro-independence causes. The government persuaded its 
citizens that it was incumbent on the ROC to repel the threat of the Soviet 
Union in East Asia.72 As a result, the majority of Taiwanese people accepted 
the excesses of the KMT authorities as necessary in order to sustain the KMT 
regime and secure protection from the US. Thus, the White Terror was a time 
of political repression but, seen from another perspective, it was a time of 
appropriate vigilance. 
When the end of the Cold War brought to an end the antagonism 
between the United States and the Soviet Union at the global level, did 
political conflicts between the Taiwanese government and Taiwanese 
dissidents similarly cease? To answer this effectively, we must scrutinise how 
society in the present reckons with the past. As Taiwan has been engaged in 
a democratic transition since the late 1980s, studying its transitional justice 
programme, i.e., the transitional justice discourse, should provide answers to 
the question.  
Taiwan’s transitional justice programme extends to various events 
and sites, including commemorations, monuments, museums, oral history, 
and documentaries, as well as legal arrangements. The official discourse, in 
this context, applies to a series of institutional arrangements. Given the three-
aspect analytic framework developed in chapter 2, the construction of the 
past in analysed in terms of justice, truth, and ethos aspects.  
The justice aspect of the programme is expressed in the legal 
restoration of the human rights that were previously violated. The truth 
aspect focuses on the accumulation of knowledge about the White Terror 
                                                
71 Chapter 1 discusses how the Truman administration and the KMT joined forces in a series 
of institutional arrangements, including military cooperation (MAAG), financial support, 
and an information service (USIS) under the framework of the Mutual Security Act in 1951. 
Although the US and ROC terminated formal diplomatic relations in 1979, the KMT 
continued to enjoy the benefits of US cooperation under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). 
72 As discussed in chapter 1, the Cold War in Taiwan signified not only a war against the 
threat of the Eastern bloc, but also a war against diverse internal threats to the authority of 
the KMT regime. However, the bipolar framing of the Cold War in East Asia enabled the 
KMT to enlist the support of the US. 
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through archives, documentation, oral history and other works, which shape 
how this episode in the nation’s past has been defined and developed its 
meaning in the present. The ethos aspect gives an account of the 
representation and imagination of the White Terror through the sites of 
memory, including monuments, museums, and historic sites in Taiwan, as 
well as art, crafts and objects, such as letters, photos and films.  
By reviewing the evolution of the official discourse since the early 
1990s, this chapter highlights the statements, events, and institutional 
arrangements related to the three-aspect analytic framework, examining the 
context of transitional justice scheme, i.e., the official transitional justice 
discourse, by which survivors learn to narrate their past in a certain way. In 
this regard, this chapter aims to explore the extent to which have survivors’ 
narratives been restricted or liberated in the state-sponsored transitional 
justice scheme.  
 
 
The introduction of ‘political victims’: The Formosa 
Incident in 1979  
As stated, the White Terror had been perceived as a time of severe political 
conflict between the KMT regime and their enemy in Taiwan during the time. 
Those accused and convicted ones were in this light a group of political 
enemy, i.e., political prisoners under the KMT party-state. However, under 
this serious political control, Taiwanese society slightly changed its 
perception of these ‘political prisoner’, for a group of political advocates 
named these men ‘political victim’ as they were persecuted under the 
dictatorship. That is, it was the advocates outside the reign of authority 
introduced the identity of political victim to Taiwan, and resulted in a 
serious political oppression which was known as the Formosa Incident. 
The story has to be traced back to the 1970s. In the wake of the ROC’s 
loss of UN membership in 1971, the KMT regime faced a series of challenges 
within Taiwan.73 When Chiang Kai-Shek died in 1975, the KMT announced 
                                                
73 Hsiau (2003) investigates the social movement of the 1970s in Taiwan through the 
emergence of Taiwanese Nationalism, especially in the cultural aspect, during the White 
Terror. 
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the commutation of life imprisonment for those who had been convicted of 
treason. Nonetheless, although political control in Taiwan seemed to loosen 
after that, the government still loomed large in people’s lives and citizens 
who had been imprisoned were still designated as ‘political enemies’. 
Despite the slightly changing situation under martial law, it was 
illegal to publish a periodical in the ROC without the permission of the 
government. Nonetheless, determined to be involved in electoral politics, 
intellectuals and candidates took the risk of issuing unauthorised 
publications. 74  Among these, Formosa magazine was the most famous, 
publishing its first issue in August 1979. With some 61 editorial committee 
members, it set up local editorial offices in cities and rural areas all over 
Taiwan. Formosa operated as a political party, not only publishing a journal 
but also organising public speaking events. Although the KMT’s presence 
loomed over Formosa, monitoring its various forbidden activities,75 the people 
of Taiwan were not intimidated; the circulation increased steadily—100,000 
for the first issue, 90,000 for the next; then 110,000, reaching 140,000 by its 
fourth and final issue.  
As the magazine gathered support within Taiwan, Formosa’s 
publishers decided to organise a commemoration on International Human 
Rights Day 1979 in honour of the Taiwanese citizens who had been subjected 
to human rights abuses. It planned public demonstrations and speeches to 
take place in Kaohsiung City. In addition, Formosa was planning to announce 
the launch of a ‘human rights’ section of the magazine on this occasion. As 
Formosa held a public demonstration on 10 December 1979 without obtaining 
an official permit as prescribed by law, the event resulted in a violent clash 
between citizens and police in the streets. The government accused eight 
individuals of treason, with 31 others tried on other charges. To obtain the 
                                                
74 During the White Terror in Taiwan, the first political periodical《自由中國》 (Liberal China) 
was released in November 1949 by a group of mainlanders who championed liberalism. This 
periodical ceased publication in 1960 as its chief member, Lei Chen, managed to organise a 
political group that offended the KMT regime. However, political dissent in Taiwan was 
never completely deterred during the White Terror. Before martial law was annulled in 1987, 
some 10 political periodicals, each of which stood for different political leanings, were 
published, including《臺灣政論》, 《夏潮》, 《八十年代》, 《美麗島》and so forth.  
75 According to published oral history, the KMT often sent its police or secret agents to 
observe or disrupt these events. For further details, see: 張炎憲、溫秋芬編 (2006) 見證關鍵時
刻高雄事件：「台灣之音」錄音紀錄選輯。台北：吳三連史料基金會.  
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release of the eight defendants, 15 lawyers, including the future president of 
Taiwan, Chen Shui-Bian, organised the defence. The incident later became 
known as the ‘Formosa Incident’ or ‘Kaohsiung Incident’, capturing 
international attention. 
At the time, activists from the US reported the incident and managed 
to obtain the release of those arrested by publishing on-going reports that 
drew international scrutiny to the situation. Among such activists, Lynn 
Miles (1943–2015) campaigned for the release of political prisoners in the late 
1960s, having learned Mandarin in Taiwan in 1965. Due to these activities, 
Miles was forcibly deported by the KMT and subsequently relocated to 
Osaka, Japan, where he acted as a link between Taiwanese activists, overseas 
Chinese based in the US, and US journalists.76 Prior to the Formosa Incident, 
there had been foreign activists in Taiwan who had obtained the release of 
political prisoners, starting in the late 1960s;77 Lynn Miles was one of them. To 
attain this goal, human rights organisations such as Amnesty International 
worked with Taiwanese expatriates based in Japan and the US to publicise 
the oppression occurring in Taiwan. With this support, the Formosa Incident 
immediately focused attention on Taiwan from overseas; accordingly, the 
Formosa Incident enjoyed the highest visibility amongst political cases 
during the White Terror. 
Amongst all the political prosecutions undertaken during the White 
Terror in Taiwan, the ‘Formosa Incident’ was the first to give rise to a public 
assertion of the concept of ‘human rights’. Since then, Taiwanese society has 
tended to perceive individuals accused of treason not as political ‘criminals’ 
or enemies of the state so much as political ‘victims’ of human rights 
                                                
76 張炎憲，沈亮編 (2010) 梅心怡人權相關書信集：跨國人權救援的開端 1968-1674。台北：吳
三連台灣史料基金會 
77 In 1964, political activist Hsieh Tsung-Min drafted the Declaration of the Self-help 
Movement of the People of Taiwan (in Chinese, 台灣人民自救宣言) and was subsequently 
convicted of treason. While in prison, Hsieh made a list of political prisoners and sent it to an 
associate on the outside, Peng Ming-Min, in 1967. Peng passed it to the US government later 
that year, yet that list has only recently been revealed. Similar actions were taken several 
times between 1967 and 75. Amnesty International and expatriates in Japan published part 
of the list in 1972. The expatriates in question belonged to the Taiwan independence 
movement. Throughout the White Terror, the movement in Japan constituted the majority of 
international support for Taiwanese independence. For further details, see 陳嘉宏 (2006) 台
灣獨立運動史 。台北：玉山社. 
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violations.78 In this regard, by introducing the perspective of suffering, a 
recognition of former political prisoners as testaments to the existence of 
persecution has gradually emerged and been consolidated in Taiwan. And it 
was the starting point of the unofficial transitional justice discourse of the 
White Terror in Taiwan. 
 
 
Non-official remorse for the 228 Incident  
Only until the 1990s, did Taiwanese authorities come to terms with the past 
political oppression under the KMT regime. After the Formosa Incident, 
Taiwanese advocates continued to propagate the idea of political victim in 
spite of their political agitation remained risky and could even have lethal 
consequences for individuals as long as martial law and the Temporary 
Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion remained in force. 
This uncertain situation sparked political protest in various forms, including 
the publishing of banned periodicals.  
Amongst the advocates, Cheng Nan-Jung (in Chinese, 鄭南榕) was 
one of the most representative activist for he was the first one who publicly 
defined 228 Incident as the result of  the KMT atrocities.79  
On 4 February 1987, Cheng Nan-Jung and his associates founded the 
228 Incident Peace Promotion (hereafter, 228 IPP), an organisation whose 
                                                
78  It was believed that the attention Taiwan’s contentious politics garnered overseas 
concentrated mainly on human rights issues. That is, an occurrence such as the Formosa 
Incident was seen as evidence of ‘political oppression’ rather than ‘political struggle’.  
79 Before discussing how the 228 Incident has been remembered by successive governments, 
it is useful to examine further Cheng’s role in 1980s Taiwan, for his story illustrates the 
winding and bumpy path of democratisation. Cheng Nan-Jung (12 September 1947–7 April 
1989) was a journalist, writer, and intellectual. Although he was the son of immigrants from 
the mainland, he did not promote unification with mainland China, but advocated 
Taiwanese independence throughout his life. Taking a stand for political rights and freedom 
of speech in Taiwan, Cheng refused to be arrested by the KMT, preferring instead to commit 
suicide by setting fire to himself as heavily-armed police came for him on the morning of 7 
April 1989. Martial law had been lifted in 1987, but the TPECR were still in force at the time. 
As I have remarked, various social and political movements have flourished in post-war 
Taiwan. But no one has acted as Cheng did. On the day of Cheng’s self-immolation, the 
United Evening News (In Chinese, 聯合晚報) broadcast that Cheng had not been in his right 
mind when he set himself on fire.79 An officer told the United Evening News that it was 
frightening to confront such a madman.79 In the days following Cheng’s death, news reports 
continued to feature a story of Cheng suffering from mental illness, as the government 
sought to define Cheng’s self-immolation as an aberrant individual act rather than a 
manifestation of revolution or a blow being struck for democracy. Nonetheless, there was a 
group of Cheng’s associates and supporters who mourned his death as a painful but 
inspiring milestone in the fight for democracy. 
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first act was to issue a manifesto directing five requests to the KMT regime: 1) 
Disclose the historical truth about the 228 Incident; 2) Redress the grievances 
of the victims; 3) Apologise to the victims, their bereaved, and the Taiwanese 
people; 4) Embark on research and investigation of the events, as well as 
erecting monuments and museums; and 5) Declare 28 February the National 
Day of Remembrance of the 228 Incident.80  
Following the manifesto, Cheng embarked on a speaking tour across 
Taiwan, leading 23 parades between 15  February and 17 March 1987. Cheng 
and his supporters often encountered obstruction from the KMT during their 
public events; nonetheless, he hosted the first public commemoration of the 
victims of the 228 Incident on its 40th anniversary in 1987. This was also the 
year when the White Terror officially ended, as Chiang Chin-Kuo revoked 
martial law on 15 July 1987. 
While Cheng and his fellows’ plea for historical disclosure appear to 
be the first wave in the process of reconstructing this portion of Taiwan’s 
past, there had in fact been a limited amount of research and some materials 
already published concerning the 228 Incident published, including a so-
called ‘truth report’ published by the Taiwan Provincial Government in 
1966.81 In that report, a few formerly classified documents were disclosed to 
the public, although only a fragmented picture of the 228 Incident emerged 
and it remained a taboo topic in Taiwanese society until the late 1980s.  
Nonetheless, Cheng still reached a milestone of inciting a wave of 
remembering the past political wounds, in the face of the absence of the KMT 
in the 1980s. Since then, Taiwanese society, including the later developed 
official discourse regard 228 Incident as the starting point of the KMT past 
atrocities in Taiwan. This forms the very basis for the later government 
account for the past White Terror. 
 
 
Official remorse for the 228 Incident 
                                                
80 張富忠、邱萬興 (2005) 綠色年代---台灣民主運動 25 年，1975-2000 上冊 pp. 248-250. 台北：
印刻中文。 
81 According to the collection from the National Taiwan Library, the first publication was: 台
灣省文獻會 (1966) 台灣省二二八事件之真相。臺灣：台灣省政府 
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In 1989, the government published its first account ever of the 228 Incident.82 
In 1995, it went on to issue its first official apology, on the 48th anniversary of 
the 228 Incident, when the president of Taiwan, Lee Teng-Hui, made the 
following statement at the unveiling of a monument in Taipei 228 Memorial 
Park: 
 
Today, those bereaved by the 228 Incident can behold the 
monument, which stands for the historical justice and ethnic 
harmony achieved in our beloved land. Also, they can hear 
Teng-Hui admit the offences committed by the government in 
the past, and solemnly apologise to the bereaved on behalf of 
the government. I believe that, by offering forgiveness, you will 
warm every heart in Taiwan. It is unfortunate timing that the 
monument was not erected earlier so that some of the bereaved 
who have now passed away would have been able to bear 
witness today.83  
 
This was the first official KMT account of the 228 Incident that made 
reference to political atrocities. However, none of the victims and bereaved of 
the White Terror were addressed specifically by the apology. The 
government acknowledged the oppressive nature of its actions, but failed to 
recognise any of those it had persecuted. 
The identity of the political victims of the 228 Incident soon emerged, 
however, when the government promulgated The 228 Incident Disposition and 
Compensation Act (二二八事件處理與補償條例, hereafter, the 228 Act) on 7 
April 1995. This was the first legal enactment dealing with the KMT regime’s 
past political repression in Taiwan. The government also set up the 228 
Memorial Foundation (hereafter, 228 Foundation) to deal with compensation 
and commemoration matters. 
While official remorse for the 228 Incident saw significant progress in 
the 1990s, survivors of the White Terror failed to receive any official apology 
                                                
82 行政院新聞局 (1989) 二二八事件專案報告。臺灣：行政院新聞局 
83 The complete speech, read by the President of the Canada Taiwanese Society, Chung Ya-
Tze, is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8vwyYMNpj4.  
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during that time. Progress in that regard occurred only at a non-official level. 
In 1993, a survivor of the White Terror, Tseng Mei-Lan, discovered the 
remains of her executed brother, Hsu Ching-Lan, in the Liuzhangli cemetery 
(in Chinese, 六張犁), in Taipei City, following a 30-year search.84 Prior to this 
discovery, Liuzhangli had been presumed, since the Japanese colonial period, 
to be an ordinary public cemetery. Following this dramatic revelation, the 
remains of 200 political prisoners who had been executed by the KMT regime 
during the early 1950s were discovered and identified.85 Liuzhangli was then 
revealed to be a site of mass graves, which provided vivid evidence of the 
extent of political oppression carried out by the KMT regime. It was the first 
ever memory site of the White Terror. Another survivor, Chen Ying-Tai, 
observes that this revelation initiated a wave of reconsideration of the history 
of the White Terror in Taiwan.86 That is, the survivors rather than the 
authorities initiated the wave of remembrance of both the 228 Incident and 
the White Terror. 
 
 
Remorse without accountability: 1996–2000 
Almost a decade after the dawn of democratisation, in March 1996, Taiwan 
held its first democratic presidential election, which resulted in President Lee 
Teng-Hui retaining authority in the name of the KMT for four more years. 
While this election has been universally hailed as a milestone for 
democratisation, this section looks at how the result limited the contrition 
discourse in Taiwan, leading to a state of public remorse without legal 
sanctions. 
 
Compensation without accountability  
During Lee Teng-Hui’s presidency, the first phase of institutional 
arrangements for revisiting the White Terror was initiated by the enactment 
                                                
84 Both Tseng Mei-Lan and Hsu Ching-Lan were communists who were convicted of treason 
in 1950. Tseng was sentenced to 10 years in prison, while Hsu was executed in August 1952.  
85 The investigation concluded that most of the tombstones were identified as belonging to 
persons who had been executed between 1950 and 1954. Further information can be found at: 
http://goo.gl/957df7.  
86 See Chen Ying-Tai’s personal web site: http://goo.gl/MUaJn9.  
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on 17 June 1998 of the Act on Compensation for Wrongful Trials on Charges of 
Sedition and Espionage during the Martial Law Period (戒嚴時期不當叛亂暨匪諜
審判案件補償條例 , hereafter, Compensation Act). It called for the 
establishment of the Foundation for Compensation for Improper Verdicts on 
Sedition Cases during the Martial Law Period (hereafter, Compensation 
Foundation), which was accomplished later that year. Fifteen years later, on 9 
September 2014, in accordance with the mandate prescribed by the Act and 
an extension made in 2012, the Foundation was officially dissolved.87 At that 
time, it released the following statement: 
 
Taiwan was under martial law from 20 May 1950 to 14 July 
1987. Notwithstanding the historical background, this period 
would prove to be a time of heart-breaking and unforgettable 
agony to those innocent ones accused of treason. After the lifting 
of martial law, in the light of foreign cases and considering the 
current political and social milieu in Taiwan, the Taiwanese 
government is attempting to face history and elaborate an 
ordinance that is both reasonable and just, to compensate the 
falsely convicted appropriately.88  
 
In this statement, the terms innocent ones and falsely convicted presumably 
apply to every political victim. However, according to the language of the 
Compensation Act, the ROC government seemed to have adopted a particular 
approach to the victims of the White Terror. According to Article VIII of the 
Act:  
 
One may not apply for compensation in any of the following 
circumstances: 
 
1. One has already received compensation according to the 
Wrongful Imprisonment Compensation or Compensation for 
the 228 Incident based on the same facts.  
                                                
87 For the context of the extension, see the next section of this chapter.  
88 Translation is my own. Emphasis added.  
 105	
2. The conviction for sedition or treason survives reviews 
according to current laws or current rules of evidence. 
 
The review mentioned in the second subparagraph of the 
preceding paragraph shall be done on a case-by-case basis by a 
review committee set up by the Foundation.89 
 
To ensure conformity with the second subparagraph, the Foundation was 
authorised to organise a 15-member review committee comprising academics, 
socially prominent citizens, and government representatives. Every past 
conviction had to be cleared by the committee in order for an application for 
compensation to be granted.  
As yet the Foundation has not published any documentation about 
the findings of the review committee. 90  It is only known that the 
Compensation Foundation rejected 96 of the 10,065 cases—a rejection rate of 
0.95% (Wu 2015: 39)—and that most of these rejections were based on a 
finding that the person for whom the application was made had possessed 
weapons during the White Terror.  
Under this dispensation, the rationale of the atrocities carried out by 
the KMT regime during the White Terror faced no substantive challenge, and 
the rights that had been violated were not vindicated by the Compensation Act. 
As the legislation was written, only political victims who were verified as 
‘identified as innocent without any subversive intention’ were eligible to 
reclaim their reputations and receive financial compensation. The scope of 
Taiwan’s scheme of vindication in this sense is limited to those who are 
recognised as having been falsely accused. Such persons would be identified 
as ‘political victims’ rather than ‘political threats’. The unspoken implication 
was that if they had actually committed the ‘offences’ with which they were 
charged, the treatment they received during the White Terror could be 
rationalised. 
Shortly after the promulgation of the Compensation Act in 1998, a 
White Terror survivor, Wu Shu-Pei (in Chinese: 吳樹培), commented that, 
                                                
89 See complete text in Appendix V.  
90 At least by May 2016. 
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although the Compensation Act marked a major step in the government’s 
acknowledgment that it indeed had ‘political victims’,91 the Compensation 
Act’s provisions nevertheless disappointed him. Apart from the its limited 
understanding of innocence, only the victims’ immediate family members—
spouses, children, and parents—were eligible to claim financial 
compensation. Since most of the victims were too young to have had children 
before being arrested, most had only parents and siblings. Only the latter 
were likely to be still alive, and they were excluded from compensation. 
Furthermore, the Compensation Act allowed only for compensation with 
respect to a victim’s real property that had been confiscated. Financial assets 
could not be recovered under the Compensation Act.  
Wu Shu-Pei condemns the 15-member review committee for failing to 
consult the surviving victims and their families in the course of their 
investigations. The Act was disparaged not only by survivors but also by 
political science scholar Wu Nai-Te (2005), who argues that the financial 
compensation envisaged under the Act constitutes not ‘compensation’ (賠償 
Pei-Chan) but ‘reparations’ (補償 Bu-Chan).92 
The distinction may seem difficult to comprehend in English, as both 
versions would probably be translated as ‘Compensation Act’. The difference 
between補償 (Bu-Chan) and 賠償 (Pei-Chan) is such that the first tends to be 
understood as a payment made when one’s actions, however cruel, were not 
wrongful or unjustifiable, whereas Pei-Chan implies that the deed for which 
one is making amends was unequivocally wrong. From Wu’s perspective, 
the fact that the KMT government did not apologise for the actions of its 
agents shows that it reserves the right to claim that its political repression 
                                                
91 Wu Shu-Pei was born and grew up in Taiwan under Japanese rule, joining the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) in 1948. Following the KMT regime’s retreat to Taiwan in 1949, Wu 
was arrested in 1950 and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment. Following his release, Wu 
endeavoured to facilitate China’s reunification with Taiwan as a left-wing political cause. In 
addition, to differentiate the political cause of Chinese reunification survivors from that of 
other political survivors who supported Taiwanese independence, Wu and his associates 
founded the Political Victims Fraternity in Taiwan (台灣地區政治受難人互助會, hereafter 
Huzhuhui) in 1988. When Wu commented on the Act, he was also President of Huzhuhui. 
Further details on Huzhuhui can be found in chapter 5. The full text of the article can be 
found at: http://www.haixiainfo.com.tw/95-2402.html.  
92 Wu himself asserts the difference between the two English terms ‘compensation’ and 
‘reparations’ on a practical level. However, to remain close to the context posed here, I 
choose to explain the difference between these two terms in Chinese. 
 107	
was defensible, albeit misapplied or over-zealous. That is to say, the regime’s 
atrocities during the Cold War have remained justified to some extent in the 
name of anti-communism and the need to counter other potential political 
enemies in Taiwan. To the KMT, the White Terror marked a series of political 
struggles, with repression as an ‘inevitable’ corollary. However, the high 
success rate of applications for compensation enables the regime to 
congratulate itself, while encouraging the official discourse to avoid 
scrutinising the justification of the past atrocities.  
 
The hurdle of truth-seeking  
Without any attempt to hold individuals accountable for their roles in 
perpetuating it, President Lee Teng-Hui issued the first ever public apology 
for the White Terror, on the occasion of the erection of the monument to the 
White Terror on Green Island on Human Rights Day 1999. He stated: 
 
Thanks to our forefathers’ contribution to democracy, we can 
now enjoy a life of freedom, and practise democratic ideals in a 
liberal society. Therefore, I am here as a representative of the 
government to express the sincerest tribute to those who fought 
for democracy and, furthermore, to express the deepest 
apologies to those who were oppressed for pursuing human 
rights.93 
 
Still, the reason for these individuals’ oppression remains unspoken, with the 
consequence that the image of the perpetrator remains blurred. For instance, 
Sung Chu-Yu, a former governor of Taiwan province, 94 issued the following 
preface to the publication in 1998 of a five-volume work entitled Historical 
Data Collected on Political Cases during the 1950s Martial Law Period in Taiwan 
(in Chinese: 台灣戒嚴時期五Ｏ年代政治案件史料彙編; hereafter, HDCP).95 
                                                
93 The complete version can be found at: http://goo.gl/b8W2ln 
94 Taiwan Province was part of the administrative division of the ROC under the KMT regime, 
which claimed to rule all the provinces on the mainland as well. Only when it abandoned 
that fiction in 1998 did Taiwan cease having a separate provincial government; Sung Chu-Yu 
therefore became its last governor.  
95 According to these volumes, the Provincial Documentation Committee conducted the 
investigation between 1995 and 1998, during which time 621 survivors of 1950s’ political 
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[…] As a government body, we play an observer role, merely 
recording without judgment the past that happened on our 
territory. […] Political cases which happened during the 1950s 
resulted from the specific conditions of that time and place, 
while the PRC regime was engaged in a plot of ‘domestic 
revolution’ in Taiwan under slogans such as ‘Emancipate 
Taiwan’, ‘Wage massacre in Taiwan’, and so on. It was not 
merely verbal intimidation, but a series of concrete armed 
military provocations designed to promote infiltration, 
subversion, and divisiveness. The government in this sense had 
no choice but to adopt the tactics of the Treason Act in order to 
cope with these thorny issues and threats (Sung 1998: 1–2).96 
 
Throughout the preface, Sung Chu-Yu appears to have an attitude identical 
to that of President Lee Teng-Hui, as Sung echoes Lee’s ‘limited remorse’. 
Only citizens who were proven not to have harboured subversive intentions 
or committed subversive deeds could be recognised as ‘victims’ under the 
Compensation Act, and both Lee Teng-Hui and Sung Chu-Yu failed to censure 
past abuses. Taiwanese society was thus coming to terms with the White 
Terror without pointing the finger at any perpetrators (Wu 2005).  
When I asked my interviews about their thoughts on the official 
sponsored work, none of my participants express their satisfaction with the 
works such as HDCP. Instead, they show their doubt and disappointment 
whilst speaking of the publication under Lee’s presidency. 
 
I don’t remember how did I reach the volume, yet I am sure I 
completely disagree with the assertion made by Sung. […] It was 
not my fault for my past insurgency, but their (the KMT regime) 
fault. They have to take responsibility for the past wrongdoings, 
rather than escaping from it (transcript of VC 2012.12)! 
                                                                                                                                     
oppression were interviewed; 312 of them agreed to the publication of their narratives, 
although this did not occur all at once. 
96 My own translation. 
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 Yes, I did receive the compensation. But it doesn’t mean 
that I agreed with the rationale of the Act. I just thought I 
deserve the compensation! [….] I am not happy with the 
rationale of the Act and the volume, but what can I say, I am 
nobody. I am only an elderly who is about to die (transcript of JH 
2013.12). 
 
Arguably the narratives cited here indicate an inconsistency of the 
expectation of the ‘political apology’ made by the government between 
the so-called perpetrators and persecuted ones. During Taiwan’s 
political transition, political apologies are a favoured technique for 
reckoning with past atrocities in order to constitute ‘new moral orders’.97 
However, the contrition discourse that developed during Lee’s 
presidency under the Compensation Act created a situation of ‘apology 
in the absence of accountability’, and Taiwan did not constitute a new 
moral order. Accordingly, a restricted contrition discourse developed 
and was reinforced. It was the government that identified who was 
deserving of official remorse.  
 
 
The memory boom period: 2000–2008 
When the DPP ended the KMT’s 55-year rule by winning the elections in 
2000, the new government immediately asserted its ambition to make 
Taiwan a new model for human rights. With this ambition, Chen Shui-Bian 
made the following statement in his inauguration speech:  
 
[…] Moreover, we are also willing to make a more active 
contribution towards safeguarding international human rights. 
The Republic of China cannot and will not remain aloof from 
global human rights trends. We will abide by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Convention on 
Civil and Political Rights, and the Vienna Declaration and 
                                                
97 Moon, C. (2008). Narrating Political Reconciliation (p.22). Lexington Books. 
 110	
Programme of Action [adopted by the World Conference on 
Human Rights in 1993]. We will bring the Republic of China 
back into the international human rights system.98 
 
With these stated priorities, the DPP government officially introduced 
international human rights norms into Taiwan. It was the first time that 
Taiwan’s official transitional justice discourse had the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) as a benchmark, after the unofficial discourse 
firstly introduce UDHR in accordance with the outbreak of the Formosa 
Incident in 1979. 
During Chen Shui-Bian’s two-term presidency (2000–2008), nine state-
sponsored oral history projects were carried out and published.99 Also, there 
were 19 official publications issued, including an anthology of academic 
research, and formerly classified documents were partially released.100 In a 
vein of commemoration, two former political prisons located in Jingmei (in 
Chinese: 景美) and on Green Island (in Chinese: 綠島; 火燒島) were 
designated as part of the National Human Rights Museum Project, 
supervised by the Council of Cultural Affairs (in Chinese: 文建會). Various 
monuments proliferated throughout Taiwan. Annual commemorations were 
instituted regularly on 10 December each year. Human rights was thus the 
central value in the eye of DPP administration from 2000 to 2008. In this 
initial reconsideration of the White Terror, various narratives of the past 
centred on a generic phenomenon of victimhood, while survivors continued 
to be required to prove their innocence before being awarded recognition. 
During Chen’s presidency, apart from CP, my other participants joined the 
official discourse as they accept official sponsored interviews, attending 
annual commemorations. Despite some of them share identical political 
stance with Chen Shui-Bian and the DPP, my participant hesitated to voice 
their revolutionary past, choosing perspective of victimhood, recollecting 
their past.  As they explain:  
                                                
98 The complete text of the speech in English is available at http://english.president.gov.tw/. 
99 See appendix II. 
100 See appendix III for details of the volumes. The formerly classified documents were 
released and published case by case. 
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Before A-Bian won the presidential election, I dared not speak 
about my experience. It was too difficult for me to talk of those 
scenes under the KMT regime. A-Bian’s victory not only 
encouraged me, but also heartened my co-defendants. … [I] 
was a really hard time for me, can you really understand? 
(Transcript of SC 2013, 10)101 
The atmosphere was still slightly fraught. I think that 
was why I didn’t talk too much during our [previous] 
interview (Transcript of RJ 2013, 3).102  
I am not afraid of those secret agents, but I can 
understand those who are scared of being imprisoned again. 
After all, it was a nightmare. You will not understand it unless 
you had been through it (Transcript of HC 2013, 3). 
 
 
Despite CP had not joined official sponsored oral histories during Chen’s 
Presidency, he joined later in 2008. When I asked why, he merely stated, “I 
was fear of another political oppression.”103 As a mainlander who stowed away 
from China in the 1960s , CP witnessed both the atrocities under the PRC and 
the KMR regime. It is not difficult to contemplate his past as a time of 
political repression. Although CP finally joined the official oral histories in 
2008, the past has left a scar upon his facial expression. I rarely saw his smile 
during our conversations.  
 Ostensibly, both the past persecution and the political condition 
restrain these men from voicing out their past, both insurgent and persecuted 
parts. Although the promotion of human rights has fashioned Taiwan’s 
official transitional justice discourse into a focus on past suffering, the 
institutional hurdle set up by the Compensation Act continues to silence their 
political insurgence in past Taiwan. In addition, democratisation does not 
guarantee solace from the enduring emotional burdens that White Terror 
                                                
101 In Taiwan, citizens often call Chen Shui-Bian A-Bian.  
102 RJ was interviewed by academic researchers in 2000. 
103 Transcript of CP 2013, 10. 
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survivors have continuously borne.104 In addition, finding a voice is just the 
first hurdle to surmount in the process of examining the complexity of 
political struggle during the White Terror. At the moment, the past is still too 
murky to be fully comprehended.  
 
Unravel the past: The Archives Act 
Regarding the aspect of justice, Compensation Act was set to define the idea of 
victimhood and the identity of political victim, the Archives Act is then the 
second justice arrangement to shed light on the obscured past since 2002.105 In 
the interim, the National Archives Administration was founded on 1 March 
2000. With these two institutional arrangements, formerly classified archives 
relating to political cases became accessible to the public. To put the truth-
seeking project into practice, Chen Shui-Bian once again asserted the DPP 
government’s determination on the occasion of a human rights memorial 
concert at Green Island Human Rights Memorial Park in 2005: 
 
We should continue to adopt an aggressive attitude towards 
tackling the issue of transitional justice in regard to the 38-year 
martial law period. While the government has begun 
programmes aimed at ‘material compensation’ and ‘mental 
comfort’ to repair and rectify the wrongful legacy of the past, 
we know that such political cases happened, and that the social 
and political impacts on the victims were widespread and 
remain unclear. Put precisely, questions such as ‘How many 
cases were there?’ and ‘What was the truth of the past?’ remain 
unsettled.106  
 
In 2006, the Academia Historica received hundreds of formerly classified 
treason crime files from the Defence Department. Under the Archives Act, 
collected files were inventoried by the National Archives Administration in 
                                                
104 See further discussion of emotional aspects in chapter 4. 
105 The Archives Act was enacted in December 1999, during Lee Teng-Hui’s presidency. 
106 A complete text of this speech, which was delivered on 17 May 2005, is available in 
Chinese at: http://goo.gl/fjqQ5e.  
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2008. That same year, the Academia Historica published a 15-volume 
compilation based on these files, Political Cases in Post-war Taiwan. This was 
the first time that the government had systematically published formerly 
classified files, case by case.  
One thing is worth noting that in spite of the enforcement of the 
Archives Act, declassified archives collection has not been conducting 
smoothly. The White Terror was a time that the KMT regime marshalled the 
whole of society under its surveillance, related documents were not only 
preserved in the Defence Department, but were preserved in many public 
sectors, such as the Ministry of Interior. The political transition did not 
happen with a party alternation in the 1990s. Taiwan’s transitional justice 
scheme was delayed to a certain extent under Lee Teng-Hui’s presidency, 
especially the documents inventory. In consequence, hitherto documentary 
inventory and analysis remains unfinished.  
Further, the secrecy that surrounded the White Terror for decades has 
not simply faded, as the privacy of survivors, especially those still living, 
must be protected. Under the Archives Act, only victims, co-defendants, and 
relatives of victims are eligible to apply for documentation about confessions, 
evidence, and interrogation records. Researchers and non-relatives can only 
access indictments, verdicts, and prison records. From a historical 
perspective, the Archives Act, in effect, facilitates fact-finding about the White 
Terror in Taiwan; however, the progress of public disclosure has not led to 
censure of the atrocities that were carried out with the acquiescence of the 
United States.107 
Although we continue to learn more about the details of interrogation, 
torture, and ill-treatment, the precise context of the prolonged political 
struggle between those arrested and the KMT remains secret. Survivors have 
no incentive to expose their past conspiracies to the public; thus, the 
identities of ‘political dissidents’, and their rationales, remain blurred.  
                                                
107 Not all archives were made public simultaneously and formerly classified documents 
continue to be released; nor did the National Archive Administration actively inform the 
bereaved of the content of the archives. Until one of my interviewees, the granddaughter of a 
victim who was executed in 1953, applied to see the documentation in December 2008, no 
one in her family had been aware that her grandfather had left five testaments relating to 
them. 
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While the fact-finding project has witnessed slow progress, the 
cultural aspect of the transitional justice has also been limited in scope. For 
instance, the human rights museums on Green Island and in Jingmei mainly 
focus on recreating the features of imprisonment. Documentation relating to 
prison life was released for that purpose, offering a picture of imprisonment 
and victimhood that includes a waxworks museum depicting scenes from 
the inmates’ lives, and a photo wall displaying pictures of victims of the 
White Terror. Such initiatives are progressing smoothly but the transitional 
justice scheme continues to gloss over the context of an adversarial past. As 
one survivor, JC, admits: 
 
We still managed to plot against the KMT while imprisoned on 
Green Island. We collected news and sent messages secretly. 
[…] This is, of course, not imparted to the public in the Human 
Rights Museum. There, we are victims; we are not political 
dissidents (transcript of JC 2013, 10). 
 
JC’s account is not unusual among interviewees. JR, my another participant 
who has been persecuted in the 1960s, firstly accepted official sponsored oral 
history interviews in 2000,108 stating his persecution throughout the published 
transcript without a delicate recollection of his adversary past. My other 
participants, CH, SC, and RJ had also been interviewed by the same project 
in 2000, moderating their adversary past without providing further details of 
their past conspiracy. At the moment, the mission of their engagement of the 
official discourse was not to tell the ‘truth’, but to secure the power of 
utterance. 
 
My words cannot go beyond the public perception of us. The 
only part I could spell out was my political stance but without 
concrete plan (Transcript of JR: 2013, 12). 
                                                
108中研院近史所⼜述歷史編委會 (2000) 蘇東啟政治案件專輯。台北：中央研究院近代歷史研究
所 
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As I have said, I have been fear of another political 
oppression. I received the compensation, and I do not want to 
break the rule (Transcript of SC 2013, 3). 
We have been appealing for recognition, both our 
persecution and past adversaries. At least I have had my first 
step. I didn’t trust the government in 2000. The political 
condition was unstable, and I had to protect myself. […] At least 
my persecution was recognised (Transcript of RJ 2013, 11).  
 
Together with the cases posed above, as long as survivors’ past as political 
agitators remains hidden from the public, the survivors suffer from a 
fragmented identity, for the narrative of persecution continues to pervade 
the official discourse that has developed since the 1990s.  
 
Reckoning with atrocities: Amendment to the 228 Act 
Before Chen Shui-Bian left office, he amended the 228 Incident Disposition and 
Compensation Act by renaming it in Chinese from二二八事件處理與補償條例 
(transliteration, ER-ER-Ba-Shih-Jian-Chu-Li-Yu-Bu-Chan-Tiao-Li) to 二二八
事件處理與賠償條例  (transliteration, ER-ER-Ba-Shih-Jian-Chu-Li-Yu-Pei-
Chan-Tiao-Li) without revising its English name. According to Wu’s 
articulation of the distinction between Bu-Chan and Pei-Chan (2005), the 
amendment from 補償  (Bu-Chan, or reparations) to 賠償  (Pei-Chan, 
compensation) implicates a change in the way in which the official discourse 
was defining the past atrocities, suggesting an official recognition that the 
KMT regime must take full responsibility for the 228 Incident. Meanwhile, 
however, the evolution of legal responsibility for the White Terror remains 
stagnant. 
Chen Shui-Bian also modified the mandate of the 228 Foundation to 
make it the permanent organisation charged with commemorations, 
management of the 228 museum, and a future 228 Incident education project. 
In this sense, the remembrance of the 228 Incident has become a permanent 
project for the Taiwanese authorities. Given the alternation, the difficulty of 
remembering the White Terror is much more evident than remembering the 
228 Incident. First, unlike the 228 Incident as an intense political repression in 
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a short-term, the White Terror was a prolonged and coercive political control 
with martial law and support from the US given by the bipolar configuration 
during the Cold War, as discussed in chapter 1. This political background 
thus resulted in a complicated picture of political victims in Taiwan. A task 
of defining the idea of persecution and the identity of political victim is thus 
more challenging than that of the 228 Incident. Second, without a proper 
political alternation during Taiwan’s democratisation, Taiwanese society 
continued to fail its scheme on addressing fact-finding project, including 
issues of past wrongdoings, persecution, responsibilities, and so forth. 
Confronted challenges from the feature of the political control of the White 
Terror and the condition of Taiwan’s political transition, review of the White 
Terror thus remained controversial during Chen’s presidency. 
To sum up, the DPP, for all that it ushered in an era of greater 
democracy, added little to the contrition discourse set by Lee Teng-Hui’s 
government. From the perspective of fact-finding, the recollection of the past 
during Chen’s presidency is sustainable to be viewed as a ‘memory boom’ 
for its proliferation of related activities. In 2005, the DPP mounted an 
unprecedented exhibition entitled, Painful Period: Martial Law during the 
Political Trials, displaying excerpts from the formerly confidential archives, 
including lists of victims, verdicts, and files relevant to the public. The 
tension between the release of the archives and the posture of denial adopted 
by the KMT escalated. Many family members of political victims were 
particularly shocked to learn that Chiang Kai-Shek had wielded the power to 
amend the verdicts. For instance, there was a document on display that 
showed how the sentence of one political prisoner, Huang Wen-Kung, had 
been amended from 15 years’ imprisonment to death in 1953; this was in 
Chiang Kai-Shek’s handwriting. The exhibition shed light on the architects of 
the White Terror in Taiwan and, as such, was considered as a major leap 
forward in truth-seeking. Whereas the political and juridical hurdles have 
discussed in the previous paragraphs made the DPP government pursue a 
course of ‘neutralisation’ of the past during its eight-year governance. As a 
result, the KMT government was able, even during the period of DPP 
governance, to continue to deny its past atrocities and human rights 
violations while returning to power in 2008. 
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The return of the KMT: 2008–2016 
The KMT in Taiwan might be the first political party worldwide to have been 
returned to power in a democratic process without being called to account 
for five decades of violent dictatorship. As Ma Ying-Jeou was elected to the 
presidency as the KMT candidate in 2008 and again in 2012, the contrition 
discourse of ‘thousands of victims without a single perpetrator’ was 
validated by the Taiwanese people’s continued acceptance of KMT 
leadership.  
When the KMT returned to power in May 2008, it triggered a worry of the 
progression of transitional justice scheme amongst survivors. Confronted the 
situation, a group of scholars, historians, and lawyers, seeking to further the 
process of transitional justice, founded a non-governmental organisation, The 
Taiwan Association for Truth and Reconciliation (hereafter TRCT) in Taiwan. 
While other transitional justice regimes in such countries as Chile, South 
Africa, and Germany, even those organised by governments, have included 
such features as truth commissions, criminal trials, purges of former officials, 
and other manifestations of accountability, the non-governmental TRCT has 
confined itself to operating as a victims’ assistance foundation, appealing for 
reparations and investigating abuses on behalf of White Terror survivors.109 
Nonetheless, along the lines defined by the International Centre for 
Transitional Justice (ICTJ),110 the TRCT claims on its web site to have four 
missions—namely, to:  
 
1. Assist the government to recollect and release archives from the 
martial law period;  
                                                
109 http://www.taiwantrc.org/about.php.  
110 The ICTJ is an international non-governmental organisation that works to help societies in 
transition address legacies of massive human rights violations and build civic trust in state 
institutions as protectors of human rights. The organisation refers on its web site to the 
following categories of transitional justice activities: 1. Establishing the truth about the past. 
2. Prosecution of the perpetrators. 3. Reparation of the victims. 4. Memory and memorials. 5. 
Reconciliation initiatives. 6. Reforming initiatives. 7. Vetting and removing abusive public 
employees. See https://www.ictj.org/ 
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2. Provide an impetus to the research, recording and preservation of 
human rights abuses in academia and nongovernmental fields;  
3. Recollect, compare and study the processes and accomplishments of 
the ‘Truth and Reconciliation Committees’ across various countries;  
4. Promote and conduct educational work on the ideals of transitional 
justice via conferences, publications and online resources.  
 
By engaging actively since 2008 in transitional justice work, including 
hosting oral history projects, research workshops, and an annual conference, 
the TRCT has become the most representative NGO in Taiwan, apart from 
the victims’ associations. 111  For example, the three-volume critique of 
Taiwan’s transitional justice published by the TRCT (2015) insightfully points 
out the need of truth-seeking and full vindication for the past persecution. 
However, Ma Ying-Jeou’s government continued disappointing their 
demands. 
 
The official sponsored documentaries  
The official documentaries are one of the most compelling evidence. Since 
2009, the government has started its annual documentary project of the 
survivors’ oral history as shown in appendix I. In 2012, the Council of 
Cultural Affairs was upgraded to the Ministry of Culture (in Chinese: 文化
部 ). The National Human Rights Museum Project, including the 
documentary project were upgraded in accord with the administrative order. 
Since then, the amount of documentary has proliferated to at least five films 
per year. Given the project, survivors and their narratives offer evidence that 
attest to the past. Each 30-minute film features a survivor’s life story.112 Each 
of them follows a formula as the narrators introduce themselves, recite their 
origins, and then explain they were dragged into the abyss of prosecution. 
Each film ends with an encouraging account of how they overcame their 
seemingly unbearable plight. For instance, one of the survivors, JC joined 
official documentary project in 2013. In his rather long 58-minute film, JC 
                                                
111 See chapter 5 for further information on victims’ associations. 
112	Available online with English subtitles at: http://www.nhrm.gov.tw/movielist?uid=938.	
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only spent 8 mistunes discussing his past political idea, without exposing 
any detail of his past communist insurgence; yet spending over 30 minutes 
narrating the persecuted episodes. In the end of the film, JC stated, 
 
We must go our own way. We shall courageously and wisely 
use our human rights. The road shall be wide and grand.113 
 
During our interviews in the Human Rights Park, I asked JC why not spelling 
out his past insurgence. JC emphasised he was not lying to Taiwanese society.  
 
To me, the most important mission is to build democratic 
country with dignity. And I am pursuing my ideal. […] It is 
true that I am not satisfied with the film, as it 
overemphasises the persecution. Not only human rights 
violations matters. Nonetheless, for me, the salience is about 
the nature of the KMT regime the past of the White Terror 
(Transcript of JC 2012, 12).  
 
However, conditioned by the Compensation Act and the government’s agenda, 
survivor such as JC has limited space elaborating his past insurgence. In 
consequence, he has to conceal and compromise. 
JC’s dilemma is not in isolation. In fact, my participants who have 
joined the state-sponsored documentaries project are in the same plight. 
Another survivor, WL, recounts his past in accordance with the released text 
about his sentencing. In his documentary, he devotes only two minutes to the 
conspiracy for which he was arrested. However, in 2013, in his interviews 
with me, WL told me far more details than were contained in the verdicts:  
 
Yes, He knew about our plan, but I didn’t betray anyone 
during the investigation. [….] Oh yes, this guy also knew 
about our conspiracy; he was one of our secret contacts in 
southern Taiwan. […] And this guy was a kind person; he 
was too kind to join this political resistance movement. [….] 
                                                
113 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f5M_oXqEPYc 
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The only way to save our lives and that of others was not to 
give any details to the secret agents, and to conceal the list of 
our associates as best we could.114 
  
To WL, protecting the anonymity of his secret associates is a lifelong task, for 
no one is confident that the dark era will not return. It is a lifetime of struggle, 
even in the aftermath of the White Terror. Confronting the KMT’s return to 
power in 2008, both JC and WL remained silent about their past as dissidents, 
not to mention the secret identities of their associates. Survivors cannot find a 
voice as agitators in the official discourse. No narratives of past political 
dissent have revealed any further information about the conspiracies for 
which they were convicted. Only the narratives preferred by the state could 
be presented in the official discourse. Not only do the interviewed survivors 
conform in their narratives, but the published volumes of official oral history 
also seem to acquiesce to the state’s version of the past. 
Survivor SC, for example, seems to defer to the narrative published by 
the Human Rights Museum’s Preparatory Office in 2012 even though, since 
2000, he has been far more forthcoming than other survivors about his 
persistent political cause. In the documentary released by the government, 
SC offers no further information than what was revealed by his verdict of 
treason, rendered in 1962.115 Conversely, during our conversations, SC states: 
 
Dong-Chi was expecting me to recruit peers while at the 
military academy, to see if there were any competent people 
with whom to cooperate. After all, this project would benefit 
from having more people join it. However, I should have 
recruited more before being arrested. […] Yes, from Dong-
Chi’s perspective, the associates from Douliou were 
positioned as the centre of strategy planning. I suppose this 
was the position that Dong-Chi had designed for me.116 
                                                
114 Transcript of WL 2013, 2 and 2013,3. 
115 陳世鑑 (2012) 我所捲入的政治黑牢。見陳銘城主編。秋蟬的悲鳴：白色恐怖受難文集第一輯。
頁 320–321。台北：國家人權博物館籌備處。For the verdict, see （51）警審更字第 15 號，
（51）警審特字第 67 號。 
116 Transcript of SC, 2013.3 and 2013.10. 
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This intricate interpretation of SC’s role in a decades-old conspiracy was 
completely absent from the state-sponsored interviews in which he 
participated. While historical works such as oral history implies that a 
memory state must accord not only with objective reality but also with one's 
immediate perception of reality,117 that is not to say that the state-sponsored 
narratives are pure fabrication. Rather, what is salient here is that the current 
official discourse, including the institutional arrangements relating to justice, 
truth and ethos aspects of traditional justice, powerfully affects the way in 
which the White Terror survivors behave and how they recount their past to 
the public. The disclosure of the verdicts has stimulated survivors to speak 
more freely of past political activism and intrigue. Yet we also observe a 
blurred sphere that has been formulated and consolidated by the 
government, from which we are still unable to discern the full truth of the 
antagonisms of the past.  
As a result, survivors keep repeating themselves in the official 
discourse. They continue to tell their stories in the same way as if reading 
from a script. What is unmentioned remains that way. In the official 
transitional justice discourse, these survivors were seriously persecuted, 
apparently due to ‘bad luck’, as they are not able to speak of their past 
activities. The grounds for their imprisonment now makes them silent in 
terms of the Compensation Act, the Foundation, and the state-sponsored oral 
histories. In consequence, the authentication of the past White Terror 
develops along officially sanctioned lines with the cooperation of the 
survivors themselves. 
 
Controversy over naming of the Human Rights Park 
A controversy that arose during the establishment of the Human Rights Park 
during Ma Ying-Jeou’s presidency reveals the deep engagement of the TRCT 
in Taiwan’s scheme of transitional justice. This event also revealed the extent 
to which Ma Ying-Jeou’s administration remained wedded to the limited 
official discourse on the subject. Although the controversy sparked in 2009, it 
dates back to the time, under DPP governance, when the two former political 
                                                
117 S. Bernecker, (2009), Memory: A Philosophical Study, Oxford University Press. 
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prisons in Jingmei and on Green Island were designated as part of the 
National Human Rights Museum Project.  
The Green Island prison was designated as ‘The Green Island Human 
Rights Memorial Park’ in 2002 and renamed ‘The Green Island Human 
Rights Culture Park’ following the transfer of jurisdiction to the Council for 
Cultural Affairs in 2006. However, the park was immediately renamed after 
Ma Ying-Jeou came to power in 2008. Absurdly, the term ‘human rights’ was 
removed and it became ‘The Green Island Culture Park’. The Jingmei prison 
was only addressed as part of the project in 2002 and in turn renamed the 
‘Jingmei Human Rights Memorial Park’ in 2007.118 The term ‘human rights’ 
was also removed in April 2009, leaving it as ‘Jingmei Culture Park’, without 
any prior consultation with the survivors of the White Terror or NGOs, 
including the TRCT. This insensitive action generated strong condemnation 
of the actions of Ma Ying-Jeou and his government, as reported here:  
 
The DPP congressional caucus argues that Jingmei Human 
Rights Memorial Park is to commemorate the once oppressed 
human rights fighters. The government’s renaming of the park 
as Jingmei Culture Park serves to wipe out our people’s 
memories. However, the KMT argues that the decision is to 
enhance the cultural connotations – people are over-reacting 
(CAN News: 17 April 2009). 
 
While the DPP condemned the decision, the TRCT and three victims’ 
associations—the 1950s White Terror Vindicated Association (WTVA), 
Taiwanese Victims of the Martial Law Care Association (TVCA),119 and 
Taiwan Association for Elderly Political Victims—also issued a joint 
statement censuring the deletion of the term human rights as a vicious 
suppression of the history of the White Terror. With the slogan, ‘We want 
human rights! We want history! We want human rights parks!’, the statement 
                                                
118 The Presidential Human Rights Advisory Panel decided to position the former prison in 
Jingmei as part of the memorial park in July 2002. 
119 See further discussion of the emergence of victim associations in chapter 5.  
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appealed for official recognition of the national human rights parks in 
Taiwan.120 
 
Table 3-1 Chronology of name alteration of memory sites 
 
Consequently, under overwhelming pressure from NGOs and the survivors 
of the White Terror, the Ma Ying-Jeou administration reversed its decision on 
both prison parks in 2009. Two years later, the government launched the 
Preparatory Office of the National Human Rights Museum, supervised by 
the Ministry of Culture, formerly known as the Council for Cultural Affairs. 
Green Island Human Rights Culture Park and Jingmei Human Rights 
Culture Park were thereby officially registered as part of the National 
Human Rights Museum. Nonetheless, for my participants who argued the in 
appropriation of the name alternation, KY, the president of TVCA, and its 
member, CH argue, 
 
‘Human rights’ is currently the very basis for we survivors to 
tell our stories in public. We cannot compromise. We must not 
(Transcript of KY 2012, 12). 
Without (the term) human rights, we still have our 
political stance! But we were seriously persecuted, no one 
                                                
120 Announced by TRCT in April 2009. 
Year Ruling 
party 
Green Island  Jingmei 
2002–
2005 
DPP Green Island Human 
Rights Memorial Park 
Designated as memorial 
park without an official 
name 
2006–
2007 
DPP Green Island Human 
Rights Culture Park 
Jingmei Human Rights 
Memorial Park 
2008–
2009 
KMT Green Island Culture 
Park 
Jingmei Culture Park 
2009–
2014 
KMT Green Island Human 
Rights and Cultural Park 
Jingmei Human Rights 
and Cultural Park 
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could deny it. It had happened! Even Ma Ying-Jeou cannot 
deny it in front me (Transcript of CH 2013, 4)! 
 
This polemic revealed the ambivalence of the KMT’s attitude towards 
the White Terror. Although it was impossible for the KMT, as the regime in 
power when the atrocities were committed, to sidestep responsibility 
completely, it was clearly not about to embark on any exploration of its 
accountability. Ma Ying-Jeou’s attempt to ‘neutralise’ and ‘de-politicise’ the 
two historic sites by wiping out the term ‘human right’ from the name 
arguably serve to envisage the political intention.  
Apart from the polemic described above, we can also observe the Ma 
government’s reluctance to assume any blame from the two examples 
discussed below.  
 
The dispute over returning testaments 
In 2008, Yi-Rong, granddaughter of Huang Wen-Kung who was executed in 
the 1950s, discovered quite by accident that her grandfather’s name appeared 
on the verdict that had been changed to a death sentence by Chiang Kai-Shek, 
as displayed in the 2007 exhibition entitled ‘Farewell to Chiang Kai-Shek: 
Anticommunism, Democracy, The Road for Taiwan’ (再見 蔣總統！反共，民主，
台灣路 ). 121  This discovery spurred her to investigate her grandfather’s 
execution. In accordance with the Archives Act, Yi-Rong applied to the 
government to access the relevant documentation in November 2008 and was 
surprised to discover that her grandfather had left bequests to five family 
members, including Yi-Rong’s mother, who was not yet born at the time of 
                                                
121 Huang Wen-Kung was born in Lujhu District, Kaohsiung, in 1920. He trained as a dentist 
in Japan and subsequently joined the Japanese army as a medical officer based in China 
during WWII. After the war, Huang returned to Taiwan to work as an independent dentist 
in Pingtung, Taiwan. In 1952, he was accused of being involved in 中共臺灣省山作委員會燕
巢支部案, and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. Chiang, however, who reviewed each 
verdict before sentencing, changed the original sentence to the death penalty. The exhibition 
displayed the verdict containing the modification in Chiang’s hand-writing; Yi-Rong thereby 
discovered the secret about her grandfather’s death.  
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his death. By this time, Yi-Rong’s mother was a 56-year-old professor in 
Taiwan.122 
According to the provisions of the Archives Act, applicants, including 
the bereaved, were only eligible to receive a photocopy of the documentation, 
rather than the original manuscripts. Yi-Rong and her family pleaded several 
times to the National Archives Administration for return of the original 
testaments, but were rejected on the grounds that their request lacked a legal 
basis. Subsequently, with assistance from the TRCT in negotiating with the 
government, in the summer of 2010, the National Archives announced the 
return of the original documents to Yi-Rong and her family.  
When President Ma returned the testaments to her on 15 July 2011, Yi-
Rong launched a media campaign containing three requests to the 
government: 1. Take the initiative in returning relevant documents to the 
bereaved. 2. Collect and review all documents relevant to the White Terror 
from every branch of the government, and make the list of perpetrators 
public. 3. Apologise sincerely and make the ‘reparations’ originally referred 
to in the Act in the form of actual compensation. 
 
In addition, I would like publicly to tell President Ma: please, 
when speaking of the political achievements under his rule do 
not ignore the fact of the dictatorship and criminality for which 
Chiang Kai-Shek was responsible while so many families, 
including mine, were destroyed owing to him! [….] I hope that 
President Ma will face history sincerely, for he should not 
circumvent the intolerable guilt of Chiang Kai-Shek.123 
 
Following the success of Yi-Rong’s case, those bereaved by the White 
Terror began to receive long delayed testaments. Since Lee Teng-Hui 
delivered the first ever apology on behalf of the KMT regime in 1999, 
archival disclosure has not satisfied the survivors and bereaved of the White 
                                                
122 For a detailed sociological discussion of the lives of the bereaved, please see蕭伶伃 (2009) 
走進白色家庭：一九五Ｏ年代政治受難者家屬生命歷程探究。新竹：清華大學社會學所碩士論
文.  
123 張旑容(2011.07.15) 我們需要真正的轉型正義。蘋果日報(Apple Daily News) ，論壇。 
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Terror, who have continued to voice their appeals. As Yi-Rong. Kuo, the 
daughter of another victim who was executed in the 1950s, states: 
 
I want not just a testament but a thorough disclosure from the 
National Archives Administration, as I want to know why 
things like this happened during that time. […] My son’s 
generation no longer cares what happened to their 
grandfathers. If my generation doesn’t take action, it will be 
ancient history.124  
 
In response to demands by Yi-Rong and the TRCT, the KMT subsequently 
embarked on a review of all of the testaments. At the end of 2011, President 
Ma Ying-Jeou announced that 112 testaments had been left to the bereaved 
among 177 private letters.125 Paradoxically, when the TRCT offered to contact 
the survivors and bereaved, the government decisively rejected this proposal, 
insisting instead on classifying the list and consigning the task to the 
Compensation Foundation, which was slated for dissolution that year. 
Consequently, by the summer of 2012, with the extension of the Foundation’s 
mandate, the government had merely received a third of the applications. 
The TRCT lodged a strong protest, insisting that the ‘National Archives 
Administration should not become an obstacle to transitional justice’.126 
 
Expiration of the Compensation Act and Foundation 
Another instance that illustrates the passive attitude of the Ma Ying-Jeou 
administration was the expiration of the Compensation Act and the 
termination of the work of the Compensation Foundation.  
According to the terms of the Act, the deadline for survivors and 
bereaved to submit claims for financial compensation was December 2010. 
                                                
124 壹週刊(The Next Magazine) No. 284: 2012.8.2. 
125 國家人權博物館籌備處(2013)遲來的愛：白色恐怖時期政治受難者遺書，頁 74。台北：國家
人權博物館籌備處。After starting to return the testaments to the bereaved, the PR organised 
an exhibition about testaments and testimony that ran from December 2013 to April 2015 in 
Jingmei Human Rights Park. For further information, please visit: 
http://chiao.tw/testament/index.html.  
126 陳俊宏，葉虹靈(2012.07.19)。檔案局不應成為轉型正義的絆腳石。蘋果日報 (Apple News 
Daily)，論壇。  
 127	
That is, as the executor of the Act’s programme, the Foundation was 
scheduled to conclude operation at that time. However, President Ma having 
assigned it the task of reviewing private documentation, the mandate of the 
Foundation was extended to September 2014. According to figures provided 
by the Foundation, in the 15-year period ending on 13 July 2014, 20.22 per 
cent of the applications were denied, while the remaining 79.78 per cent were 
accepted. The amount of reparations was 197,000,000 TWD in total. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3-2 Outcome of applications to the Compensation Foundation127 
 Decision Number  Percentage  
1. Found to contain ineligible 
element(s)  
1,940 19.27% 
2. Rejected altogether 96 0.95% 
3. Accepted 8,030 79.78% 
  10,066 100.00% 
 
Based on the cases from the martial law period that were published by the 
DPP government, the number of known cases reached 806, with 15,912 
individuals listed as known victims.128 From the number of applications for 
financial compensation, it seems that nearly 5,000 individuals (or their 
families) failed to apply. Furthermore, the number of victims identified 
continues to rise as the task of archival discovery progresses. 
In addition, international human rights experts came to Taiwan in 
February 2013 to investigate the state of implementation of the International 
Bill of Human Rights:  
 
Expert: Financial Compensation cannot cover every aspect of 
                                                
127 Source: http://www.cf.org.tw/data.php?list=statistics_list.  
128人權之路小組 (2008)《人權之路 2008 年新版》頁 79。台北: 陳文成基金會.  
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transitional justice. It is important to encourage society to get to 
know what happened in the past and to face the historical truth. Yet 
your report mentions little on this, which makes me underscore its 
importance here. 
Government representative: We have already established two 
compensation foundations and enacted laws relating to the 228 
Incident and the White Terror, through which tasks of compensation, 
commemoration and memorial, museums have been undertaken and 
publicised so that our people may learn the lessons.  
Expert: Did the government ever consider establishing ‘truth and 
reconciliation commissions’ or other mechanisms for tackling 
transitional justice and historical issues? 
Government representative: The two foundations have worked 
smoothly for 20 years. We have not received such a suggestion from 
outside Taiwan.129 
 
According to this conversation disclosed by the TRCT, it is evident that the 
KMT government considers the Compensation Act and the Foundation as the 
two main transitional justice mechanisms for dealing with the White Terror. 
This inevitably leads to the question: how should Taiwan sustain momentum 
in its recollection of the White Terror after the dismantling of these 
institutions? 
Given the expected expiration and content of the Act, it seems 
untenable for the KMT to assert that its contrition amounts to genuine 
accountability. With the investigation and archival disclosures still not 
complete, the deadline for applying for compensation was approaching and, 
as noted, only those who professed no opposition to the government were 
eligible. Thus, it remains uncertain what steps Taiwan will take in the pursuit 
of transitional justice once the FOC has been abolished. 
 
 
                                                
129 葉虹靈(2013.03.23) 以機密知名埋藏真相。蘋果日報 (Apple Daily News) ，論壇。 
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Commemoration of the guilty party or Great Man 
Immediately after Chiang Kai-Shek’s death on 5 April 1975, the KMT regime 
declared the date as Taiwan’s official Memorial Day, on which the 
government and people would worship and commemorate him ever after. 
Until the DPP won the presidential election in 2000, each successive 
president hosted a commemoration event and eulogised Chiang Kai-Shek as 
the hero of the Chinese people from 1945 onward. The commemoration was 
cancelled, however, once the DPP took over and, in 2007, the new 
administration took a further step: It declared that 5 April and 31 October, 
Chiang’s birthday, were no longer national holidays, and the government 
and citizens no longer had a responsibility to commemorate Chiang. It even 
closed the Cihu Mausoleum where Chiang Kai-Shek was buried. An official 
statement issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs stated: 
 
Secretary of the Interior Lee Yi-Yan (in Chinese, 李逸洋) 
announces that National Memorial Day entails a specific 
meaning that is worth remembering by the country and its 
people, as the two memorial days in commemoration of the 
former President Lord Chiang were the product of the 
authoritarian regime with its specific historical background. We 
shall not deny the mixed reactions to the role of Lord Chiang in 
the history of national development. We should not in effect 
pay tribute to him by promulgating Memorial Day while 
pursuing transitional justice, endeavouring to eliminate the 
effects of his authoritarian system. Furthermore, those bereaved 
by the 228 Incident have strongly appealed to the Ministry of 
Home Affairs to revoke these two Memorial days.130  
 
Nevertheless, in 2007, in his capacity as leader of the KMT, Ma Ying-Jeou 
visited the Cihu Mausoleum（in Chinese, 慈湖）to pay his respects, and 
emphasised that while Chiang Kai-Shek had undoubtedly issued orders that 
brought about the 228 Incident and the White Terror, he was nonetheless 
                                                
130 Statement released by the Ministry of Home Affairs on 29August 2007.  
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worth venerating in the light of his three-decade record of governance as a 
whole, 131 since it was Chiang Kai-Shek who had protected Taiwan from the 
threat of the PRC. Once again, we find the KMT rationalising the brutal 
atrocities carried out in Taiwan in the name of the Cold War. Ma Ying-Jeou 
went on to reopen the Cihu Mausoleum during his first term as president in 
2008. After that, he made an official presidential visit to Cihu on 5 April each 
year, notwithstanding the public resentment this caused. 
 My interviews with survivors were conducted under Ma’s second 
term of his presidency. During my interviews, each of my participant 
expresses his disappointment even anger toward Ma’s commemoration of 
Chiang Kai-Shek. Words such as “Chiang Kai-Shek? He was a sinner!”132, “I am 
not surprised at Ma’s deeds, what I surprised is why it could happen in my late 
eighties? It’s ridiculous!”133 pervade my participants’ narratives.   
   
Although it is axiomatic that Chiang Kai-Shek was the key person 
who carried out the White Terror against his political opponents during the 
Cold War era, it is also true that the economic support he obtained from the 
United States assisted his government in bringing about ‘Taiwan’s economic 
miracle’. Against this background, any disenchantment of the KMT with 
Chiang becomes tricky. Despite the increasing number of narratives of 
survivors, and archival records that ascribe blame to Chiang Kai-Shek, 
President Ma annually apologises to Chiang’s victims annually on the one 
hand, while celebrating Chiang’s greatness on the other. Meanwhile, the 
KMT has maintained its inflexible contrition discourse, seemingly unaffected 
by the introduction of the UDHR, and Taiwan’s transitional justice agenda 
continues to focus on ‘persecution’—a narrative that has yet to capture the 
brutality or culpability of the KMT.  
 
 
                                                
131 陳志平報導 (2007.10.31) 馬英九談蔣介石：功大於過！聯合晚報 (United Evening News).  
132 Transcript of JC 2012, 12. 
133 Transcript of VC 2012, 12. 
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Discussion: the divergent culture of contrition 
Taiwan’s efforts to come to terms with the White Terror have been 
challenged by international human rights experts for diverging from the 
generally accepted principles outlined by the ICTJ.134 Absent the resolution 
afforded by a truth commission, or criminal trials, or any process that would 
require the former perpetrators of abuse to be identified and held responsible 
for their actions, and given the expiration of the financial compensation 
programme, it seems that transitional justice for the White Terror in Taiwan 
has stalled.  
Throughout the almost two-decade transitional justice scheme in 
Taiwan, ‘human rights’, especially the UDHR has been the polemic value in 
the official discourse. As it was also embraced by the advocates of the 
Formosa Incident in 1979. Nonetheless the UDHR is subscribed to the 
political condition of the Cold War even in the post-Cold War era. 
For some scholars, Western-centrism not only implicates the 
understanding of transitional justice, but also dictates how people define the 
content of human rights. Concern over the UDHR emerged during its 
preparation in 1947. The American Anthropological Association (AAA) 
published a Statement on Human Rights, suggesting that the concept of 
universal human rights should embrace a variety of ways for individuals to 
define and pursue the term ‘human rights’ in their own societies and cultures. 
Based on the Statement (1947), the AAA suggested that the UDHR was a 
statement of rights conceived only in terms of the values prevalent in the 
countries of Western Europe and America (ibid.: 539). According to the AAA 
(1947), a society cannot freely develop its own human rights culture while 
featuring something transnational as a superior culture. However, this 
research is not concerned with cultural differences among nations in the 
context of a universal human rights discourse, or investigating the extent to 
which a nation follows the UDHR. Rather, it looks at how post–Cold War 
                                                
134 Amnesty International visited Taiwan and commented that the ROC government should 
have addressed the political repression during the White Terror in a more determined way, 
especially with regard to those political criminals who had been executed by the KMT 
regime. For more discussion in Chinese: https://www.amnesty.tw/news/936. 
 
 132	
politics affect the ability of Taiwanese governments to come to terms with the 
country’s past.  
Didier Fassin (2007) questions the use of human rights discourse by 
discussing how, in 1999, Allied forces and civilians in the Kosovo conflict 
were categorised in terms of lives to be protected versus lives that it was 
acceptable to risk. By investigating the process of decision making on the 
board of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF; Doctors without Borders), Fassin 
observes that humanitarianism and politics are continuing to merge. He 
bases this on the fact that the staff of MSF—an NGO—began to work for the 
government. He finds that ‘in Kosovo, sacrificing the life of several hundred 
is the condition of preserving the life of one individual of Allied force [sic]’ 
(ibid.), underscoring the proposition that the lives of the two groups are not 
valued equally. The notion that there is always, at a policy level, some 
prioritisation of the lives of some over the lives of others gives rise to both 
Atanasoski and Fassin’s critiques of inequality in contemporary society. Thus, 
it is to be expected that not every persecuted individual could retrieve their 
lost human rights and dignity to an equal extent in Taiwan. Both scholars’ 
arguments raise a question: On a practical level, are so-called universal 
human rights truly guaranteed to everyone to an equal extent? Savic’s (1999) 
formulation offers a clue to the answer: 
 
Generally speaking, for liberal democracies, guaranteeing 
human rights meant advocating values related to ideas about 
the dignity of the individual; for authoritarian states, who 
oppressed their citizens, guaranteeing human rights meant 
acquiring legitimacy with regard to the outside world. Also, 
human rights to an extent represented moral trump cards in the 
ideological game that was, in the middle of the Cold War, 
played for the hearts and souls of people throughout the world 
(ibid.: 6).  
 
The current globalisation of human rights is a phenomenon of ‘moral 
integration’ that parallels the processes of economic integration, as normative 
and moral aspirations converge (Evans 2005: 4). Thus, the era immediately 
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following WWII saw the articulation of legal standards for universal human 
rights, and the later politico-economic phenomenon of globalisation 
encouraged the establishment of a universal human rights regime. As argued 
in chapter 1 that transitional justice in the post-Cold War era is more of 
western-centric, by problematising the universal human rights discourse as a 
‘normative value’, Savic argues that human rights at the global level have 
been the subject of diplomatic competition and ideological propaganda since 
the Cold War era.135 Richard Rorty (1999: 67–83) also suggests that a society 
seeking to develop its own human rights culture can never free itself of 
Western cultural imperialism by featuring something transnational as 
superior. At this point, the post-Cold War political situation is a continuation 
of the Cold War, as the former rivals are still expecting a genuine 
reconciliation.  
While the global human rights discourse aims at securing basic 
human rights in political life, there is tension among the various political 
interests and movements in Taiwan. The system of transitional justice in 
Taiwan is based on a human rights discourse that does not fully empower 
survivors with freedom in voicing their past persecution and struggles, due 
to the tension among conflicting political ideologies. When the official 
discourse in Taiwan defines the identity of political victims, it attests to the 
fact that survivors of the White Terror are still subject to those tensions, 
causing them to struggle to make their past and present political views heard 
in the official discourse.  
In this regard, governments have the power to define what kind of 
justice is sought in a scheme of transitional justice. By studying relations 
between nations and global human rights discourse, Huyssen (2011) suggests 
that nations produce their own human rights discourses under the influence 
of hegemonic Western powers. Contemporary society is still engaged in a 
process of ideological battle, as political enemies from the Cold War remain 
stigmatised in the present day. The official transitional justice discourse in 
Taiwan illustrates how White Terror survivors’ power to recount the past 
remains constrained, even in an era of liberalism, as they are required to 
                                                
135 Ibid. 
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present themselves as neutralised and innocent ones in the official 
transitional justice discourse.  
Certainly, Taiwan is subject to the global human rights regime. In fact, 
the ROC signed both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1967, 
but these had yet to enter into force when the ROC left the UN in 1971. As 
noted, the notion of universal human rights was only introduced in 
Taiwanese society in 1979, with the outbreak of the Formosa incident. Later, 
in 2000, President Chen Shui-Bian claimed to follow the principles of the 
UDHR in developing the scheme of transitional justice in Taiwan. 
Nonetheless, the official discourse remains limited with regard to 
acknowledgement of the past in Taiwan, and this condition did not improve 
after the Taiwanese parliament ratified both Covenants in 2009. While the 
global human rights discourse has undoubtedly assisted Taiwanese society 
in initiating a scheme of transitional justice and according a measure of 
recognition to the victims of the White Terror, the global human rights 
discourse has not afforded Taiwanese society complete emancipation from 
its conflicted past. On the contrary, the continued hegemonic influence of 
Western nations enables the Taiwanese authorities to continue excluding 
former political enemies from the sphere of reconciliation. Communists 
continue to suffer accusations and discrimination.  
Having argued that Cold War politics persist in the present day 
around the world, including Taiwan. Even though Taiwan is not in a state of 
armed conflict, the system of transitional justice there illustrates that, under 
the protection of global human rights discourse, the prioritisation of some 
lives over others still happens. My interviewees, the survivors of the White 
Terror, have yet to be fully embraced by the transitional justice system. Not 
only their suffering but also their political activism deserves full respect from 
the authorities. The limited contrition discourse initiated in Taiwan in the 
1990s drew structural support from the legacy of the Cold War era. Because 
it was the fall of the socialist nations that marked the end of the Cold War, 
the post-Cold War era did not allow for rehabilitation of the formerly 
stigmatised ideologies of socialism and communism. Rather, it has seen the 
continued dominance of capitalism and democracy. Socialists continue to be 
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viewed as ‘undesirable’ political elements worldwide, including in Taiwan, 
while the non-socialist who were pro-independence political dissidents 
persecuted by the KMT regime have gained more sympathy and focus in 
Taiwan’s transitional justice scheme since the DPP came to power in 2000. In 
its pursuit of transitional justice, the government therefore confronts an issue 
as to whether it should ‘destigmatise’ the socialists among its former political 
criminals.  
This political challenge profoundly leads the remorse for 228 Incident 
and the White Terror to completely different directions. The 228 Incident has 
been widely defined as serious political violence that aimed to silence the 
rebel happened on 27 February 1947 in Taipei. The rather uncomplicated 
nature of the conflict paves the way for the later democratic authorities, 
especially the DPP to reach a full vindication for the formerly persecuted 
ones. The remorse of the 228 Incident is in this regard not profoundly 
affected by the political legacy of the Cold War. However, as having 
discussed in the previous chapters, the White Terror was a prolonged time of 
political conflict between the KMT regimes and its enemy of socialists, pro-
independence, anarchism, and so forth. The space of uttering their past 
varies with their different political causes.  
And the term ‘human rights’ has inevitably been neutralised in 
Taiwan as if it is a taboo for people to explore the reason that had led to these 
former political prisoners’ suffering. All the documentaries, de-classified 
archives, and oral histories point out the fact of human rights violation. Yet 
in the face of the Compensation Act and the political condition, Taiwanese 
society barely advances to hold the KMT regime accountable. During Ma 
Ying-Jeou’s presidency, Chiang Kai-Shek was almost partially vindicated for 
the proposition that his governance secured Taiwan from the threat of 
socialism during the Cold War, in spite of the governance was all-out state 
violence. The plight of Taiwan’s transitional justice scheme is itself a mirror 
of the legacy of the Cold War in present-day Taiwan.  
As a result, Taiwan’s recollection of the White Terror has tended to 
focus on the aspect of ethos and neglect the truth and justice aspect; its 
perfunctory museums, monuments, and public apologies show a lack of 
political will. Because neither the global politics nor the contrition discourse 
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create a climate of compulsory accountability, the proliferation of cultural 
works has served to reinforce a situation in which only those survivors who 
insist they had no subversive intention are eligible to benefit from the culture 
of contrition. That is, no one can connect the past systematic abuse of human 
rights with the reality of popular resistance during the White Terror. The 
survivors of the White Terror thus in a sense co-operate in the construction of 
the culture of contrition by taking on the neutral role of innocent victims in 
the KMT’s characterisation of the Cold War. As long as the characterisation 
of ‘innocence’ prevails, Taiwan’s culture of contrition remains at a standstill. 
 
 
Conclusion  
Taiwan’s official transitional justice discourse is characterised by a culture of 
contrition that has gradually become prevalent in post-Cold War Taiwan. As 
Elster explains, in practical terms, transitional justice is always context-
dependent (2004: 79). Conditioned by a universal human rights discourse 
that is Western-centric, Taiwan’s transitional justice discourse enables it to 
continue justifying the political oppression in which the government 
engaged in order to exterminate political threats to the KMT regime and US 
interests in Taiwan. In addition, because it was the United States that 
prevailed and brought an end to the Cold War, the culture of contrition has 
been developed under a paradigm of anti-socialism that has endured since 
the Cold War era. That is to say, the survivors of the White Terror have yet to 
be truly de-stigmatised as long as their rehabilitation requires them to 
disguise their past as political dissidents. 
Thus, as the violent past is revisited, ‘justice’ is meant to be expressed 
in a series of institutional arrangements and strategies for preventing any 
further oppression by the government of its former adversaries. However, as 
Taiwanese society searches for the meaning of the White Terror, it is 
presented with an account of oppression against seemingly random 
individuals with no specific political agenda. Domestic institutional 
arrangements allow White Terror survivors to give voice to their past 
provided they confine their narratives to the framework offered by the 
government. The authorities’ perfunctory approach prevents the political 
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conflict aspect of the White Terror from coming to light, as survivors are 
inhibited from referring to it and, by conforming their stories to the official 
discourse, contribute to the deficit in Taiwan’s transitional justice discourse. 
Since the suspension of the compensation machinery in September 
2014, the project of national remembrance of the White Terror remains 
uncertain. In the absence of any legal arrangements or institutions, the 
culture of contrition continues to address only those who have not opposed 
the KMT. Taiwan’s scheme of transitional justice is stalled, for it excludes 
those who do not fit the current contrition discourse. Progress will require 
the emergence of a powerful competing discourse outside the official sphere. 
That is, while only permitted voices are given a platform by the authorities, 
where have the elusive voices of survivors gone? Further, how do survivors 
who cooperated in the formation of the official version of the White Terror 
memory currently perceive themselves? These questions form the themes of 
this study on how survivors revisit their past in their public and private lives. 
Namely, the competing non-official discourse among survivors is the central 
issue in the chapters that follow. Chapter 4 focuses on the survivors’ silence 
in the official discourse. Their silence offers clues as to how the survivors 
locate their unspeakable past in their private life, which is a major impetus to 
their development of a competing discourse in Taiwan and also sheds light 
on what survivorhood means to them. 
 138	
Chapter 4 
Breaking the conspiracy of silence— an 
ethnographic analysis of survivors  
 
 
Introduction 
While confronting the legacy of the White Terror, the issue of how survivors 
situate their past, especially the undisclosed episodes, in their present-day 
lives becomes vital. When it comes to the hidden portions of the past, it is 
important to be aware of the salience of silence (Felman and Laub 1992) in 
understanding the past of survivors of human rights abuse. During my field 
research in Taiwan, I noticed my informants often were silent about aspects 
of their past. Publicly, they were inclined to maintain silence about details of 
their past persecution, and also about their personal histories of insurgency. 
For instance, VT, a man who was convicted in the 1950s of being a 
communist and served a 10-year prison sentence. Although VT is more 
communicative than most of my interviewees, he still finds it difficult to talk 
about the political activities that brought about his persecution. And he is 
reticent about some elements of his prison experience—particularly about the 
inhumane treatment and killing of fellow inmates that he witnessed. As this 
behaviour is not unique to VT in my field research, it seems that silence 
sheds light on the survivors’ experience of persecution and of resistance and, 
accordingly, informs the study of my informants’ survivorhood. Exploring 
their silence provides insight into how they relate to their past in 
contemporary Taiwan. 
To psychologists and sociologists, silence does not imply merely an 
absence of verbal communication. Rather, as Block de Behar (1995: 7) 
explains, ‘silence remains subject to the interpretations of the receiver to 
whom its message is addressed’. Although silence cannot be comprehended 
in verbal terms, it is capable of conveying diverse meanings, which, in the 
political context, include conformity, resistance, denial, depression, and so 
forth (Aminzade et al. 2001; Ferguson 2003). Silence is not merely a lack of 
response but can be a political practice whereby actors engage in the public 
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realm. From the perspective of power relations, Bassett (2013) points to 
silence as a common tactic of the powerful. However, while the analysis of 
Taiwan’s official transitional justice discourse presented here points to the 
authorities’ silencing of survivors by means of a series of institutional 
arrangements, Bassett emphasises that silence has also been a tactic adopted 
by subjugated groups, and affords a certain freedom (ibid.). Here, the sense 
of freedom refers to the one whose silence is a strategy employed in response 
to the powerful. In the case of Taiwan, the pervasiveness of silence among 
survivors has been remarked frequently in the literature, but researchers 
have assumed that it was a side effect of their painful experiences, without 
considering silence from a perspective of political struggle. Bassett’s 
approach invites us to reconsider why, in the official discourse, survivors do 
not speak up about their history of resistance. Having shown how that 
discourse inhibits my informants from speaking freely of their past political 
activities, I turn in this chapter to their own perspective on their silence. In so 
doing, I examine the power relations currently operating between the 
authorities and survivors in present-day Taiwan. Does the latter’s silence 
signify passivity in the face of past persecution or a deliberate resistance to 
the prescribed official discourse?  
Individual responses to traumatic experiences of political oppression 
are not uniform. People suffer in different ways (Levi 1990; Agamben 1999); 
their stories are varied and their responses unique. But the official discourse 
in Taiwan does not recognise this diversity; rather, it creates a single 
trajectory of persecution under the KMT regime. In the state-sponsored oral 
history, a model of persecution is established that is rooted in the political 
needs of present-day Taiwan. There are nuanced but nonetheless notable 
differences between the picture of victimhood that emerges from my field 
research and that which is portrayed in the government publication. 
Certainly, they have facts in common, such as the historical conviction and 
imprisonment practices of the KMT regime. However, their perspectives on 
their experiences vary according to such factors as extent of persecution and 
political viewpoint, and this diversity is the focus of this chapter. In this 
regard, the discrepancy between the authority-driven research and my 
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findings suggest that the understanding of silence, and of survivor trauma, is 
problematic. 
One of the limitations of the official discourse concerning survivors of 
the White Terror in Taiwan is its description of such people as uniformly 
‘innocent’ of subversion. In our interviews, my informants frequently report 
that they feel shame about their past, not because they were victims but 
because they were ineffectual opponents of the government—failed enemies 
of the state. This invites us to consider the White Terror as not merely a 
period of monolithic state oppression but, rather, a time of complex political 
struggle. Because it seems that the silence of many survivors is a function not 
only of their victimhood but of their continued identification with political 
resistance and intrigue.  
Once survivors speak out about their painful past, they serve as 
witnesses to history. Their narratives provide perspective on the extent to 
which that past was a time of persecution by the government but also a time 
of political conflict across the society. According to Taiwan’s brand of 
transitional justice, the regime that perpetrated the oppression of its citizens 
now writes their obituaries. National mourning displaces private grief. Tens 
of thousands of stories have been presented to bear witness to the 
persecution under the KMT regime. Although the culture of contrition has 
vindicated the right of survivors to give voice to the trauma and shame of 
their persecution, it does not equally empower them to express their political 
convictions. My findings indicate that my informants perceive themselves 
not only as witnesses to state terrorism but as witnesses to a history of 
political unrest that lies outside the official discourse.  
As some scholars would have it, ‘silence is for [survivors] a fated exile, 
yet also a home, a destination, and a binding oath’ (Felman and Laub 
1992:58)136; however, silence provides clues to the individual’s understanding 
of survival. Silence is about one’s attitude towards past and present, for it is 
not only a feature of how one retells one’s past but, in this case, also a 
reflection of how the current political condition encourages or inhibits certain 
perspectives on the past. The limitations placed on Taiwan’s official 
discourse on the White Terror has proven to be the most significant obstacle 
                                                
136 Here, Felman and Laub refer to traumatised people such as victims of the Nazi Holocaust. 
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to the survivors’ narrative experiences. Much of the complexity of 
survivorhood is about the degree of traumatisation experienced and how 
one’s past is reflected in present-day power relations—whether they still feel 
traumatised or ashamed and why. Thus, only by exploring the silence will 
researchers be able to comprehend fully the emotions that grip survivors and 
compel them to relive the past. 
Given the difficulty that White Terror survivors have in confronting 
the past, an ethnographic analysis can illuminate how they reconcile the past 
and present and provide insight into the nature of their subjectivity. This 
entails approaching their emotions from a sociological perspective, rather 
than undertaking a psychoanalytical approach at the individual level. 
Traumatisation and shame are thus not analysed as features of their 
psychological makeup, but addressed as social phenomena in a specific 
socio-political context. In exploring how my informants are re-living their 
past, we gain insight into the complexity of society’s memory of the White 
Terror.  
Having argued that Taiwan’s official transitional justice discourse 
circumscribes the way in which survivors can recount their memories, I 
would suggest their silence is a function of current power relations between 
the authorities and survivors. Silence reflects the discrepancy between the 
viewpoints of the two sides. A tension in the contestation of the past is thus 
exposed. 
 
 
The meaning of survival 
In autumn of 2013, I was invited to a private screening of a documentary 
about a survivor, VT, who was imprisoned for 10 years during the 1950s. The 
documentary mainly focused on how VT survived under the KMT regime 
and continues to live his life afterwards. VT also attended the private 
screening, as it was his first opportunity to preview the documentary before 
it was released. Just before the closing credits, a list of political criminals 
executed during the 1950s appeared on screen, which bothered VT: 
 
I survived the White Terror. Yet I do not speak for those who 
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were executed; I can only express my own views (Field 
research note: 2012, 10).137 
 
VT grew quite agitated on this point. He explained to the director and the 
audience that some of the individuals named on the list had been his friends 
or associates during his imprisonment and he felt it would be presumptuous 
if he were to appear to be testifying in this film about their situations, which 
he had not experienced directly: ‘I could never understand what he was 
faced with, what kind of agony he was feeling as the threat of death grew 
nearer or when it arrived’, he said, recalling one of his departed comrades on 
the list.138  
VT found it impossible to bear witness to the experience of death, 
although he, like most survivors, especially those incarcerated during the 
1950s, witnessed the execution of others.139 For instance, JL, imprisoned in the 
1960s, recalls two warders dragging a condemned political prisoner down 
the prison corridor in shackles.140 Survivor Huang Chiu-Shuan (in Chinese, 黃
秋爽), arrested along with her father and five other family members, recalls 
witnessing her father similarly dragged along the prison corridor to his death 
after being interrogated under torture.141 Both survivors share VT’s reticence 
on the subject out of respect for the departed and a sense that it is not their 
place to interpret another person’s subjective experience of death. 
Certainly, during the KMT regime, many survivors knew of inhumane 
treatment or witnessed it directly. Although there was a period in their lives 
when the threat of death was omnipresent, it is difficult for them to talk 
                                                
137 It was the occasion I was not allowed to take audio record; I thus present the scene in terms 
of my field research note. 
138 Ibid. 
139 As noted, of all the casualties attributable to the White Terror, nearly 50 per cent occurred 
during the 1950s. 
140 Field research note 2012.10. On this occasion I was not allowed to make an audio recording; 
I thus present the scene on the basis of my field research note. 
141 Huang Chiu-Shuan was born in 1930, a daughter of the famous Taiwanese insurgent 
Huang Tien (in Chinese,黃天). Owing to her father’s insurgent actions, Huang Chiu-Shuan 
and other family members, including her mother and siblings, were arrested by the KMT 
regime. Ultimately, Huang Tien was executed but Huang Chiu-Shuan and other family 
members were released. For further details, see 曹欽榮，鄭南榕基金會 (2012) 流麻溝十五號：
綠島女生分隊及其他。台北：書林. 
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about death. Almost every of my participants adhere to Adorno’s dictum, 
“[t]o write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric”, finding it impossible for 
survivors to interpret or testify to extreme, inhuman experiences, such as 
death, in later years. Accordingly, witness remains a lapse in the subjective 
experience of death.  
But Felman and Laub (1992) offer a more radical argument, asserting 
that it is not only impossible to bear witness to death from the inside, but 
also from the outside. The outsider is, by definition, excluded from the event 
(Felman and Laub 1992: 231–232; Agamben 1999: 35). Meanwhile Primo Levi 
(1990) recalls the phenomenon of Muselmann, the slang at Auschwitz for 
those prisoners who seemed to have lost all will to live.142 To Levi, Muselmann 
became the witness of the inhuman condition. Muselmann simply attests to 
the inhuman condition by his appearance. To articulate this, Levi describes 
an inmate at Auschwitz called Hurbinek, an emaciated three-year-old child 
with no parents. Hurbinek spoke only babble, and persisted in repeatedly 
sounding out a single word or phrase that no one could understand, until he 
died in early March 1945. ‘He bears witness through these words of mine,’ 
says Levi (ibid.).  
Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben (1999) elaborates on Levi’s work, 
remarking that, lacking language, Hurbinek could not bear witness (1999: 39). 
While Levi claims that it is his own language through which Hurbinek bears 
witness, Agamben carefully adds that ‘not even the survivor can bear 
witness completely, can speak his own lacuna’ (ibid.). The Muselmann 
expresses the limit of human endurance under political torture, and the term 
‘lacuna’ refers to what Agamben calls ‘non-language’ in identifying the 
sounds made by Hurbinek. The non-language, which one may speak when 
one is alone, and may be merely a sound, or a word that conveys no 
                                                
142 Primo Levi (1919–1987) survived the Auschwitz concentration camp. After liberation in 
1945, he immediately began a book about his time there, which was published under the title, 
If This is A Man (1947). Recounting his own experiences and his observations of fellow 
inmates, Levi describes a category of prisoner who, in the final stages of hunger, disease, 
exhaustion, and despair, had all but shut down. They were called Muselmann (German for 
Muslim), possibly because they were inclined to squat on the ground in what was regarded 
as an ‘Oriental’ fashion, or because some had reached a stage where they seemed to have lost 
the power of language, uttering only guttural sounds that were faintly reminiscent of Arabic. 
Regardless of its origins, Levi adopted the term to refer to the phenomenon of living as if one 
is already dead. 
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information or interpretation of the human condition. Nonetheless, it attests 
to the existence of Muselmann, the extremely inhuman condition.  
Agamben’s view potentially undermines the proposition that 
survivors may not bear witness to the death of others. The dividing line 
between inside and outside seems to be crossed. Pointing to the existence of 
Muselmann—the living dead143—Agamben seeks to transcend the traditional 
assumption of political philosophy that the border between survival and 
death is fixed. Muselmann suggests that the borders between language and 
non-language, human and inhuman are permeable, making the distinction 
between survival and death in Auschwitz ambiguous. Accordingly, 
testimony does not necessitate the use of language. As Agamben argues: 
 
Perhaps every word, every writing is born, in this sense, as 
testimony. This is why what is borne witness to cannot already 
be language or writing. It can only be something to which no 
one has borne witness. And this is the sound that arises from 
the lacuna, the non-language that one speaks when one is alone, 
the non-language to which language answers, in which 
language is born. It is necessary to reflect on the nature of that 
to which no one has borne witness, on this non-language (2002: 
38).  
 
Suffice to say that Muselmann opens a window for Agamben to decipher the 
extreme conditions at Auschwitz. Agamben’s work focuses on what it means 
for language to exist and, in this context, on the boundaries of testimony. As 
the phenomenon of Muselmann blurs the disjunction between survival and 
death for Agamben, the non-language in survivor testimony. In this regard, 
silence can be understood as a way of testifying. 
Many survivors of the White Terror experienced inhuman conditions 
under political torture, such as brutal interrogation, terrible prison conditions, 
and the omnipresent threat of death and further torture. For instance, 
                                                
143 Here, Agamben elaborates on the term Muselmann by introducing the account of another 
survivor of Auschwitz, Jean Améry (1912–1978), who uses Muselmann to describe a prisoner 
who was giving up and given up on by his comrades, who was no longer able to distinguish 
between good or bad, intellectual or unintellectual. They were like mummy-men, the living 
dead (Améry 1980; Agamben 1999: 41). 
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survivor and famous artist Ou Yang-Wen (in Chinese, 歐陽文; 1924–2012) 
painted the scene of a surgery that he was forced to undergo in the name of a 
‘medical demonstration’ in the course of his imprisonment during the White 
Terror. During the surgery, the medical officers cut open Ou’s belly without 
providing anaesthetic, and pulled out his intestines to show the doctors for 
teaching. The painting below depicts the horrible past that Ou has suffered. 
 
 
Illustration 4-1: Ou Yang-Wen’s painting of the inhuman treatment he suffered during the 
White Terror. Provided by Ou Yang-Wen‘s family. 
 
For now, the White Terror has now been officially recognised as a time of 
systematic state atrocities. Society had been propelled into a state of conflict 
whereby any individual who opposed the KMT regime would be targeted as 
a political enemy, and subject to arrest and imprisonment. While most 
survivors refuse to recall or are perhaps unable to verbalise the worst of their 
experiences, none seems to find peace in silence. Here, Agamben’s 
understanding of silence as a lacuna in survivors’ testimony is helpful. It 
suggests that witnessing others’ deterioration and death is part of one’s 
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survival, and the meaning of silence not only touches on one’s own 
subjective experiences, but also implicates how one deals with others’ 
experiences, including their loss of humanity.  
While my participant, VT expresses a similar reluctance to attest to 
others’ experiences, CP’s narrative echoes VT’s reaction to the witnessing of 
death: 
 
It makes me cry when I think back to the time when I was 
imprisoned with Guo and Hsu. I heard them planning their 
appeal for a retrial, but the High Military Court sentenced both 
Guo and Hsu to death, and both were executed within three 
months. […] During those days, I cannot imagine how anyone 
could hold back tears. Everyone was crying. When the warders 
called their names to be executed at midnight that night, we 
were all speechless, we had known this was going to happen 
(transcript with CP: 2010,10). 
 
CP offered this recollection when we visited the prison where he had been 
deprived of six years of his youth. During the interview, he kept breaking 
down into sobs, so we had to pause the interview. As CP recalled the scene at 
midnight, words seemed to fail him. He kept repeating every detail of Guo 
and Hsu’s last few minutes on the ward, subsiding into agitated gasps from 
time to time. Cleary, he found it extremely difficult to recount this episode. 
Amongst my informants, the agony that haunts CP is not unique. SC 
was convicted of treason during the 1960s and sentenced to five years’ 
imprisonment. While awaiting trial, SC was taken from his cell late one night 
driven to a thicket outside the prison. An agent of the secret police forced 
him to dig a hole for several hours, and he was told that this would be his 
grave if he did not give up the names of his associates. SC recalls: 
 
I was frightened and exhausted. The secret agents were afraid 
that potential traitors had not been reported. I know, but [long 
pause] I don’t want to recall that night again (Transcript of SC 
2013, 3). 
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Not only SC, PH, a survivor of the 1960s, also finds difficulty in recalling his 
past persecution, merely stated, 
 
My past cannot be cured. Never (Transcript of PH 2013, 12). 
 
Compare with PH’s silence, SC is able to describe his unbearable and 
dehumanising experiences only in fragments, with frequent pauses, silence 
attesting to the persistence of his wounds. Silence stores their unspoken past 
and emotions; it is a way of witnessing.  
Arguably my participants’ different levels of silence attests to that 
silence constitutes a space in which to store testimony that the speaker 
cannot bear to verbalise or that lies beyond the limit of language. Survivors 
do not deny the existence of the unbearable past. Sometimes they seem 
unable to convey the past to an audience, for they are profoundly self-
conscious. They only revisit the unspoken parts in private. Yet silence also 
lets the listeners know that there is more testimony. In the context of 
victimhood or suffering, silence implies being unable to speak out about 
unbearable events and a refusal to recall them.  
However, silence need not be read as signifying passivity and denial, 
for it can stem from a sense of loyalty or defiance. VT, for example, is silent 
with regard to the past of others not only because there are limits to his 
knowledge but, more profoundly, because he declines to seek recognition for 
himself on account of their persecution,144 or to manipulate his comrades’ 
reputations. Also, he has grown tired of describing himself as an innocent 
survivor according to the role ascribed to him in the official discourse. VT 
had always seen himself as a political objector and a threat to the KMT 
regime until he was invited to come forward as a victim. Silence in this 
context complicates VT’s view of himself, offers clues to his unbearable 
sorrow, and also suggests his resistance to the programmed official discourse. 
By silencing part of his own past and that of others, VT asserts his 
independence: He may be dominated by the official transitional justice 
discourse but silence is his mode of resistance against that domination.  
                                                
144 Field research note 2012.10. 
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Hence, the manifestation of silence is key to an understanding of the 
implications of survivorhood. Bearing witness to others’ unbearable 
conditions constructs the meaning of survival, especially when silence 
implicates such issues as agony, trauma, loyalty, and resistance. Silence 
offers insights into how the experience of persecution, and of participation in 
political struggle, both work to construct survivors’ memory of the White 
Terror. That is, silence not only reflects the shame and trauma of painful 
experience but also the suppressed perspective on the White Terror in 
contemporary Taiwanese society.  
 
 
Trauma: collective victimhood  
There is wide acceptance of the notion that silence is a symptom of traumatic 
response to painful experience (Butalia 1998; De Brito et al. 2001). We are 
inclined to accept the causal relation without hesitation, all the more so in 
Taiwan where the official discourse provides a model of persecution and 
victimhood. However, given the various dimensions of silence discussed 
above, a question is raised: Is my informants’ trauma associated with their 
persecution or is it linked also to their experience of political struggle? 
 
A sociological perspective on trauma 
The notion of psychic trauma as a phenomenon—a way of articulating 
emotional response to a shattering event—has emerged only recently. During 
the First World War, patriotism was the primary tool used by armies to rouse 
their soldiers’ fighting spirit. However, in the day-to-day reality of battle, 
fear was more pervasive than fighting spirit. This fear—of being attacked, 
wounded, or killed—was ever present. As a result, some of them suffered 
psychological damage. Unlike the soldiers whose physical scars were 
recognised as evidence of heroism, those who were psychologically scarred 
were isolated from their comrades in arms by a diagnosis of ‘trauma insanity’ 
(Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 41–42). Although the mentally wounded soldiers 
were eligible for financial compensation, they were stigmatised by the 
perception of cowardice. Their injuries were met with scepticism until the 
post-WWII period, when the trauma of survivors of the Nazi concentration 
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camps was recognised and studied. It was only in the 1980s, when post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was included as a new clinical entry in 
diagnostic manuals, that these survivors were seen as victims of trauma. 
(Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 76–97). In psychoanalysis, as Freud suggests in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trauma is understood as a wound inflicted on 
the mind. When an upsetting event is experienced too suddenly, too 
unexpectedly, it may be unavailable to the consciousness until it imposes 
itself again, repeatedly, in the nightmares and repetitive actions of the 
survivor (Caruth 1996: 4; 2001). Caruth found that, as a response to a 
catastrophic event, trauma can manifest in the often delayed and 
uncontrolled repetitive appearance of hallucinations and other intrusive 
phenomena (1996: 11). In other words, trauma often occurs belatedly, 
returning to haunt the individual. Reviews of psychoanalytical works that 
analyse the notion of trauma (Hollander-Goldfein et al. 2012; Caruth 1996; 
Hunt 2010) show that scholars tend to focus on the internal mental process of 
the individual, which does not address the significance of trauma in power 
relations at the collective level. 
Finding the psychoanalytic approach limited, Jeffrey Alexander (2012) 
suggests ‘cultural trauma’ as an approach to studying trauma from a more 
sociological perspective, arguing that events are not inherently traumatic, but 
that trauma is a socially mediated attribution (ibid.: 13). Events are one thing, 
and their interpretation is another. Alexander suggests that this attribution is 
not necessarily simultaneous with the occurrence of the event, but may be 
made before the event occurs, as an adumbration, or in its aftermath, as post-
hoc reconstruction. To Alexander, imagination is intrinsic to the very process 
of representation (ibid.: 14). However, he does not see trauma simply as an 
‘innovative process’ within the individual’s internal mental process. The 
notion of cultural trauma emphasises that trauma exists also in the socio-
political context and suggests that exploration of an individual’s mental 
reaction to a particular event should include an examination at the societal 
level of such influences as mass media, state bureaucracy, and the legal 
setting. In this regard, trauma is subject to the power relations of a society 
and should not be ascribed solely to the inner psychic activity of the 
individual. 
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Furthermore, trauma is a process rather than an outcome. It is true 
that trauma is an emotional response that stems from one’s past. But this 
emotional response also implicates one’s present and future. Hence, trauma 
does not exist as a fixed effect, but continuously mirrors the socio-political 
situation that influences one’s interpretation of a particular time or event. 
Trauma in this light can be viewed as malleable, for once the socio-political 
situation ceases its influence, one’s emotional response nonetheless continues 
to develop. 
Certainly, survivors offer the most compelling representation of past 
state persecution in Taiwan. It is reasonable to deduce that they are silent on 
the overwhelming feelings that have haunted them for a long time. However, 
we have seen how political power relations come to silence survivors’ 
accounts of trauma, and this influence is almost certainly operating as well. 
Hence, my analysis is conducted in two steps: first, re-locating the emotion of 
trauma with regard to various experiences of persecution; and second, apart 
from the torment inflicted on them, scrutinising how other aspects of the 
White Terror—such as the antagonism between the government and its 
people—traumatised them.  
 
Regarding the pain of themselves and others 
I first met HC in Jingmei Human Rights Park in December 2012, when I was 
invited to attend an informal meeting hosted by several survivors of the 
White Terror. At the time, this 82-year-old man kindly agreed to be 
interviewed. Over the next few months, we met several times in his flat and 
talked about his past. 
In 1958, HC was convicted of treason for promoting the cause of 
Taiwanese independence during his military service. Prior to his arrest, HC 
had served in the navy for two years. According to the charges against him, 
he had planned to steal a fishing boat and flee to Okinawa, Japan, to seek 
political asylum from the US, which had a military base there. HC confirmed 
that this was true during his interview with Professor Chang Yen-Hsien (張
炎憲: 2000). As he observed, the U.S. had been friendly towards Taiwan 
during his military service in the 1950s, so he believed that the U.S. would 
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help those who fought against China, either Nationalist China or Communist 
China. 
 
The KMT, of course, represents China. […] I understand the US 
had assisted in developing Taiwan’s military force during the 
White Terror. Yet, the KMT was not a worthy ally. We 
Taiwanese deserved better. (Transcript of HC 2013, 3). 
 
How unworthy was the KMT? HC explained that the corruption he observed 
in the army and the coercive measures being carried out by the KMT regime 
were what had led him to ‘betray’ the nation—that is, to revolt against the 
KMT authority. Hence, he embarked on his course of political activism by 
assisting in translating from Japanese to Taiwanese a famous book about the 
ideal of independence by Thomas Wen-I Liao, who led the Tokyo-based 
Taiwanese independence campaign between the 1940s and 1960s.145 To HC, 
Japan was the last hope for the anti-KMT movement. Japan was home not 
only to one of the largest US military bases in East Asia but also to the most 
active overseas pro-independence organisation. Suffice to say that HC hoped 
to harness the hegemonic position of the US in support of his campaign for 
independence. Although he did not refer directly to the influence of the Cold 
War during our talks, it was clear that the Cold War framing affected his 
political judgment. 
Accordingly, HC was found guilty of treason and sentenced to seven 
years in prison. After his release in 1965, he was unable to resume his 
military service. He took various jobs and started two ventures, both of 
which failed. Life was far tougher than he had anticipated. Eventually he was 
                                                
145 Thomas Wen-I Liao (廖文毅 1910–1986) was born in Yunlin, Taiwan. At the age of 22, he 
pursued a master’s degree in Mechanical Engineering at the University of Michigan, US; and 
completed his doctorate in Chemical Engineering in 1935. Before the end of the Second 
World War, he was appointed professor at the University of Zhejiang, China. When the 
KMT took over Taiwan in 1945, Liao returned home and was appointed a senior civil servant. 
However, following the 228 Incident in 1947, Liao and his brother were blacklisted by the 
KMT regime. They fled first to China, then to Hong Kong, and finally to Japan, where they 
settled in 1948. There they founded the Taiwan Democratic Independence Party (台灣民主獨
立黨) along with other Taiwanese expatriates. In 1956, Liao officially claimed to have 
founded the Taiwan Republic Provisional Government (台灣共和國臨時政府) in Tokyo, 
which was known during the 1960s as the primary Taiwanese independence movement 
overseas.  
 152	
able to open a pharmacy based on his experience as an army medic, and thus 
managed to support his family. Now he is retired. 
At first glance, HC looks cheerful, giving no outward sign of having 
been persecuted in the past or traumatised by his experiences. But there is 
trauma beneath the surface, and it has been there for a long time. During our 
conversations in HC’s flat, his wife usually stays in her room rather than 
joining us. Speaking of his past persecution, HC tends to describe events 
calmly. Only when he tells how his wife managed to survive that difficult 
time and raise their child on their own, does HC start to sob and halt the 
conversation: 
 
We had enjoyed only five months of married life before I was 
arrested. I heard that Mrs Hsu was very upset as her husband 
was also arrested and she took this out on my wife: ‘My 
husband is the only breadwinner in my family and it is because 
your husband has implicated him in his treason!’ (Transcript of 
HC 2013, 3) 
 
To HC, the agony of his imprisonment and disgrace is the cloud his wife has 
been under for such a long time. When I ask whether he has ever justified his 
‘treason’ to his wife, he shakes his head. From HC’s viewpoint, his political 
activities need to remain a secret even now, in spite of the repercussions for 
many individuals, including members of his own family. To HC, avoiding 
discussing his past with family members is to protect them from further hurt. 
He admits he feels distanced from his beloved wife when he ponders his past 
intrigues.146 HC’s silence conveys the horror of the state’s atrocities against 
him, which traumatised him and his family. But it also conceals his 
subversive activities, which were psychologically damaging to the couple. 
Both experiences—persecution and political struggle—construct HC’s 
current silence.  
HC’s sense of persecution is more intense than that of his wife, for he 
was the one who was interrogated under torture. Before the trial, he was 
                                                
146 Field research note of HC 2013.3. The occasion was a private dinner gathering, I thus 
collected materials with immediate handwriting notes. 
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kept in solitary confinement at Fengshan Military Detention Centre (in 
Chinese, 鳳山招待所) for 16 months. HC recalls the details with a clenched 
fist: 
 
That period was hard. […] While preparing our plot, I was 
ready to sacrifice my life. When I was arrested, I did not resist, 
but behaved as a secret agent is supposed to. I had violated 
military law. I deserved to die. […] They threatened me with 
instruments of torture [here, a pause of nearly two minutes, 
with an anguished facial expression]. The same happened with 
Mr Hsu: The interrogators tortured him for hours to force him 
to reveal the identity of his accomplices (Transcript of HC 2013, 
3). 
 
Recounting the scene triggers HC’s deep trauma. While the suffering he 
recalls so vividly was his own, he feels that his family were also victims. 
Although he did not witness his wife’s experiences during his persecution, 
he still feels a sense of ‘collectivity’ with her. He was not the only interviewee 
to express agony for a loved ones’ suffering, as in the case of WL and SC: 
 
One night, at midnight, my wife was sobbing and went out. My 
mother-in-law was very worried about her, and followed her. 
At that time, I was in prison and my family lived in Mon-cha. 
My wife just walked along the road towards the Xindian river, 
and it looked as if she were going to drown herself. Suddenly, 
my mother-in-law ran after her, crying, ‘Come back! Don't 
leave us!’ My wife looked back at her mother and, in the end, 
they both broke down in tears (Transcript of WL 2013, 3). 147 
I have never spoken of my experiences to my wife even 
though we have been so close. […] It was too hard for me to 
describe to her what I had undergone, especially since I know 
how much she suffered, all because of my deeds (Transcript of 
                                                
147 As outlined in chapter 1 and 3, WL was an intelligence officer of the KMT regime during 
the 1950s, and was subsequently convicted of treason in 1957 for advocating independence.  
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SC 2013, 10).  
 
Both WL and SC appeared agitated and SC wept when they described the 
suffering of others. The difference between the experience of former political 
prisoners and that of their families does not impede them from sharing a 
sense of collective trauma. In other words, collective trauma does not 
emanate only from shared direct experiences of the same event, as 
interpretation and imagination are inherent to it. While only the individuals 
who experience such things directly can bear witness to excruciating 
experiences and death under torture, there is a collective trauma based on 
the interpretation of an event, irrespective of personal experience. The 
collectivity of this trauma develops through a specific socio-political process 
rather than arising from empathy with loved ones. The meaning of the 
‘collectivity’ of trauma is about how power relations operate on one’s 
memory.  
For instance, JL is a former political prisoner who was convicted of 
treason for allegedly conspiring to hijack a ship during his compulsory 
military service in 1963. JL insists that he did no such thing. ‘The indictment 
was completely fabricated’, he says, although he admits that, from adolescence 
onwards, he was determined to subvert the KMT. After two appeals, his 
conviction was lengthened from a 15-year sentence to life imprisonment, but 
he ended up serving 15 years in prison. Looking back, JL expresses anger and 
sorrow, for one of his co-accused, Chiu, had been sentenced to death after the 
first appeal.  
 
Chiu was so angry and frustrated when he realised that he had 
been sentenced to death. I felt the same way. We felt helpless; 
no one believed that we had ever conspired to do anything 
[silence for nearly a minute]. The KMT regime persecuted us, 
before we had a chance to subvert them. (Transcript of JL 2013, 
11) 
 
Here, the experience that traumatised JL was not only about ‘persecution’, 
but also related to the contentious politics under the KMT party-state. Both 
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the state-level atrocities and intensive political conflicts came to formulate 
these survivors’ trauma and the way in which they interpret others’ pain. 
Hence, for JL, Chiu’s condition was not merely an episode of persecution. 
Rather, it was a series of political oppressions that happened to a political 
activist.  
In the eyes of the KMT party-state, all of my informants were a group 
of political criminals being punished by the state apparatus, although their 
political causes varied at the time. Here, the idea of collective trauma sheds 
light on how past political conditions came to influence a group of people to 
co-formulate a trauma, regardless of the different degrees and dimensions of 
their individual experiences. 
 
Everyone was frightened after being arrested. We had been 
conscious of the risk and consequences all along but still, life in 
captivity was tough and worse than you anticipated. 
(Transcript of RJ 2013, 11) 
 
RJ was born in 1938 and, during the 1960s, was convicted of the crime of 
treason for his pro-independence activism under the KMT regime. From RJ’s 
perspective, the White Terror was a time of severe hardship, to which a 
traumatic reaction is understandable. While each of my informants was on 
the brink of emotional collapse during our interviews, the focus here is on 
how trauma has gradually become a means whereby society recognises 
survivors as ‘traumatised’—or, to put it another way, how the current 
political situation makes room for survivors to formulate their traumatised 
discourse in a similar way.  
 Like other cases discussed in this section, HC, SC, WL, JL, and RJ 
spoke of their past suffering by keeping the trauma bottled up inside 
themselves. Certainly, for them, the past was too painful to be disclosed. 
Moreover, the current political conditions in Taiwan continue to silence their 
identity as political insurgents. As stated in Chapter 3, many of my 
participants have joined the authority-sponsored oral histories, yet none of 
them has referred to their sufferings or their emotion of trauma as being due 
to past political insurgence.  
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It’s better not to talk too much about my past conspiracy, let 
alone my sorrow for the insurgent past. (Transcript of SC 2013, 3) 
I shall spell it out if I can live long enough to witness the 
collapse of the KMT party. The past has haunted me for too long, 
it’s been too long for me. (Transcript of HC 2013, 4) 
   
As Taiwan’s scheme of transitional justice came to focus on victimhood, my 
informants became recognised as ‘survivor victims’ and their trauma 
acknowledged, regardless of whether their emotions were expressible or not. 
But the current power relations reveal how profoundly trauma can be 
silenced in public. HC, for example, describes his past as a frustrating 
experience of defeat only to me, but not before society in general. Meanwhile, 
as a survivor of the 1960s, JL articulates his victimhood by emphasising his 
innocence in the official discourse.148 The extent of survivors’ trauma has not 
been fully recognised in the scheme of transitional justice. Two focal points 
thus emerge: First, the trauma is silenced not only as a response to past 
persecution, but also as a reflection of the expectations of Taiwan’s 
transitional justice project. Second, even when trauma is acknowledged 
through a specific socio-political process, this validation does not necessarily 
render the trauma shareable. On the contrary, some elements of trauma are 
bound to be subjective and exclusive to the subject. The focus here is not on 
the phenomenon of trauma-induced isolation from a psychoanalytical 
perspective but, rather, on how the political relations in Taiwan’s scheme of 
transitional justice generate a similar content of trauma amongst White 
Terror survivors that is related to their past political struggles. It is the 
political context of the scheme of transitional justice that deliberately silences 
their trauma in the official discourse. The isolation that survivors experience 
in the present day is a function of their trauma. 
                                                
148 JL was born in 1940 and was convicted of treason during his military service in 1963. 
Initially, JL was sentenced to life imprisonment; upon appeal, he was sentenced to death. But 
he did not give up, and a second appeal ended in his receiving a 15-year sentence. During 
his captivity, he witnessed the 1972 prison uprising known as the ‘Taiyuan Incident’, which 
is discussed in Chapter 5. Since JL’s release, he has continued advocating the cause for which 
he was imprisoned: Taiwan’s independence.  
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Collective trauma: A sense of isolation 
Silence should not be a block to investigating the emotion of trauma. Silence 
reflects the limits and restrictions set up by current power relations, which 
may limit the range of traumatic experiences that are expressible in the 
scheme of transitional justice. 
 
No, I have never mentioned my persecution publicly. It was too 
hard for me to explain. (Transcript of JH 2013, 12)  
I wrote poems during my captivity in Taiyuan Prison in 
Taitung. It was hard to express my anguish, so I wrote poems 
to calm myself. (Transcript of WL 2013, 2) 
 
If we looked no further, we might infer merely that mental agony silences 
their trauma. Objectively speaking, both JH and WL were traumatised by 
their past persecution. They are surviving political victims who continue to 
endure the trauma in their current lives. But what aspect of their past 
traumatised them? Was it the persecution, or the political struggle? Both JH 
and WL acknowledge that both their failed political ventures and their 
persecution continue to haunt them.149 So, why do most survivors, including 
my informants, tend to emphasise the perspective of persecution? Arguably, 
the main reason is the political situation, which deliberately silences part of 
the trauma at the collective level. That is, even if the trauma were not 
unspeakable, my informants would still be facing a political situation that 
prevents them from earning full recognition of the multiple dimensions of 
their past.  
Collective trauma does not need to be based on a sense of sharing but, 
rather, can be a ubiquitous status among a group of isolated, traumatised 
people. On the one hand, trauma is a mental state experienced by a subject. 
To the extent that it is based on an individual’s past experiences, it is fair to 
say that no one suffers in quite the same way. Thus, a sense of the 
uniqueness of one’s victimhood can justify mental isolation in respect to 
catastrophic experiences such as political persecution (Fierke 2004: 487; Ben-
                                                
149 Field research note of JH 2013, 12; transcript of WL 2013, 4. 
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Ze’ev et al. 2010). On the other hand, trauma is a social phenomenon, casting 
a shadow over a group of people or even a society. For instance, each of my 
informants may be categorised as a group of traumatised individuals, but 
they rarely discuss their trauma with others, not even their associates. They 
are isolated from their own interpretation of their own past. Apart from JH 
and WL noted above, BY also continues to experience a sense of isolation 
with respect to his traumatised past. BY was persecuted for his pro-
independence stance during his military service in the 1960s. Unlike my 
other participants, such as JC, BY always remains low-profile and hesitates 
over publicising his past insurgence, including his persecution-related 
emotions. During our first two interviews, it was not difficult to discover that 
‘some episodes’, or ‘a certain part of the past’ has disturbed him, as he was 
extremely reticent about ‘his feelings’ about the time of imprisonment.  
 
There is nothing worth noting in my past persecution. I chose 
to be a staunch activist for my political beliefs [Taiwan’s 
independence]. People must have been frustrated and felt let 
down by their fate. So did I. I have accepted my fate. That’s all. 
(Transcript of BY 2013, 4) 
 
But BY’s refusal to elaborate upon his past persecution does not stop him 
from resonating with others’ painful experiences. When we spoke of people 
he knew during his captivity, BY not only recognised those prisoners as 
‘frustrated activists’ but he also showed empathy for those who suffered 
under the KMT during and after their imprisonment. 
  
I won’t say that I almost feel the same things as they [BY’s 
fellow prisoners] experienced, but if you were me, I bet you 
could not ignore those scenes that happened to ‘us’. 
(Transcript of BY 2013, 4) 
 
BY cannot deny the fact that he was one of those who had been politically 
abused under the KMT regime, despite the fact that he has been controlling 
himself from delving into the scene of persecution. For him, the term ‘us’ 
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confirms the fact that persecution did exist in his life. But, hitherto, he is still 
isolated from sharing the emotion of trauma or relating to his comrades and 
fellow prisoners, let alone with researchers or citizens in Taiwan. In 
consequence, as a survivor who has been recognised by the Taiwanese 
authorities, BY repeats himself in narrating the details of his arrest, 
interrogation, conviction and so forth, i.e., the picture of persecution during 
the White Terror, in the official transitional justice discourse. But he has never 
expressed his reflection on his or others’ persecution in the officially 
sponsored oral histories, or with his fellow survivors. 
  
No, I don’t think we [survivors] need to talk about our feelings 
of persecution. I don’t even know how to start the conversation. 
(Transcript of BY 2013, 4)   
 
The imperative for transitional justice is not for survivors to decide whether 
or not they are willing to narrate their reflections on their past. Quite the 
contrary, the salience of transitional justice is to provide secure conditions, 
granting these traumatised men dignity (Kriesberg 2004). Without this 
premise, a study of survivors’ isolated emotional state would remain at the 
level of psychological analysis, instead of advancing to unravelling the 
persistent political conditions that have restrained and haunted their 
narratives, both in private and in public. 
 The sense of isolation is not only based on their particular experiences 
of persecution but derives, more profoundly, from the way in which, 
currently, the scheme of transitional justice in Taiwan defines them as 
‘traumatised survivors with innocence’. 
Not only BY, all of my participants have a bone in their throats when 
it comes to their trauma. Like JC, who emphasises that he has never talked 
about his reflections on his experiences of persecution with his associates or 
even with other survivors, ‘Unmentionable, it is unmentionable. I don’t even 
know how to describe it.’ In accordance with the analysis above, it seems that 
both the persecution and the political struggle have traumatised JC. After 
engaging with the official transitional justice discourse for two decades, JC 
still hesitates over spelling out his reflections on his persecution. As one of 
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the most aggressive survivor victims in the official discourse, JC is isolated 
from himself, narrating his reflections on his own traumatised experiences. 
Nonetheless he continues to devote himself to narrating scenes of 
persecution in the official oral history: 
 
They [intelligence agents] tried to force me to confess, but I 
refused. And I was tortured. They covered my head with a 
sack. Two men. When the car stopped. Two or three men 
placed me in a sack and put me on this [a bridge guardrail in 
Tainan]. I knew I was not on the ground, but I didn’t know 
where I was. A few minutes later, the man who gave my name 
was pushed into the canal. He asked me, ‘hear something?’ I 
heard flops, and I knew we were by the canal. He asked me if I 
would confess, and if I didn’t I would be thrown into the canal. 
I didn’t answer. He said, ‘your last chance.’ And I didn’t 
answer. He boosted me into the canal.150 
 
Given JC’s experience is not isolate but common amongst my participants, 
suffice it to say that the silenced trauma is not only about one’s experiences 
that are too painful to be verbalised. The official transitional justice discourse, 
which awaits liberalisation, fails to provide survivors with a secure and 
stable space for narrating their past, including their reflections. These men 
have suffered from a confluence of these perspectives, silenced both by the 
horrors of their past and the sanitising of Taiwan’s scheme of transitional 
justice. When the official discourse consolidates the identity of ‘qualified’ 
political victims as those people who did not plot any subversion against the 
KMT regime but were somehow brutally repressed during the White Terror, 
this not only silences survivors’ revolutionary attitudes but also limits 
society’s understanding of their trauma. In this regard, what makes survivors 
feel isolated derives not only from the horrors they experienced but also from 
the limits of the state-sponsored traumatic discourse, which does not allow 
                                                
150 Translation by the Taiwanese government: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f5M_oXqEPYc&list=PLm_5EfdMTx2fmgvM2Gpzier9j
YyGB4TJA&index=19 
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their trauma and persecution to be fully recognised or embraced by 
Taiwanese society. And a sense of isolation continues to hover around their 
trauma in the era of reconciliation. 
 
The politically silenced trauma 
Given previous discussion, it is ostensibly to observe the trauma that has 
been silenced by the current political condition in Taiwan. According to the 
Compensation Act, only those whose innocence was legally recognised were 
entitled to base claims on their past sufferings in the scheme of transitional 
justice. In this regard, not only survivors’ narratives but also the nature of 
their trauma has become fixed in the official discourse.  
To clarify what is meant by the term ‘fixed’, I would first recall that 
state-sponsored oral histories of the White Terror have been published by 
successive Taiwanese governments since the project of reckoning with the 
distasteful past began in the 1990s. Against this background, those of my 
informants who had been interviewed previously in connection with that 
exercise all seemed to narrate their past along the same lines, seen below: 
 
I was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1954. […] I would be 
lying if I said that being in prison was easy. It was always 
tough. During that period, I saw people suffering from mental 
illness, without any psychiatric care. IF a prisoner went insane 
and seemed to annoy and harass others, the prison would put 
him in solitary confinement. To avoid this, you had to force 
yourself to think, read, or do anything else to distract you from 
your situation (Transcript of JC 2012, 11). 
My life got even tougher after I was released, for the 
secret agents followed me for two years afterwards. Every time 
I got a job, an agent of the secret police would visit the 
company and warn them of the danger of hiring me. [Sobs] … I 
just could not make a proper life for my wife and children 
(Transcript of MO 2013, 11). 
What can I say? My life was completely ruined by the 
KMT. They were always there watching me, even though I was 
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innocent! (Transcript of RJ: 2013, 3)  
 
Although these narrators were incarcerated in different periods, ranging 
from the 1950s to the 1970s, they profess a similar perspective on their 
persecution by the KMT regime. JC’s statement above echoes most of my 
informants’ accounts; their experiences were all very similar. For instance, 
MO and RJ both experienced surveillance, even though they were 
imprisoned and released in different eras. The omnipresent themes in my 
informants’ narratives are arrest, trial, imprisonment, and subsequent 
monitoring and harassment by KMT agents after their release, until martial 
law was lifted.  
Aside from this similar trajectory of persecution, there is another point 
that my informants have in common, as illustrated by RJ above—namely, the 
power to claim their innocence. Each of them emphasises his innocence at the 
start of the interview, possibly because most have been granted financial 
compensation by the Taiwanese authorities, on condition that they assert 
their innocence of the offences for which they were convicted.151 Those 
awarded compensation have now been accorded official recognition as 
political victims in the scheme of transitional justice. They are identified as 
worthy of official apology and vindication. However, the identity of political 
victim also connotes a tacit agreement not to bring up the facts of their past 
resistance to the government. The ability to silence the survivors is a 
prerogative of the powerful side.  
As long as the official transitional justice discourse remains prevalent, 
survivors will be unable to recount publicly the truth of their revolutionary 
past. They are not free to speak from any perspective other than that of 
victims of seemingly random persecution.  
The state atrocities carried out during the White Terror were 
institutionalised as governing tactics by the KMT party-state. That is to say, 
the pattern of persecution was relatively consistent throughout the White 
Terror. Nevertheless, it is worth exploring the victimhood that underlies the 
narratives quoted above, especially to the extent that it departs from the 
content of the official discourse. 
                                                
151 For details of this financial compensation, see chapter 3. 
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The following story indicates how survivors in Taiwan continue to be 
silenced by power. In 1954, a prison rebellion allegedly occurred at Green 
Island Prison (in Chinese, 新生訓導處), after which more than 100 political 
prisoners were sent to Taipei for retrial; 12 of them were subsequently 
executed. Of these 12, only one was female, 23-year-old Ru-Zhi, who was 
accused of secretly receiving a ‘love letter’ from another convicted traitor, 
containing details about the rebellion.152 When Ru-Zhi’s close friend, Mei, 
recalls the situation, she offers another scenario, indicating that Ru-Zhi was 
transcribing the news of the political situation under the KMT regime for 
circulation among the prisoners in Green Island (林世煜 & 胡慧玲 2003). 
Either way, it seems that Ru-Zhi was indeed conspiring to cause a prison riot. 
Mei describes her as a political victim, someone who hated the KMT regime, 
but was nonetheless innocent of the specific charge for which she was 
sentenced to death.  
Meanwhile, VT was imprisoned on Green Island in the early 1950s, 
and had been close to some of those executed, including Ru-Zhi.153 He informs 
me in a private conversation that he often joined Ru-Zhi in transcribing news 
from the newspapers while in prison: ‘The mission was to keep monitoring 
the political situation in Taiwan and to seize any potential chance to rebel’, 
he says, becoming agitated, his hands shaking.154  
Prior to this conversation, nothing similar had featured in any of the 
other narratives I had encountered; in particular, the prison riot case was 
widely assumed to have been fabricated by the KMT to strike terror among 
the prisoners and suppress any potential conspiracies among them. As far as 
we knew, the KMT regime had been keen during the White Terror to confirm 
that death sentences were being carried out; every political prisoner 
sentenced to death was photographed before and after being executed. The 
photograph shown here is of Ru-Zhi immediately prior to her execution; in it, 
she appears to face death with a brave smile. I ask VT why Ru-Zhi was 
                                                
152  File number: B3750187701=0043=1571=40736010=154=019=0000217500001, and 
B3750187701=0043=1571=40736010=154=019=0000217500002.  
153 VT was imprisoned for treason crime from 1950 to 1960 under the KMT regime. For his 
story and introduction, see the beginning of this chapter. 
154 Notes on field research 2011.4. 
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smiling, and he nearly breaks down in tears: ‘She welcomed death for her 
political ideals. She was proud to die.’ 
 
 
Illustration 4-2: The photo shows Ru-Zhi smiling just before her execution. The blank space 
contained a photograph taken immediately after; it is held in the National Archives, where only 
her family may apply to see it. Courtesy of National Archives, Taiwan. 
 
VT’s narrative tells the story of a political dissident proudly sacrificing her 
life to resist the dictatorship. However, the official narrative is fixed, allowing 
only for an innocent victim who succumbed to unwarranted political 
persecution.  
Asked about his time in prison, JC observes that some prisoners 
surrendered while incarcerated but others, such as himself, VT, and Ru-Zhi, 
never let go of their desire to conspire against the KMT while in custody:  
 
I am not saying we were rushing to rebel, but we did not lose 
hope of overthrowing Chiang Kai-Shek (Transcript of JC 2012, 
11). 
 
To explain his reluctance to admit his radical past as such, JC explains his 
current situation:  
 
As long as the KMT has not collapsed, it would be dangerous 
for me to detail all of the episodes that occurred during our 
captivity (Transcript of JC 2012, 11). 
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Arguably, survivors are still silenced in Taiwan, because neither their history 
of persecution nor their history of political struggle has been fully recognised 
in the scheme of transitional justice. VT, for example, started out as a pro-
unification communist but came around to the cause of independence later, 
whereas others mentioned here have been consistently pro-independence. 
Despite the variations in their political orientation, the silence of these 
survivors reveals that trauma is evoked not only by one’s past sufferings, but 
also by witnessing the inhumane treatment of others. Furthermore, trauma 
can also arise from one’s own past insurgence. VT recalls his past activism as 
a time of ‘self-awakening’155 whereas RJ views the comparable period in his 
own life as a time of ‘nation-building’.156 Former communist JC refers to the 
project of ‘fighting for a fair society’.157 They may define their politics in 
different terms and they may espouse different causes, but their silences are 
nonetheless informative with respect to their past and present political lives158 
due to their having been muzzled by the current transitional justice scheme. 
As Jay Winter suggests, silence is ‘socially constructed space in which 
and about which subjects and words normally used in everyday life are not 
spoken’, as well as an active and deliberate response to past trauma (Winter 
2010: 4). VT’s deliberate silence reveals the discrepancy between the 
perspective of the authorities and that of survivors in Taiwan. The KMT 
regime’s policies in Taiwan sparked a state of civil conflict and political 
insurrection from the 1950s to the 1990s, which is officially portrayed as a 
period of excessive state brutality that was not entirely without justification. 
In pursuit of recognition, survivors of the White Terror conceal their 
insurgent activities from the authorities, and in so doing conceal much of the 
                                                
155 Transcript of VT 2011, 5.  
156 Transcript of RJ 2013, 12. 
157 Transcript of JC 2014, 7. 
158 As one may logically wonder what these survivors’ political pursuits are in contemporary 
Taiwan, this forms the main topic of chapter 5, which includes an examination of how 
survivors currently work for their varied political goals and define their politics today. 
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trauma that is attributed to this past. Victimhood is thus presented in a static 
and limited context. 
From Foucault’s perspective, the term ‘power relations’ refers to 
power not merely in terms of institutionalised oppression of the powerless. 
Rather, he envisages power as it operates in everyday life, and always 
entailing an element of resistance (Foucault 2000d: 120–123). It is true that VT 
and JC are silenced by the dominant official transitional justice discourse, yet 
their silence also becomes a mode of resistance against the authorities. VT 
emphasises that he will not speak of Ru-Zhi in public, since it is both his duty 
to protect her reputation and privacy, and his right to refuse to recount his 
and Ru-Zhi’s past suffering publicly. As JC says, ‘I am the one who decides 
whether or not to share my past, not the government’.159 Survivors find the 
restrictive official discourse pervading their daily lives, as they must 
compromise and cope with it on a daily basis. They suffered in the past, and 
continue to suffer in the context of the scheme of transitional justice in 
Taiwan; meanwhile, their silence is not only about repression, as it also 
entails resistance. 
The identity of political victims is politically constructed in Taiwan. By 
the same token, trauma is also politically constructed as it functions as an 
approach to enable survivors to narrate their past persecution in the official 
discourse. Accordingly, survivors remain limited in their ability to voice their 
trauma and victimhood. Only trauma that is validated by a claim of 
innocence is addressed in the scheme of transitional justice. That is, the 
official discourse excludes from consideration any trauma that is connected 
to the experience of engaging in resistance against the government, whether 
this trauma takes the form of sorrow over the ‘inhuman conditions’ suffered 
by other insurgents or the KMT regime’s crushing of one’s own rebellion. 
The narratives that are incompatible with the official discourse are 
suppressed by the KMT regime as it continues to evade legal responsibility 
for its past atrocities. In this context, silence becomes strategic for survivors 
because it secures their right to recognition in Taiwanese society. By 
accepting the constraints on their narrative of trauma, survivors retain access 
to the platform accorded them in the scheme of transitional justice. Without 
                                                
159 Transcript of JC 2013.1. 
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such recognition, survivors lose the right to claim even the limited and 
conditional trauma delineated by the official discourse. 
 
 
Shame: holding the mirror to a revolutionary past 
Conditioned by Taiwan’s official discourse, survivors’ shame, like trauma, is 
also recognised as one of the negative emotions associated with political 
condemnation and repression during the White Terror. All of my informants 
openly admit to feeling ashamed of their past persecution.  
 Political repression was brought to bear throughout Taiwanese society, 
as everyone was called on to root out and suppress the political criminals. 
However, according to my field research, the shame that has haunted my 
informants does not merely present as the remnants of stigma, but also flows 
from a sense of having been an unsuccessful subversive. 
 
I don’t feel as though there is anything worth mentioning. I am 
ashamed of being imprisoned. (Transcript of HC 2013, 2)  
 
If we understand shame only in its literal sense, we risk missing the more 
complex psychological context of HC’s case. To most of my informants, the 
term ‘shame’ signifies a feeling of having been demeaned (in Taiwanese, 
‘Giensiao’ ⾒笑), because the subject has failed to meet the standards set by 
the community to which he or she belongs. As SC, JR, and MO put it more 
straightforwardly:  
 
Giensiao… (speaking in a weak tone). I was not a capable 
insurgent. I failed to overthrow the KMT government. […] Miss 
Hsiao, I don’t want to talk about it, it’s not worth mentioning. 
(Transcript of SC 2013, 3) 
Umm…I feel Giensiao to tell you things [about his past] 
as such. People don’t like to share their shameful past with 
others, nor do I (Transcript of JR 2013, 12). 
It's too difficult to speak of the past. It’s too Giensiao to 
talk about it. (Transcript of MO 2013, 11)  
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From a perspective of pure victimisation, it is reasonable to understand 
survivors’ shame as a reaction to the overbearing political control that 
continued to embarrass and belittle them even after their release from prison. 
Faced with this coercive and hostile force, the narratives cited here are 
understandable. My participants are ashamed of their identity of political 
criminal. However, aside from this unmentionable shame, I discovered there 
is another form of shame that the official discourse declines to recognise 
during my interviews with them. As JR and MO elaborated during our 
interviews: 
 
Certainly I feel ashamed of my persecution. My conviction not 
only persecuted myself, but also my family. […] The whole of 
society rejected a person like me. They [Taiwanese citizens] 
were taught to be fearful of people like me. […] I had lived 
under this tremendous stress because of Chiang Kai-Shek and 
his KMT regime. […] It’s shameful to be arrested by Chiang Kai-
Shek. It means that I lost. I failed in my attempt to revolt against 
Chiang Kai-Shek’s authority. I failed. Giensiao. (Transcript of JR 
2013, 12) 
Although I have insisted on my enduring pro-
independence stance, I have to assert that my verdict was 
completely fabricated. I admit that my intention of revolting 
against the government had been grounded and developed 
prior to my accusation. But it was shameful to be discovered 
before I put my ideas into practice. I failed even before I took 
any action for the insurgence. (Transcript of MO 2013, 11) 
 
Just as this discourse has silenced part of the White Terror survivors’ trauma, 
it seems that the content of their shame that is associated with their past 
insurgency is likewise silenced. But the silenced part of the trauma and the 
shame related to my informants’ insurgent past are quite different. The 
trauma of being a failed insurgent is interwoven with the fear of further 
persecution, along with sorrow, which includes having witnessed the deaths 
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of friends and comrades at the hands of the KMT regime. That is, the silenced 
trauma is about their own experiences and their reaction to those of others, 
especially of those to whom they were close. But the silenced shame is purely 
individual, from having failed in their political projects. And this part forms 
the key issue in the following section. 
 
A sociological perspective on shame 
In the field of psychology, shame is an emotional state that requires self-
awareness and self-evaluation (Gilbert and Andrews 1998; Kaufman 1993). 
As Michael Lewis (1995) suggests, shame is not a primary emotion but a self-
conscious one, for it develops through a process of self-reflection. Lewis 
underscores the role of ‘self’ in his analysis, as any emotional state requires a 
self, both to produce the state and to experience it (ibid.: 29). In this context, 
shame is an emotional state evoked by comparing one’s actions to some 
standard—be it moral, cultural, social, or political—that one imposes upon 
oneself. While psychology often focuses on the individual’s inner mental 
activities without adopting a more structured viewpoint that would locate 
the self in a socio-political process, shame is nonetheless recognised by 
psychologists as an emotional state that emerges from a mental interaction 
between a subjective self and an array of objective external factors. That is, 
individuals’ responses to events and situations are specific to their unique 
history of experiences, expectations, desires, and needs. Based on this 
description, Lewis argues that shame reflects intense pain, discomfort and 
anger on the mental level, which is different from embarrassment or shyness, 
both of which are less intense. Arguably, shame concerns a process of self-
criticism with respect to one’s own actions. In Lewis’s words, shame is in a 
sense an emotion of which individuals become an object as well as a subject 
(ibid.: 34). That is, the process reflects not only one’s actions but also one’s 
self. Self-reflection subsequently takes a step further towards ‘re-defining’ 
the self.  
Lewis’s study of shame emphasises that it can only be understood by 
addressing the individual’s social conditions as well as her mental state. 
While accepting that shame is an intense emotional experience of self-re-
evaluation, this research is concerned with the mental process of shame at 
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the collective level. Using this approach, we can comprehend how Taiwan’s 
official discourse silences survivors’ shame, and how survivors use silence to 
challenge that discourse.  
Sociologist Erving Goffman, in his study of stigma, also emphasises 
the importance of the self,160 but focuses on how social interaction makes 
people value themselves more. Goffman (1968) discusses shame as an 
emotional response to stigmatisation, a social interaction that leads actors to 
define and evaluate their behaviour and their very being on the basis of 
perceived societal norms.161 In this context, shame refers to how we present 
ourselves to others, and how our self-concept is constructed from the 
viewpoints of others in our social life. In Goffman’s words (1959), the 
emergence of shame must be studied through social relations, because 
people tend to act with the perceptions of others in mind. Individuals 
attempt to be accepted or, at least, to avoid rejection, as members of a tribe 
(Scheff 2013: 119). Seen in this light, shame engenders in them a sense of 
panic at being excluded from their community. Shame is thus a hidden and 
unwanted emotion, a sign that our interactions with others are not 
proceeding smoothly.  
Social constraints also have a role to play in triggering shame. Norbert 
Elias (1982) points to a profound relationship between shame and civilisation. 
In particular, he observes that the ability to reject feelings of shame has 
developed along with the process of civilisation, as social controls have 
evolved from physical punishment to self-control (ibid.; Scheff 1997; 2000). 
For Elias, shame functions to caution people that some actions might exceed 
the bounds set by the consensus of society. It can be triggered suddenly if 
people break the explicit rules or the hidden consensus that underpin the 
operation of their community. Shame does not come out of nowhere, but 
derives from a systematic arrangement that includes certain values and 
expectations, and places demands on a society’s members. 
                                                
160 Goffman developed his theory of emotion in terms of Cooley’s description of the ‘looking-
glass self’, which suggests that the self is a product of continuing interactions between 
individuals. In this case, Goffman addresses the self as a social product rather than a purely 
mental one.  
161 Goffman is concerned with embarrassment more than shame in his study of stigma (1968), 
but this does not affect his argument that shame is a type of feedback on one’s social 
performance, which emerges from social interactions at the micro level.  
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Arguably, social boundaries play a crucial role in modern life. 
Goffman focuses on shame at the micro level, while Elias offers a more 
general, macro view on how shame is triggered within a certain socio-
political process. Meanwhile, both point to the importance of social relations 
in analysing the concept of shame in two respects. First, each individual, at a 
minimum, secures a sense of belonging to a community, which makes the 
avoidance of shame a central element in her social life. Second, with shame 
potentially directing the individual’s social and political behaviour, the 
operation of social boundaries mirrors how a society or a government 
defines its content.  
Nonetheless, for Foucault, self-evaluation such as the definition of 
shame in one society also progresses in the power relations. From the 
perspective of power relations,162 Taiwan’s scheme of transitional justice, 
when viewed in the context of this discussion on shame, has not allowed my 
informants the freedom to construct their own narratives of their persecution 
or their activism. It has silenced them to a certain extent. As my participant 
JR stated: 
 
JR: I really don’t want to talk about it [past conspiracy]. I feel insecure 
about spelling it out either with the government or with researchers, 
including you. I am sorry. […] Taiwanese governments do not 
welcome our insurgent stories.  
I: Why do you think they do not welcome your stories? 
JR: Partly because of their oral history project. They only want to 
know the details of our persecution without inquiring into the reason. 
[Silence for almost one minute.] As you can imagine, of course I think 
of myself as a political activist, but I find it difficult to expose my past 
frustration. And I know that Taiwanese governments do not welcome 
our [insurgent] stories. (Transcript of JR 2013, 12) 
 
JR is not alone in his perception of the ‘pressure of silence’ created by the 
official discourse, as my other participants also echo his narrative. 
 
                                                
162 See discussions in chapter 2. 
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We are here to claim the importance of advocating the idea of 
human rights. We are the evidence of past atrocities. It is true 
that we rarely talk about our feelings about the past revolution. 
Miss Hsiao, it’s hard to verbalise. It is the past that has 
continued to haunt us. I am proud but also ashamed of it. No 
one could spell it out without hesitation. […] It is true that the 
government never invites us to talk about our past insurgence 
or our feelings about it. But it’s fine. At least we are here, we, the 
evidence of past atrocities. (Transcript of KY 2012, 12) 
I felt completely ashamed of being arrested and accused 
of treason. […] [wept] I was not guilty! But I failed [to revolt]. 
They [the oral history organisers] don’t welcome our political 
beliefs. I sometimes think that perhaps the whole of society 
rejects our existence. (Transcript of CH 2013, 4)  
 
Shame does not spring from nowhere. Speaking in an agitated tone, CH 
expressed stress about the silencing of his revolutionary past and his 
negative emotions, such as shame, in the official transitional justice discourse. 
For CH, his silence is the product of Taiwan’s transitional justice scheme. But 
KY’s narrative shows that the silence of shame is not merely an outcome, but 
more of a strategy. KY is the president of the political victim association, 
TVCA, apparently the position that restrains him in his narrative from 
elaborating upon the ‘limit’ of spelling out his reflections on the official 
transitional justice discourse. Still, KY cannot deny the ‘reluctance’ of the 
official transitional justice discourse to embrace their past insurgence and 
their own related reflections. For him, the first priority is to seize the power 
to stay in the official discourse, regardless of the fact that this power is 
limited and restrictive. 
 The government has outlined an appropriate identity for an 
acceptable political victim: someone who has not conspired against the KMT 
or, possibly, did engage in some form of conspiracy but now regrets that 
error. However, as articulated in chapter 3, the latter would not be eligible 
for the official recognition and compensation accorded to the ‘innocent’ 
political criminal, although a ‘sense of regret’ is welcomed in the official 
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discourse. In this regard, Taiwan’s scheme of transitional justice has not fully 
legitimised the victims, and continues to over-simplify the definition of 
political victim. JC, for example, knows that he could have expressed 
remorse for his past subversion in order to claim more space for his 
utterances, but he refuses to do so. ‘I did nothing wrong’, says JC. How my 
informants choose to describe themselves indicates the extent to which they 
are circumscribed by social boundaries and the power relations of a given 
society. That is, with Taiwan’s official discourse having defined trauma and 
shame as expected reactions to the abuses suffered under KMT repression, a 
nuanced study of the shame of White Terror survivors can show the extent to 
which the official discourse has influenced the terms in which they conceive 
their own survivorhood. 
 
Shame complicates the meaning of survivorhood 
As mentioned previously, informant JH was a political prisoner during the 
1950s. The informer who denounced him and his associates was one of his 
relatives. When I interview one of the associates, he tells me there was no 
reason to blame JH. ‘It was a matter of sedition, and this often makes people become 
scared’, says WT.163 Nonetheless, JH himself still struggles with this memory:  
 
The informer was my relative, and that is why they [JH’s 
associates] still misjudge me, but it is fine. I once said that you 
can think of me as a good or bad person, but I am not the kind 
of person who would betray my friends. I do not betray people. 
(Transcript of JH 2013, 12) 
 
Although WT displays an understanding attitude, some of his other 
associates were less generous in their assessment of JH prior to their passing 
away a few years ago, and JH still suffers from the knowledge that they 
blamed him. It seems as though JH wishes to convince me that he was not a 
betrayer; as we talk, he continues to justify himself. Yet, while referring to 
                                                
163 Field research note of WT 2013.3. This was said at a private gathering held by some 
survivors of the 1960s White Terror, which I recorded by means of handwritten notes. 
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himself as a political victim within the official definition, JH gives his story a 
different twist when he tells it to me: 
 
I consider myself a revolutionary. But I was arrested, I failed… 
Only others can rationalise whether I am a political victim or 
not. I consider myself a person who fought for Taiwanese 
independence... I am willing to devote my life to this 
movement. Of course, I was ashamed to be arrested and 
reluctant to be imprisoned, but I deserved it since I was not 
clever enough to elude the KMT authorities. (Transcript of JH 
2014, 1) 
 
Shame is continuously interwoven with guilt as JH recounts his past. Unlike 
shame, guilt is not a function of how individuals value their global selves but, 
rather, of how they value their actions towards others (Lewis 1995; Teroni 
and Deonna 2008). Feelings of guilt tend to be less overwhelming than 
feelings of shame. As JH’s account shows, trauma, shame, and guilt all come 
into play when White Terror survivors contemplate their survivorhood. But 
shame is a particular index of the prominent role that political struggle 
continues to play in their outlook on life; the fact that their efforts to 
overthrow the dictatorship resulted in failure remains a source of 
humiliation.  
Suffice it to say, JH seldom thinks of himself from a standpoint of 
victimhood as much as one of participation in political struggle. Another 
survivor, HC, shares a similar attitude. He says that there is nothing worth 
discussing about his past because he feels ashamed of having been 
imprisoned. But, while we might expect shame to be a consequence of state 
oppression and abuse such as occurred during the White Terror, my 
questions elicit a different perspective from HC:  
 
What can I say? I was defeated. (Transcript of HC 2013, 3)  
 
Another telling example is FC. As a former political prisoner during the 
1970s, FC is haunted by the Taiyuan Incident, a prison mutiny organised by a 
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group of pro-independence prisoners for which five of his fellow inmates 
were executed, one of whom was his best friend in Taiyuan.164 FC rarely 
mentions his best friend to others, not only because the memory of his death 
is painful but also, as he explains: 
 
I feel I did not protect him. We were that close. I should have 
told him not to join the conspiracy. Miss Hsiao, I know nothing 
about the past. […] I have no words to speak. (Transcript of FC 
2013, 12) 
 
FC was reticent during our conversations, partly because of an 
overwhelming sorrow. FC views himself and his fellows as political 
dissidents but also as victims of political oppression. The two perspectives 
are not entirely separable, for it was the political struggle that gave rise to the 
KMT regime’s campaign of repression and, inevitably, the ongoing 
repression that inspired more and more people to oppose the government. 
Thus, both viewpoints define the White Terror in Taiwan. By the same token, 
the twin experiences of persecution and political struggle complicate the 
survivors’ silence and their emotions of trauma and shame. Like HC and FC, 
one may feel ashamed of surviving when one’s fellows were executed. One 
may also feel traumatised because one’s past experiences were too horrific to 
be understood. Survivors may be silenced due to the perspective of viewing 
themselves and their associates as ‘dissidents’, rather than helpless political 
victims. The White Terror was not only about repression but also about the 
antagonism between the KMT and those whom it imprisoned. The act of 
opposing the KMT during the White Terror created a common bond among 
survivors who espoused different political causes but suffered similar 
consequences. Further complicating the picture is the silence borne of shame 
at the failure of their efforts to overthrow the government. 
                                                
164 Taiyuan Prison was built in Tai-Tung, on the east coast of Taiwan, in the late 1960s, 
specifically to house political prisoners. The struggle between the pro-Taiwan and left-wing 
pro-China activists is reflected in the proliferation of political prisoners during the late 1960s 
who were pro-Taiwan. The Taiyuan Incident was a failed mutiny staged solely by pro-
Taiwan prisoners. The Chiang Kai-Shek administration executed five prisoners who escaped 
but were subsequently recaptured. See Chapter 5 for further discussion. 
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Hence, I would not suggest that the shame my informants admit to 
feeling is unrelated to the atrocities they suffered at the hands of the state; 
however, their discomfiture at the ineffectiveness of their political projects 
seems to be more salient. Among my 24 participants, TZ may be another 
compelling case:  
 
One cannot say I am not a victim for I suffered and survived. 
[…] I know the persecution that happened to me was attributed 
to my conspiracy against the KMT. I do not regret this, but it is 
unfortunate that I failed. (Transcript of TZ 2013, 11) 
 
TZ was born in 1937 in Keelung, Taiwan. Owing to his strong pro-
independence stance, he was convicted in 1969 of the crime of treason and 
sentenced to eight years in prison. TZ’s narrative has widespread resonance 
amongst my informants. The most unmentionable content of shame is not the 
status of victim but the status of failed subversive. Their identity of political 
dissidents posing a threat to Taiwanese society was formed by the KMT 
during the Cold War. The stigma of being a political threat has haunted this 
group since they were targeted, convicted and imprisoned, and the shame 
has yet to be alleviated because Taiwan’s transitional justice programme has 
not fully recognised or vindicated their past. Meanwhile, another aspect of 
shame has also haunted my interviewees since their arrest: shame at being a 
failed political dissident. At this point, two social boundaries shape the 
survivors’ shame: (1) the KMT’s widely accepted discourse, which continues 
to stigmatise socialism; and (2) the forces of opposition, which stigmatise 
ineffective activism. Although my informants’ causes were diverse, their 
shared determination to displace the regime formed the basis for categorising 
them and for their subsequent shame.  
Moreover, the scheme of transitional justice continues to silence the 
content of shame, because only survivors who claim their innocence can be 
recognised as political victims. Without it, neither their persecution and past 
struggles, nor the emotions of trauma and shame, can be acknowledged. 
In sum, shame complicates the meaning of survivorhood. A view of 
the White Terror as a period of atrocities committed by the state cannot 
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address all of the elements that its survivors hold in memory. While 
survivors reveal another perspective on their past as an ongoing state of 
political struggle, shame in turn reveals that they address their survivorhood 
as a consequence of their defeat. Confronting the official discourse, survivors 
continue to conceal their past struggles from the government. Shame is thus 
a mirror, which directly casts light on the untold episodes and pictures of the 
memory of the White Terror.  
 
Shame is itself political  
 
Of course, we don’t speak of this. It is too shameful. But I 
believe we all feel the same way. (Transcript of SC 2013, 10)  
It’s all because of you, Miss Hsiao, we [with RJ] are here 
to talk about it. Without your invitation, I would not know we 
feel the same way [sobbed]. (Transcript of CH 2013, 4) 
My life has been an adventure. […] Yes, yes I failed, but I 
stood up. My failure left a scar here [pointed to his chest]. I 
think I will live with it until my death. It’s Giensiao, but it’s fine 
[with tears and smile]. (Transcript of JR 2013, 12) 
   
The emotion of shame is multi-layered in my survivors’ past and present-day 
lives. Some may overcome the mental disturbance, some may not. 
Nonetheless, the shame that has haunted all of my participants is politically 
constructed by the perspectives of both political suffering and political 
struggle. More precisely, shame is an alarm clock that continues to remind 
my participants of the very fact of their past suffering and frustration. They 
are haunted by the past, yet silenced by both past and present-day political 
configurations. However, in the case of my two most aggressive participants 
in Taiwan’s transitional justice scheme, JC and KY, their silence of shame is 
not merely a reaction of mental disturbance. Their reticence about this shame 
is a tactic in the face of this restrictive scheme. And all of my participants 
have shown identical interpretation of their reticence.  
 
Sakana, it is that I choose not to talk about it. They [Taiwan’s 
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transitional justice scheme] silenced me, but I also choose not to 
talk. It’s my own fight. (Transcript of JC 2012, 12) 
 
Regarding JC’s narratives throughout this chapter, suffice it to say that he is a 
man who was traumatised and persecuted by the powerful. However, there 
is a convincing argument that his silence is also a tactic in response to the 
powerful figures in his past and present-day life.   
While the multiple dimensions of shame felt by survivors of the White 
Terror in Taiwan tell us that their identity as survivors is not merely about 
victimhood, the emotion likewise complicates the significance of silence. 
Trauma provides an approach that validates their status as victims, which 
fits into the scheme of transitional justice. Nevertheless, the narrative of 
victimisation that survivors disclose is incomplete insofar as the missing 
parts implicate their revolutionary past. Here, silence is not only about the 
psychological wounds that lie hidden beneath the surface of survivors’ 
minds. It is, on the one hand, a means by which the powerful can control the 
discourse and, on the other, a means by which the survivors can withhold 
their consent to the dominant discourse.  
While silence and shame are often studied from the perspective of 
violence, suffering, and humiliation (Duffy 2005; Hartling et al. 2000), this 
chapter has shown that silence also sheds light on the shame that arises from 
survivors’ frustration at their defeat, and their perceived failure to fulfil their 
duty (Gilbert and Andrews 1998: 9). The more we discern the multiple 
meanings of survivors’ silence, the more precisely we can explore their 
memories. Survivors’ silence in the official discourse implies the rejection of 
memory on the one hand while protecting them from the scrutiny of those 
who may be unsympathetic on the other. Thus, silence may be perceived as 
passive but also, to some degree, aggressive. Survivorhood is not only about 
bearing witness to persecution, but also about exercising caution in 
recounting the past while they continue to face challenges from the 
Taiwanese authorities. In the wake of controversial events, survivorhood is 
inevitably politicised.  
Most of my interviewees seemed uncomfortable discussing their 
shame with others and struggled to verbalise it. Silence manifests as a sign of 
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intense emotion. By re-locating shame in Taiwan’s current political 
conditions, survivors’ shame can be understood as always political and 
contextualised within power relations. 
 
 
Conclusion 
For survivors of the White Terror, the complex elements of their 
survivorhood exceed what the official culture of contrition can encompass, 
for this culture narrows the meaning of the term ‘political victim’ in such a 
way that the content of their suffering is not fully represented.  
Ferguson (2003: 51) suggests that the use of silence in response to 
questions that are morally or personally difficult to answer constitutes a kind 
of response, but ultimately remains avoidance. Whether silence is seen as 
withholding participation or avoiding a subject, it is nonetheless a political 
practice. My informants’ silence in relation to victimhood and trauma is 
tantamount to a strategic practice for coping with their identity as political 
victims, as defined by the authorities. As demonstrated in VT’s case, 
survivors choose not to speak of their persecution as a matter of resistance to 
the current scheme of transitional justice. 
Among my informants, feelings of shame arise mainly from the 
prevalent unspoken perspective of participation in political struggle. Their 
silence implicates a collectivity in which these survivors tend to discern 
themselves less as victims of the government and more as its adversaries. 
This perspective underpins their interpretation of their past and their 
approach to the scheme of transitional justice. While the government 
authorises them to speak of the past, the culture of contrition circumscribes 
the perception of the past, so that survivors are compelled to echo the official 
discourse in order to retain a space in which to earn recognition. Thus, even 
in this era of reconciliation, the antagonistic relationship between the 
authorities and the survivors endures. As described above, past political 
conflicts surface in the ways that survivors continue to struggle with shame 
and trauma, and in their deliberate silence about their political activism, 
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while striving for recognition in present-day Taiwan.165 The fixed definition 
ascribed to a ‘survivor of the White Terror’ propels survivors into a new 
war—a war on memory, which forms the central issue of chapter 5. 
Thus, for White Terror survivors, silence exists on a spectrum ranging 
from the perspective of victimisation to that of participation in political 
struggle. The terms of their survivorhood are not cast as binary opposites. 
Along with the analysis of trauma and shame, multiple aspects of 
survivorhood persist in their lives. The nature and extent of the individual’s 
suffering during the White Terror shapes that individual’s personal trauma. 
However, when the whole of society is induced to identify these people as 
‘innocent individuals who were wrongly persecuted’, the political content of 
their trauma and shame is at odds with what the public recognises. Trauma 
is thus an individual emotional reaction that also encompasses a collective 
approach by which abuse survivors recount their past to the public. Likewise, 
shame reinforces survivors’ continued victimisation and offers clues to 
experiences that remain unmentioned. Taiwan’s transitional justice 
programme challenges the memory of White Terror survivors to varying 
degrees. 
Jay Winter elaborates on the notion of silence in the aftermath of 
political atrocities or a state of war. He is concerned with ‘focused, directed 
and purposeful silence, not conceived of as the absence of sound, but as the 
absence of conventional verbal exchanges’ (2010: 4). From this standpoint, I 
argue that we may be unable fully to comprehend the White Terror until we 
scrutinise the silence of its survivors. Trauma and shame are two primary 
indicators that the silence of White Terror survivors is related to the 
inadequacy of the ‘innocent victim’ model to convey the nature of their 
experience. Survivors’ emotions and memories more precisely reflect that the 
White Terror comprised a series of episodes of political repression and 
violence set against a backdrop of political conflict during the Cold War. 
The political transition that has been taking place in Taiwan since the 
1980s has engendered a public concern for truth and transparency and, as a 
consequence, the question of how to describe and interpret the White Terror 
has become a point of contestation between the KMT authorities and the 
                                                
165 See further discussion in chapter 5. 
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survivors. The ‘war on memory’ to which I refer has two aspects: (1) the 
political conflict that framed the White Terror has not dissipated; and (2) the 
official memory project continues to pit the government against the survivors. 
To consolidate this argument, in chapter 5, I forefront a competing 
transitional justice discourse that has been gradually developing amongst 
survivors in present-day Taiwan, thus problematising the identity of political 
victims, of which survivors are the primary representatives. My contention is 
that the survivors have never surrendered their identity as political activists. 
If, indeed, the main task of transitional justice in Taiwan is reconciliation, an 
examination of the competing discourse sheds light on what would 
constitute a meaningful reconciliation for survivors—one that would 
accurately reflect their experience. 
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Chapter 5  
De-politicised survivors— the competing 
transitional justice discourses 
 
 
The concept of reconciliation suggests that the enemies of 
yesterday will give up and let go of their hatred, animosity or 
wish for revenge, as well as their identity that had been 
constructed around the conflict. One expects that a new identity 
construction will develop together with a new relationship 
between former enemies that will address the roots of the conflict, 
not only its unfortunate outcomes. But how can we create such a 
deep process of change in people who have been committed to 
the conflict, in some places for generations, in others for a 
substantial part of their lives? Are these expectations realistic or is 
it wishful thinking and talking that has little substance in 
intractable conflicts? 
—Dan Bar-On, Darkness at Noon 
War Crimes, Genocide and Memories, 2007 
 
 
Introduction 
The politics of memory is usually not about fact—that is, what actually 
happened in the past. It is about how truth is conveyed in the present. As 
Hodgkin and Radstone suggest (2003), contesting the past involves, of course, 
posing questions about the present, and what the past means in the present, 
which means that truth is not objective, but perspectival. Present conflicts 
over representation become central to analysing the meaning of the past. 
And different viewpoints of the past serve to unravel the contestation.  
 Given analysis in the previous chapter, survivors’ silence is 
complicated by trauma and shame, reflecting their perspectives on the 
experience of the White Terror. Both the viewpoints of the period have 
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constructed their knowledge of their past. For these men, silence is not 
merely a consequence of the past and the present-day political configuration. 
More precisely, silence is also their tactic in the face of Taiwan’s transitional 
justice scheme. Having stated that most of my participants have joined the 
official transitional justice discourse in Taiwan, yet many of them remain 
reticent about part of their past, especially their adversarial past.  Given that, 
the ways that my participant consider their role in the official discourse, 
especially their reflection on their engagement and silence forms the 
imperative to be studied regarding the contestation of the past. 
In short, this chapter studies the survivor victims’ non-official 
transitional justice discourse, which seeks to explore the discrepancy 
between the survivors’ perspective on the White Terror and that of the 
authorities. Survivors’ views are still rarely shared, and remain highly 
controversial. According to Taiwan’s transitional justice scheme, the 
government authorises survivors to share only their memories of innocence 
and mistaken persecution in the transitional justice programme, while their 
memories of political opposition are silenced. Here, one point remains 
unclear: how do these men perceive their involvement in the transitional justice 
system? Is it possible for them to develop their competing discourses either within or 
outside the scheme of transitional justice? If so, how? The questions form the central 
issue in this chapter.  
Non-official discourses—competing discourses—are referenced in 
plural because not every survivor perceives his past in the same way. While 
this chapter seeks to develop a model for the construction of non-official 
discourses by my informants, the content of these discourses and the degree 
of their variation from the official discourse is bound to vary.  
At present, those once labelled as political criminals are recognised in 
the official discourse as ‘innocent’ victims whose past has no connection to 
conspiracy against the KMT regime. Because White Terror survivors are the 
best source of non-official discourses, the way they represent themselves to 
citizens in Taiwan forms the approach for the study. Having observed in 
chapter 4 that White Terror survivors tend to identify more as political 
activists than as victims in both their past and present lives, we may now 
turn to their current public engagement, especially with regard to the 
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officially-sponsored memory project. By studying their political life in detail, 
this chapter aims to reveal how, in the democratic era, these men continue to 
fight for their lost dignity and seek to advance their long-standing political 
causes. Accordingly, the competing transitional justice discourses come to 
reveal how their articulations of the past remain limited in the era of 
liberalism and democracy.  
 
 
Reconciliation with past atrocities but not with past 
political enemies  
In post-conflict situations, reconciliation has been identified as an 
indispensable process for healing societies torn apart by civil war or brutal 
regimes. Peace activists in particular see reconciliation—referring to a 
process by which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future—as 
a requisite condition for lasting peace (Fischer 2011: 415). Transitional justice 
having been initiated in Taiwan by the KMT regime, the perpetrator of the 
White Terror, the reconciliation process has bypassed the full disclosure of 
the extent of atrocities committed and identification of the perpetrators. 
Moreover, the end of the Cold War did not bring an end to anti-communist 
sentiment in Taiwan; it continues to exist, focused especially on mainland 
China. In the wake of the KMT’s return to power in 2008, an elite group of 
pro-independence scholars and politicians, including Taiwan’s current 
president, Dr Tsai Ing-Wen (in Chinese, 蔡英文; who was elected in January 
2016), founded the Taiwan Youth Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps 
(in Chinese, 台灣反共青年救國團). The impetus for this group came from 
President Ma’s diplomatic overtures to China, so the group found itself in the 
ironic position of charging the KMT with not being sufficiently tough on 
communism.  
The two survivors who had been accused of treason for communism 
in the 1950s, VT and VC are illustrative to the argument. Both VT and VC 
had secretly joined Chinese communist party in the late 1940s. However, 
confronted the definition of ‘political victim’ in the official transitional justice 
discourse, neither VT nor VC have prepared well enough to account for their 
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past political struggles in public. As discussed, VT is still haunted by the 
trauma of his comrades and fellow prisoner’s deaths.166 He has been deeply 
suffering in his mental life. For VT, the moment of full vindication has not 
arrived, as he has been in denial of his communist past. Under the 
circumstance, all he can do is to cooperate with the successive governments 
on the scheme of reconciliation, though socialism and communism remain 
stigmatised. 
 
It’s nothing, Miss Hsiao. I am happy to do it (join the scheme), 
and will continue to devote myself in it until I am no longer a 
man that you (the society and the citizens) need me (Transcript 
of VT 2012, 11).  
 
Hitherto VT remains active in Taiwan’s transitional justice scheme. By joining 
the committee board of curations which exhibited in the Green Island and 
Jingmei human rights park, VT collaborate with the government in stabilising 
the official transitional justice discourse. Ironically, VT merely secures his 
position in the scheme yet seems to failed in challenging the discourse.  
VT’s mindset is shared by VC. VC has been participating in the scheme 
for nearly two decades. For now, as he confessed, ‘Nothing has changed. I am 
still repeating myself about the perpetration.’167 But VC never gives up delivering 
his will to researchers whom he met. According to the Archives Act, only the 
bereavements can apply for the already execution photo of the executed ones 
under the KMT party-state. Yet, VC has spent years collecting the execution 
photos from the bereaved families all over Taiwan. He showed me the photo 
once when I visited him at his place in Taipei. We just sat shoulder to shoulder, 
seeing the photos carefully, without much talk. On that day, VC said:  
 
See their smile? It is the evidence that attest to their identity. 
They were not executed for no reason. They sacrificed their lives 
for their political beliefs! The photos have proved it (Transcript 
of VC 2012, 12).     
                                                
166 See discussion in chapter 4. 
167 Transcript of VC 2012, 12. 
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These men on the one hand cooperate with the successive governments for 
their power of utterance in the official discourse, secretly preparing for 
welcoming the full vindication on the other. The cooperation on the superficial 
strikingly envisages the yet-to-be-accomplished reconciliation in Taiwan.   
In any case, citizens in Taiwan are disinclined to censure the excesses 
committed by the government in the name of anti-communism. Without 
political alternation or fundamental reform of the KMT regime, 
democratisation in Taiwan has not encouraged, much less compelled, the 
KMT to come to terms with its past human rights abuses. Without a proper 
truth-telling mechanism, neither the persecutors nor the persecuted have a 
proper space in which to narrate the truths that should be shared by the 
various groups, including former adversaries, in Taiwan. Neither side trusts 
in its ability to challenge the already established viewpoint of the past. The 
whole of Taiwanese society has been invited to pardon both the past 
atrocities and their anonymous perpetrators without being allowed full 
knowledge of the White Terror.  
Suffice to say, the Taiwanese authorities have established a political 
sphere in which reconciliation is a ‘romance with remorse and with 
reparation, memory and healing’ (Scheper-Hughes 1998: 26). Without 
probing the facts of past repression by, and resistance to, the ROC 
government, the official discourse is not concerned with reconciling with 
former ‘political enemies’, but only with receiving absolution for its untold 
abuses and their nameless perpetrators. As a result, my informants’ status as 
convicted criminals has not been fully de-stigmatised. Taiwan’s official 
discourse merely apologises in general terms for the occurrence of the White 
Terror, and this apology, in a sense, preserves the moral order that existed 
when the White Terror began: those who favour socialism or communism 
continue to be regarded in Taiwan as a threat to society. 
If we value reconciliation as a process rather than as a way to achieve 
a particular outcome, as Dan Bar-On suggests, storytelling is, in a sense, 
central to that process. It provides the basis for developing a shareable truth 
as well as expressions of regard and security. In the dominant culture of 
contrition in Taiwan, the justice dimension is circumscribed by the notion of 
 187	
what truths are permissible. Based on VT and VC’s stories, an advanced 
review of my subjects’ contributions to the official and non-official discourses 
offers insight into the emergence of reconciliation as a watchword for both 
the government and survivors of the White Terror as they compete over how 
to represent the past, and shows how reconciliation is central to my 
informants’ current political life. 
 
 
De-politicisation as a perspectival and strategic truth 
In reconciliation processes, truth refers to the recognition of past injuries and 
violations of human rights. To bring formerly divided and often opposing 
groups of people to unite and develop an understanding of the past that they 
all find shareable and acceptable, truth may have more to do with harmony 
and reconciliation than with actual fact. Accordingly, truth can be 
perspectival and strategic in reconciliatory processes. It is the very approach 
for exploring how my participants deal with the seemingly decisive power 
relations, as my field research demonstrates.  
The first time I encountered JC was during a summer course on the 
White Terror in 2010, where he was billed as a survivor, lecturing on his 
incarceration by the KMT during the 1950s.168 Throughout the programme, JC 
recounted his life in prison in terms of his suffering. He described how the 
political prisoners were forced to build the prison in which they were 
incarcerated on Green Island, and the abuses that he and his fellow inmates 
endured during their captivity. Without any reference to his conviction as a 
traitor for his adherence to socialism, the storyline that JC narrated is totally 
consistent with the official transitional justice discourse. In this regard, JC is 
both a survivor of persecution and a witness to human rights violations.  
Apart from the course in which we met, JC has also worked as a 
docent for the National Jingmei Human Rights Park since 2010. For most of 
the time in Jingmei, JC conducts tours of government-sponsored exhibitions 
and gives talks to local and foreign visitors concerning his past suffering at 
the hands of the KMT regime. Most of the time, JC conforms to the storyline 
                                                
168 The summer course was sponsored and supervised by the Taiwanese government, and 
organised by a private organisation. I was employed to assist with its administration.  
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set up by the official discourse. He delivers a truth that conveys a sense of 
how an individual could be brutally persecuted by a dictatorship without 
having committed subversion. From a human rights perspective, JC’s 
narrative is reasonable and sustainable; no one should be persecuted for his 
political beliefs. However, after closely observing JC for six months, I 
concluded that he adopts this posture not only to further his vindication and 
reconciliation but, more important, to maintain a space in the official 
discourse to give voice to his still indistinct past and still unpopular political 
cause: 
 
I am continuing to fight. As long as the KMT has not been 
toppled, I will stay and fight (Transcript of JC 2014, 7). 
 
Speaking in an uncompromising tone, JC views his participation in the 
official discourse as a means of ongoing subversion against the KMT. In fact, 
the KMT was no longer in power, although it continued to compete for 
influence with other factions—primarily the DPP—through democratic 
processes. Nonetheless, JC and my other informants—such as CH and WR, 
whom the KMT convicted of treason in the 1960s for supporting 
independence—will remain politically engaged unless and until the KMT 
disbands and disappears from the political landscape.  
 
You never know whether you would be oppressed again if the 
KMT were to seize power in the future (Transcript of JC 2014, 
7). 
Hsiao, I will fight to the very end unless the KMT 
collapses. But for now, I am a political victim; this is the easiest 
way to get people to accept me (Transcript of CH 2013, 4). 
Even now, I cannot find any reason to compromise 
myself before the KMT. […] But what can I say? We survivors 
must accept the reality. We need a platform. And this [the 
officially-sponsored project] is our only chance to be heard 
(Transcript of WR 2013, 12). 
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By CH’s own account, he did not despise the KMT to such an extreme degree 
before he was convicted of treason for advocating independence. As he 
explains, he only meant to pursue a future in which the Taiwanese people 
could have their own nation.169 However, after being brutalised by the KMT in 
the 1960s, his antipathy for the KMT grew dramatically. CH reiterates 
emphatically his reluctance to cooperate with the government but, as he says, 
he is keenly aware that this is his only opportunity for recognition.  
WR shares the mindset of CH. As a pro-independence activist, WR 
was more aggressive in his youth, and more determined to subvert the KMT, 
which led to him being sentenced to death, although this sentence was 
subsequently commuted. To increase his political engagement, WR has 
joined the DPP party and become a local politician, serving since 2000 as 
mayor of a rural area. He sees this a way to have a voice in the political realm, 
even though it is hard for a rural mayor to influence national policy or have 
an impact on the transitional justice scheme; WR thus continues to confront 
the reality of his de-politicisation. Both CH and WR choose to align 
themselves with the official discourse but also develop other strategies to 
deal with that reality. 
Unlike WR, who chooses to be a local politician in Taiwan, JC seeks a 
broader audience, he even writes a column about his imprisonment in the 
Japanese periodical, MOKU.170 Furthermore, he assertively interacts with the 
foreign visitors whom he personally escorts on tours of Jingmei Human 
Rights Park. JC is fully aware of the importance of framing himself as a 
political victim before advocating his politics to the public. It is 
unequivocally true that he suffered from persecution under Chiang’s 
government. But there is another truth concerning JC’s opposition to the 
government that endures, albeit in a different way. To JC, subverting the 
KMT and pursuing vindication are equally important.  
In this democratic era, it is irreproachable for JC, CH, WR or anyone to 
voice a personal political opinion, even if this includes hatred of a particular 
                                                
169 Transcript of CH 2013, 4. 
170 The articles published by JC are mainly derived from his autobiography 《耕甘薯園的人》, 
published in Chinese in Taiwan. MOKU is a monthly Japanese magazine that focuses on 
socio-political and literary issues in Japan and East Asia. The magazine’s official web site (in 
Japanese) may be found at: http://www.moku-pub.com/saishin.html.  
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political group or party. However, JC has more at stake than freedom of 
expression. Rather, he views himself as an adversary of the state with a 
specific political agenda. His will to subvert the KMT has never diminished, 
notwithstanding the fact that the KMT party no longer constitutes an 
authoritarian regime. Truth in this context is manipulated by JC when he 
poses as an aged White Terror survivor who is no longer capable of 
fomenting rebellion. It must be recalled that JC became a socialist in the 1940s 
due to his anger over the 228 Incident, which happened in 1947. The brutal 
political repression in the wake of the 228 Incident led him to the CCP, which 
clandestinely recruited him. However, JC is no longer so idealistic: 
 
Sakana, who could have known that the Chinese communists 
were also brutal by that time? After all, I had dreamed of a 
just nation without repression or lies. I thought that Chinese 
communism could fulfil my dream. But now, I am sure that 
communist China is not an option for me anymore. 
(Transcript of JC 2012,12). 
 
It is reasonable for JC to continue concealing his insurgent past. Secrecy 
remains important to him due to his experience of the collective antipathy of 
Taiwanese society for his left-wing socialist orientation.  
For all of my informants, the assertion of personal truth is not only 
about defining the past but also about their current political lives. KY’s story 
offers another telling instance and illustrates the variety of subversive 
intentions entertained by this group. 
KY is a survivor from the 1960s who also participates actively in the 
transitional justice programme. When I interviewed him at the end of 2012, 
he had been serving for several years on the TVCA committee, which is one 
of the three major political victim associations in Taiwan.171 As a TVCA 
representative, KY has co-operated with the Taiwanese authorities in 
different respects, including publishing the survivors’ autobiography 
                                                
171 See further discussion below. 
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corpus172 and oral history,173 and expediting the building of the Taiyuan 
Incident (in Chinese, 泰源事件) monument.  
The Taiyuan Incident was a prison mutiny organised by a group of 
pro-independence prisoners, five of whom ended up being executed as a 
result in 1970. When the monument was proposed, Ma Ying-Jeou’s 
government was hesitant because the themes of subversion and resistance 
were all too evident, and not in keeping with the official discourse which 
held that only those who had not intentionally subverted the regime 
deserved to be memorialised.  
As a result, KY and his fellows did not succeed in erecting the 
monument at any of the National Human Rights Museums. Eventually, in 
the summer of 2014, they were able to place one in the Taiwan Sacred 
Ecological Education Park (in Chinese, 台灣聖山生態教育園區), which is 
operated by the pro-independence Taiwan Ta-Ti Foundation (in Chinese, 台
灣大地基金會 ). This illustrates the unresolved tension between the 
authorities and the survivors of the White Terror: 
 
I have to complete this mission; otherwise, I am afraid that 
people will forget this unrealised ambition and the five 
sacrificed heroes (Transcript of KY 2013, 1). 
 
KY never expresses any further intention of subverting the KMT during our 
conversations. To him, a primary mission is to remind people that the White 
Terror was a time of political conflict, and persuade them that these men 
who sacrificed for the cause of independence were heroes rather than 
criminals. Thus, we see my informants committed to advocating their 
respective causes in present day Taiwan. To both of them, transitional justice 
is not only about shedding light on past violations of human rights but is a 
                                                
172 From 2012 to 2014, the TVCA published 《秋蟬的悲鳴》 and 《看到陽光的時候》, the two 
autobiographical corpuses in 2012 and 2014 respectively, both with government sponsorship. 
173 To date, the TVCA still cooperates actively with the government on an oral history project 
on behalf of its members. For further discussion of the cooperation between the government 
and the various victim associations, see below.  
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process that affords them the opportunity to advocate their political 
convictions.  
Given Taiwan’s transitional justice scheme, my subjects’ status as 
surviving political victims provides them a platform to gain wider 
recognition for their beliefs than has been available hitherto in Taiwan. 
Certainly, their suffering attests to the past atrocities, and their interest in 
redefining the past as a period of political conflict is not at odds with the 
reality of their victimisation. The focal point is their dissident political 
opinions were the basis for their unjust persecution under the KMT regime. 
They desire a recognition that their devotion to their political causes did not 
merit such harsh repression. But Taiwan’s transitional justice scheme lead 
them to a consequence of de-politicisation. Both their past insurgence and 
oppression remain de-politicised. whatever the variations in their politics 
and the extent to which their opposition was actualised, the Compensation Act 
clearly specifies that former political criminals are not eligible to receive 
compensation if their conviction of sedition or treason survives reviews 
according to current laws or rules of evidence.174 Thus, only those who 
cooperate in this exercise can engage in reconciliation; the truth asserted by 
the official discourse is strategic and perspectival.  
Given stories stated above, de-politicisation is not merely a 
consequence of Taiwan’s transitional justice scheme. Rather, it forms an 
approach for survivors in voicing out their political desire in the transitional 
justice scheme. Like JC’s role of docent and KY’s contribution to the erection 
of monument. For my participants, de-politicisation opens an approach of 
cooperation between survivors and the government. Despite de-politicisation 
is itself a hurdle for survivor in winning a full recognition of their past, to my 
participants, contesting the past not only means exposing the extent to which 
they were brutally repressed by the dictatorship. It also means that the 
persecuted ones, including those who had explicit subversive intentions, 
deserve vindication and recognition. In Taiwan my informants who join the 
official discourse cooperate with the government in various settings where 
they are requested to reveal their past persecution. Without their 
involvement—namely, their testimony, the official transitional justice 
                                                
174 See detailed discussion in chapter 3. 
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programme could not be established and consolidated. They are aware of the 
de-politicisation imposed on them by the limits of their narrative in the 
scheme of transitional justice but they are also developing strategies to 
address this perspectival truth. To them, their testimony does not constitute 
surrender but, rather, claims a space for their utterance in the official 
discourse. Thus, the tension between the official and non-official discourses 
rests on how the truth of the past is produced and developed in present-day 
Taiwan.  
Arguably my informants are dissatisfied with the official discourse of 
Taiwan’s transitional justice system, for their assigned role in that discourse 
as innocent victims leaves them de-politicised. Although the account of their 
persecution is true, all of them opposed the KMT government and thus were 
not ‘innocent’ of the political crime charged. There is a spectrum of 
involvement: While some committed subversive actions, others were still in 
the planning or discussion stages when arrested, and some merely criticised 
the government without hatching a plan to undermine it.  
Thus, the situation of de-politicisation is more complicated than it 
may appear on the surface. For example, since the pro-independence cause 
has gained more space for advocacy since the DPP came to power in 2000, 
White Terror survivors who espoused that cause have gained more space in 
the official discourse in which to give voice to their dissident past than have 
others whose causes were different.  
Most of my participants stay determined with their political ideal of 
different political causes, in spite of the plight of de-politicisation. Although 
JC is now pro-independence, he was accused of treason because he joined the 
Chinese communists in the early 1950s. Nowadays, he speaks openly of his 
current political ideals and pro-independence principles, which developed 
during his captivity, but rarely mentions having been a communist. I asked 
JC once, in private, why he did not discuss his communist phase with people 
in Taiwan. He paused for a few seconds, then said: 
 
Sakana, that was the past. I am fighting for my current political 
cause. […] Maybe, one day, they will understand and fully 
accept my past but not now (Transcript of JC 2013, 12). 
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JC is fully aware that revealing his communist roots would jeopardise his 
current position in the official discourse. For him, the system of transitional 
justice does not represent an opportunity for ‘reconciliation’ between 
persecutors and their victims so much as the chance for him to reconcile with 
society, the people of Taiwan. Although disclosure of his communist past 
remains all but impossible, JC still clings to the prospect of a full 
acknowledgment of his past struggles and persecution. The stance which is 
shared by all of my participants.  
In the context of transitional justice, Wendy Lambourne (2009) argues 
that the use of the word ‘truth’ can be misleading, as it tends to be 
interpreted as the finding of a single truth about what happened, who was 
responsible and why. She argues that truth in this context is based on some 
kind of agreed-upon record that can be used for redressing past crimes and 
identifying suffering. This can be termed ‘knowledge’, as it might include 
various truths or interpretations held by various participants in a conflict 
(ibid.: 39). Hence, our focus here is not so much on an objective truth of the 
White Terror as on the process by which a shareable truth is developed and 
accepted by multiple groups, some of which are former adversaries.  
Transitional justice in Taiwan is itself in conflict regarding two 
aspects—the characterisation of the past, and the continuing power struggle 
among factions. Foucault considers whether conflict offers an effective 
analyser of power relations (2000a: 59–61). In Society Must Be Defended (2000a), 
he examines power relations from the standpoint of a historico-political 
discourse that points to conflict as the permanent basis for all institutions of 
power. While the philosophico-juridical discourse identifies conflict as the 
professional and technical prerogative of a carefully-defined and controlled 
military apparatus (ibid: 60), Foucault rejects this analysis; he suggests that 
conflict does not operate exclusively in the military context but, rather, exists 
in all sectors of society. Conflict, according to Foucault, is the driving force of 
every social order, inducing us to believe in a natural order, or a functionally 
required order. In this regard, we are bound to re-encounter conflict, for it is 
the cipher of peace (ibid: 61). Politics itself is thus for the individual an 
extension of war, as Foucault explains below: 
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In that general struggle of which he speaks, [the individual] is 
necessarily on one side or on the other; he is in the battle, he 
has adversaries, he fights for a victory. […] And if he also 
speaks of truth, it is that perspectival and strategic truth that 
enables him to win the victory. So, in this case, we have a 
political and historical discourse that lays claim to truth and 
right, while explicitly excluding itself from juridico-
philosophical universality (Foucault 2000a: 61).175 
 
While power relations often restrict the discourses that actors develop, 
they do not prevent the development of discourses. Even within the confines 
of the official discourse, my informants have availed themselves 
surreptitiously of opportunities to advocate different political causes. The de-
politicised identity of political victims may be constructed and restricted in 
the official discourse but has nevertheless become one of the weapons in the 
arsenal he uses to contest the past. The White Terror survivors may engage in 
various challenges and to a varying extent but, as a group, they seem to share 
a common recognition that acquiescing to the role of de-politicised victim 
gives them an opening to claim the power of utterance in Taiwan’s 
transitional justice system.  
 
 
Memory is itself a struggle 
As we have seen, the de-politicisation of Taiwan’s political victims attests to 
the perspectival and strategic nature of the account of the White Terror that 
is offered in the official discourse. Based on a legal arrangement—namely, 
the promulgation of the Compensation Act and the establishment of the 
Compensation Foundation—the official discourse creates an identity for 
                                                
175 Foucault maintains that one must abandon the legal notion of sovereignty while studying 
the notion of power. As this model aims to account for the ideal genesis of the state, it makes 
law the fundamental manifestation of power (2000). However, Foucault suggests that the 
study of power should focus on the power relation itself; also, he rejects the study of power 
merely at the level of the state. His recommended approach, i.e., historico-political discourse, 
seeks to unravel the fundamental logic of power relations that exist in all sorts of societies, in 
which the state is merely one of the aspects of socio-political practices. 
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political victims that is de-politicised. Accordingly, the legal arrangement 
underpins the cultural and truth aspects of transitional justice and the picture 
of de-politicised political victims comprises the dominant understanding of 
the White Terror in Taiwan. 
Nonetheless, this mandated de-politicisation merely impedes 
survivors from developing their own non-official discourses in the context of 
transitional justice, but it does not stop them altogether. As a contestation of 
truth arises between the survivors and the government, the memory of the 
White Terror becomes a zone of conflict.  
It is a conflict about what account of the past is acknowledged by the 
official discourse, which always reflects the government’s current needs. 
Survivors of political persecution may feel compelled to develop tactics for 
dealing with the dominant discourse if it conflicts with their own accounts. 
VC, VT and JC find in transitional justice an opportunity to advocate their 
political goals, which include eliminating the KMT party that was in power 
during the White Terror. KY sees his own role more as an advocate for the 
vindication of his associates who were executed by the KMT regime. Apart 
from these survivors, there are others who have elected to cooperate with the 
official discourse and who share their attitudes or approaches to some extent. 
Under the umbrella of their de-politicisation, one may observe a range of 
attitudes as well as varying degrees of activism. 
For instance, AN was born in 1947 in Nantou, Taiwan and, at the age 
of 20, was accused of treason for advocating Taiwanese independence. For 
the time being, AN is plainly cooperating with the official discourse, as he 
willingly participates in state-sponsored interviews as well as those with 
independent researchers. He readily accepted my invitation to be 
interviewed and I soon learned that AN has no intention of concealing his 
commitment to the pro-independence cause. While he does not articulate his 
political convictions while being interviewed for state-sponsored projects, he 
was very open with me: 
 
Because I read some pro-independence articles, I was convicted 
of treason for promoting independence. […] However, it was 
when I encountered Chan Yi-Jen in prison that my political 
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commitment to Taiwan independence developed through our 
discussions. […] Yi-Jen is a very clever person. He usually 
explains things simply and clearly. […] Had I not met people 
like Yi-Jen, my politics would have been less enlightened, and I 
would not have thought as deeply as I do now (Transcript of 
AN 2013, 12).176 
 
AN recounts his past in an excited tone. He does not consider advocating 
independence to be more important than recounting his past persecution in 
the official discourse; nonetheless, he is not satisfied with his current de-
politicised status and feels resentment. AN showed me a video he had filmed 
in December 2012 during the official annual commemoration of the White 
Terror, at which he had appeared as a guest of the government. It showed a 
small group of pro-independence survivors throwing shoes at the podium, 
shouting ‘Step down! Ma Ying-Jeou,’ (in Chinese, 馬英九下台) and ‘Taiwanese 
Independence!’ (in Chinese, 台灣獨立) while President Ma was delivering a 
speech. As we watched the film, AN told me that his political views were 
similar to those of the protestors but that he would never act in such a 
manner. To AN, the smooth conclusion of the ceremony was also important:  
 
The ceremony was at least a commemoration of the past 
suffering (Transcript of AN 2013, 12).  
 
Apparently, AN is willing to accept the status quo of de-politicisation 
because he considers recognition by the official discourse to be equally 
important as his commitment to the independence cause. AN sees himself 
having two roles at present. On the one hand, he performs as de-politicised 
survivor in accordance with the official discourse; on the other, departing 
from that discourse, he plays independence advocate. Thus, his competing 
transitional justice discourse gradually emerges: 
 
                                                
176 Chan Yi-Jen was born in 1925, in Yunlin, Taiwan. He was accused of treason in 1962 due to 
supporting Taiwan independence, a charge known as 蘇東啟叛亂案. This became known as 
the most famous political trial relating to Taiwan independence, and led to other 
interviewees such as SC and RJ being accused of treason.  
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I suffered, and I continue to support Taiwan independence. […] 
The point is I am genuinely a political victim, but I am also a 
pro-independence advocate. I talked about my past suffering 
when people view me as a victim, but I also would like to share 
my political cause with them. Because this is what I also care 
about (Transcript of AN 2013, 12). 
  
TJ’s story offers a starker illustration of the contestation of memory. As a pro-
independence survivor who was accused of treason during the 1970s, TJ 
never conceals his political convictions in public. Like AN, he is a fervent 
proponent of the pro-independence campaign. Recently TJ has started to 
reveal the extent of his past involvement in anti-KMT conspiracy, although 
he never goes beyond what was stated in his conviction. That is, as a political 
victim, TJ deliberately echoes the requirement of official discourse: 
 
It was when I joined the Lee Tang-Hua Orchestra as a 
saxophonist and toured the U.S. that I encountered the Chen 
brothers and subsequently joined World United Formosans for 
Independence (hereafter WUFI). 177  While Chen Rong-Chi and 
Chen Rong-Fong promoted their ideal of Taiwanese 
independence in our conversations, they also gave me a WUFI 
stamp, encouraging me to advocate independence as well.178  
 
The interview was conducted in 2012 by a state-sponsored oral history 
project. It may seem that the proscriptions against referring to the 
revolutionary past are loosening in the official discourse but, as a matter of 
fact, they remain as firm as before. As TJ expressed, he always feels insecure 
in recounting past subversive past in state-sponsored oral history projects. ‘I 
                                                
177  World United Formosans for Independence was a pro-Taiwanese independence 
organisation, secretly organised by a group of Taiwanese migrants and students in Japan 
and America. The WUFI had hubs in both countries. The organisation still exists although it 
no longer actively opposes the government; it works mainly overseas to promote the ideal of 
Taiwanese independence.  
178 Chen Ron-Chi and Chen Rong-Fong are siblings who lived in the U.S. during the 1970s as a 
foreign student and migrant worker, respectively. 
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do not trust the government, I know what I can do is to share my past suffering as 
much as possible,’ says TJ.179 
Once Taiwan independence become more accepted by Taiwanese 
society, White Terror survivors who espoused that cause were welcomed by 
the pro-independence DPP government to join the transitional justice 
projects that it sponsored from 2000 to 2008. More and more pro-
independence survivors have come forward to have their stories of past 
persecution included in the official discourse. Although that discourse 
continues to gloss over their past ‘subversive intentions’, still, a grey area 
may exist for political victims to mention their ‘subversive’ intentions in the 
official discourse, but it does not extend to allowing them to go into further 
detail. Thus, throughout our lengthy interview, this brief reference is the 
only instance in which TJ touches on his revolutionary past. The remainder 
of the narrative focuses on how he survived ‘seemingly unbearable 
repression’ and continues to live as a de-politicised survivor. Restricted by 
the official discourse, TJ says little about his revolutionary past, and spends 
most of our interview describing his persecution under the KMT regime. 
But my later interview with TJ shows that he is willing to give details 
of his past activism:  
 
During my time in America, Chen Rong-Chi gave me books 
and magazines, and asked me about my thoughts.180 I said, as I 
told you before, I support Taiwanese independence. He replied, 
‘I cannot return to Taiwan at the moment. Think about to what 
extent you can contribute to Taiwan, but keep safe’. He 
expected me to recruit several people who were trustworthy 
and create a secret organisation. At that time, we performed a 
secret ritual in which I vowed my loyalty to the organisation. 
Both the Chen brothers and someone whose surname was 
Liu—I cannot recall his full name now—and Chang Tsan-Hung. 
                                                
179 Transcript of TJ: 2014, 1. 
180 The publications that TJ mentions were Taiwanese Youth (in Chinese, 台灣青年), published 
by the Tokyo office of WUFI in 1960, which inspired Taiwanese students, scholars, and 
immigrants to rally in Japan around the cause of Taiwan independence.  
 200	
Tsan-Hung reminded me that the principle of the secret 
organisation was unilinear leadership. I needed only to obey 
my leader, and did not even know the identity of the other 
members who were at the same level as myself. It would be 
risky if you knew more members or were known to too many 
of them. Chen Rong-Fong directed me. I did not need to contact 
the others (Transcript of TJ 2013, 12).  
 
This is the very first time that TJ has talked about his subversive activities—
offering a new perspective on his past. We spend more than six hours talking 
about the conspiracy in which he was engaged and the process by which he 
had become an adversary of the KMT during the White Terror. However, he 
asks me not to reveal the details of his past to my readers; his facts and 
quotations are included here only with his express permission.181 Like other 
survivors, he is uncertain about politics in Taiwan and worries that the KMT 
could return to power.182 In the eyes of the government, TJ is one of the most 
co-operative survivors; he never brings up politics on official occasions such 
as the exhibition on Green Island where I first encountered him in 2010. 
Speaking to visitors, TJ describes the harsh conditions to which political 
prisoners were subjected, but keeps silent about how he came to be 
imprisoned. He engages judiciously in the official discourse, keeping his 
oppositional past and ongoing political commitment separate from that 
discourse.  
Certainly some spectres from the Cold War are deemed more 
threatening than others today in Taiwan. During democratisation, 
supporting independence was fully recognised and welcomed by citizens as 
a legitimate political alternative. However, the neutralisation to which White 
Terror survivors have acquiesced as they compromise with the official 
discourse has pervaded all aspects of their lives, including their current 
political identity. For instance, in May 2016 I encountered the survivor of 
                                                
181 A major reason for his discretion is that his story involves others whose identities were not 
discovered by the KMT regime during the White Terror. To this day, TJ still wants to protect 
these individuals. 
182 Transcript of TJ 2014,1. 
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1960s, HC in Taipei at an academic conference on transitional justice in 
Taiwan, hosted by the Taiwan Historical Association (in Chinese, 台灣歷史學
會 ) and a well-known pro-independence organisation, Wu Sian-Lien 
Foundation (in Chinese, 吳三連史料基金會). Although HC remained silent 
during the discussions sessions, he told me privately that he was coming to 
learn and to support Taiwan independence.183 His attendance was a way of 
asserting his political ideal of reforming Taiwan’s transitional justice system 
and supporting the cause of independence. For HC and others like him, 
contesting the government’s version of the past is a struggle not only for the 
power to define the past, but for the present right to advocate freely their 
formerly suppressed political causes, a goal that has become vital in their 
current lives. Suffice to say, for my informants, memory is inherently 
contentious. 
In the various cases described above, my interviewees all find it 
impossible to discuss their past activism freely. Some dissemble about it as 
they engage in the official discourse, while others choose to raise it delicately 
and to a very limited extent. The extent to which White Terror survivors feel 
able to reveal their subversive past in the official discourse is a function of 
the contestation of memory. Or, more precisely, the extent to which some 
may be more outspoken than others is a function not of individual 
temperament but of the offence for which they were convicted. For instance, 
PH is a survivor who was convicted of the crime of treason in the 1960s for 
advocating socialism and received a 10-year sentence. However, PH refuses 
to speak of his insurgent past to interviewers, including me. 
  
It is meaningless to speak of my past, for no one is truly 
listening. People only care about how I was beaten and 
terrorised by the regime. […] Unless the government 
acknowledges my past, I shall not talk about it (Transcript of 
PH 2013, 12). 
 
                                                
183 Field research note of HC 2016, 5. We encountered each other by chance; after our brief 
conversation, I immediately jotted down notes. HC was born in 1930 in Changhua, Taiwan. 
He was convicted of treason in 1958 for advocating Taiwan independence. See a more 
detailed account of his story in chapter 4. 
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Thus far, PH has not said a word about his insurgent past to any researcher in 
Taiwan. Nonetheless he is cooperative in presenting himself as a ‘political 
survivor’ who has undergone atrocities. Accordingly, survivors of different 
convictions may compromise, circumvent, or struggle with the authorities. 
Accepting the identity of de-politicised victims enables them to undermine 
the official discourse.  
Certainly, some survivors were falsely accused of treason, as they did 
not plot against the KMT regime at all. While it is true that there are those 
who are innocent as defined by the Compensation Act, the fact remains that 
the White Terror was perpetrated at a time of great political conflict in 
Taiwan. The memory of the White Terror remains controversial to this day, 
and the official de-politicisation of its survivors attests to the contested 
nature of memory and the endurance of political beliefs. 
Thus, survivors’ approach to the memory of the White Terror is 
conditioned by the official discourse, as their de-politicisation reflects the 
politics of truth. Underpinning the seemingly cooperative relationship 
between the survivors and the authorities is a conflict in which truth, 
political causes, and memory itself are at stake. Consequently, their de-
politicisation reflects the extent to which the essential identity of these 
victims is political. However, not all of the dissidents of the White Terror 
were pro-independence like AN and TJ. What about the communists, whose 
cause has not been rendered more palatable with the passage of time? With 
no leeway even to hint at their political demands in the official transitional 
justice discourse, how do they react to this discourse in the process of 
revisiting the past? The phenomenon of de-politicisation reveals competing 
discourses across the spectrum of survivors who engage in the official 
discourse. Based on this analysis, the following section examines how 
survivors act and develop their own transitional justice discourses to 
compete the official discourse.  
 
 
The enduring resistance of political activists 
Since the late 1980s, the White Terror’s survivors have often acted 
collectively in public in the name of their victims’ associations, which were 
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founded during democratisation. Of the multiple associations, there are three 
that appear to be the most representative in terms of the number of their 
members and the degree to which they engage in the public sphere: the 
Taiwanese Victims of the Martial Law Care Association (in Chinese, 台灣戒
嚴時期政治受難者關懷協會; TVCA), the 1950s White Terror Vindicated 
Association (in Chinese, 五零年代白色恐怖案件平反促進會; hereafter, WTVA) 
and Huzhuhui (in Chinese, 互助會). The first two associations are made up of 
pro-independence survivors, whereas the latter’s members are left wing pro-
unification. The cause of Huzhuhui is closer to pro-PRC than anything else. 
There are other associations, such as the Elderly Political Victims’ 
Association mentioned in chapter 3. But these associations are subgroups of 
the TVCA and WTVA, and their membership overlaps with those of the 
larger groups, inasmuch as they share a common political cause.  
Different political stances fundamentally influence the logic of 
organising survivors’ associations, which attests to Taiwan’s political 
condition, especially the tension between pro-independence and pro-
unification leftists, continues to be imperative in survivors’ present-day life. 
With the democratisation in Taiwan since the late 1980s, survivors of the 
White Terror began to consider the possibility of organising associations for 
themselves and the bereaved to engage in political networking and 
rehabilitation activities. From this initiative, the three associations above 
were founded, corresponding to respective political causes and periods of 
imprisonment. Huzhuhui, most of whose members are survivors and 
bereaved relatives representing the left wing pro-unification movement of 
the 1950s—that is, those accused of communism—is the major association of 
left-wing political victims. Meanwhile, WTVA and TVCA members, even 
those who may have been communists under the KMT, are now grouped 
under the banner of independence. Political affiliation is a primary indicator 
of the origin and differentiation of these associations and survivors often act 
collectively under their aegis in the official discourse and outside it.  
Each of my participants acts under his different aegis. For instance, VT, 
JC, VC, and the survivors of the 1960s mentioned above, including KY, AN, 
SC, WR, and CH are members of TVCA. Despite their varying degrees of 
engagement with the official discourse, all of them attend the official annual 
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commemoration, and participate in state-sponsored exhibitions and other 
official events as representatives of TVCA, which is the association that is 
most engaged with the official discourse. One of the most distinct instance is, 
KY, as the representative of the TVCA, has attended the annual official 
commemoration on 10 December each year since 2005, despite the DPP or the 
KMT party is in power.  
  
We (survivors) need to cooperate with the government, we 
demand for our recognition (transcript of KY 2012, 12).  
 
This is in part a function of how much the survivors desire such 
engagement, but has even more to do with how the authorities define a 
‘qualified’ political victim. Once the political cause of pro-independence was 
no longer taboo after the DPP came to power in 2000, TVCA members 
qualified as political victims, as long as they continued to claim their past 
innocence in the official discourse. JC, for example, was a former communist, 
yet opted to remain silent about this aspect of his past. Owing to this gesture 
of ‘cooperation’ with the authorities, JC is eligible to speak out about his past 
persecution and discreetly advocate his current political cause, Taiwan 
independence, in the scheme of transitional justice. Thus, not only one’s past 
political activism matter but one’s current political affiliations are at stake 
when one is a victim striving for the power of utterance within the official 
discourse.  
To the authorities, not only survivors’ past subversion but also their 
continuing political activism can exclude them from the official discourse, 
especially when survivors are vocal in support of their political causes. To 
Huzhuhui with their determined political stance of pro-unification leftism, 
the task of advancing their cause is equally important as the goal of being 
fully acknowledged by Taiwanese society. A left-wing agenda that includes 
unification with the mainland has been their enduring political ideal since 
the 1950s. Because their cause remains anathema to the Taiwanese 
government, and because they decline to compromise, Huzhuhui has 
adopted a completely different approach to that of the TVCA. Remaining 
outside of the official discourse, Huzhuhui has developed its own 
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transitional justice discourse. In the following section, we shall discuss how 
different political causes are silenced to varying degrees by scrutinising 
different political victim associations. 
 
 
The nonofficial annual commemoration of the martyrs 
As stated, Huzhuhui is one of the most unwelcome associations for the 
official discourse, for their determined leftist stance. To develop an 
alternative discourse of the memory of the White Terror, Huzhuhui has 
hosted an annual commemoration since 1991, known as the Autumn 
Worship (in Chinese, 秋祭 Chiu Chi). Huzhuhui members recount and 
honour the deceased Chinese communists of the 1950s every autumn at the 
Ba-ba Cho Memorial Park (in Chinese, 馬場町紀念公園).184 Before it was 
officially designated as a memorial park, Ba-ba Cho was a place where 
political prisoners were executed during the 1950s. 
In the official discourse, only the innocent victims deserve 
commemoration. But the Autumn Worship organised by Huzhuhui 
describes those who died under the KMT regime as ‘martyrs’ (In Chinese, 烈
士); these deaths attest to the intensity of the political struggle between their 
comrades and the government. Reviewing the content of speeches made at 
Huzhuhui commemorations, one discerns that they not only pay tribute to 
the fallen but also promote the political ideal of unification. For Huzhuhui, 
the Autumn Worship not only recalls former political clashes but also serves 
to strengthen survivors’ commitment to the present cause: 
 
This year is the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of the 
New China, but also the sixtieth year of the Cross-Strait 
confrontation, recalling the historic scene of 60 years ago, at the 
historic turning point, which was interwoven with war, 
revolution, darkness and light. You carried on the glorious 
patriotic tradition of the martyrs who pursued anti-imperialism 
and national liberation under Japanese rule. You 
                                                
184 The name of the place was initially translated from the Japanese, which appears the same 
as the Chinese name but is pronounced differently.  
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wholeheartedly accepted the mission of national liberation of 
the Chinese people. As a result, you gave your precious life to 
the historic wave of new democracy without hesitation, solely 
to achieve the goal of ending the civil war and unifying the 
nation [Autumn Worship address 2009].185 
Today, we stand here solemnly; yet we no longer feel 
sorrow and even embrace some joy. Nevertheless, we would 
not be here without our martyrs’ devotion and sacrifice. Your 
solid skeletons and impassioned blood crushed the old world 
as you ignited the fire of youth with your bodies. A single 
spark is sufficient to start a prairie fire. We will continue to 
struggle, to go forward, so that your ideals may come to 
fruition. Rest in peace, dear martyrs! Do not worry, people’s 
comrades! We will walk on the road you guide us along, to 
continue the unaccomplished path of peaceful unification with 
our tears, our songs, and our steps! May your souls always stay 
with us! [Autumn Worship address 2012]186 
 
Suffice to say, Huzhuhui’s commemoration publicly defines the past 
as a time of political struggle. They celebrate the deceased as individuals 
who ‘sacrificed themselves’ for their political cause. They make it clear that 
the persecution was unjust, for no one, even if they opposed the authorities, 
should be treated thus. While acknowledging the persecution, the speeches 
focus on carrying on the political struggle. For Huzhuhui, the conflict 
between socialism and capitalism remained unreconciled when the Cold War 
ended. The rise of the PRC in East Asia and the tension between the PRC and 
ROC in Taiwan have encouraged these survivors to continue advocating 
their cause, as some of them still look forward to the day when the PRC and 
the ROC will unify under a socialist regime. As claimed in a documentary 
film produced by Huzhuhui, Red Youth, White Terror (in Chinese, 紅色青春，
白色恐佈),187 their past persecution has paved the way for the coming 
                                                
185 See complete text in Chinese in appendix VI. 
186 See complete text in Chinese in appendix VII. 
187 The documentary is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XEOHBrq5gUg 
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revolution. As the founding member, Lin Shu-Yan (1926–2012), states in the 
documentary: 
 
What kind of death will not be perceived as wasting one's life? 
There is a viewpoint, perhaps I speak presumptuously, that has 
led us to pay the price for the development of our society. We 
had no alternative but to sacrifice ourselves. 
 
Lin’s tone in the film is very confident. As a former political prisoner who 
was imprisoned for 34 years and seven months, he is authoritative, for he has 
been the mentor for the Taiwanese socialists. Huzhuhui has developed a 
discourse that encourages White Terror survivors to view their present-day 
life as a continuation of the past struggle.  
The competing discourse developed by left-wing pro-unification 
survivors is complicated. For them, the past was a time of political struggle 
and persecution, which leads them to define themselves as surviving 
political dissidents and witnesses to past atrocities. Both perspectives are 
irreducible. Meanwhile, through their commemorations and cultural 
products, they situate their present-day lives as a continuation of their 
struggle under the KMT regime.  
While Huzhuhui publicly characterises the past as a time of political 
struggle, the pro-independence associations, TVCA and WTVA also host a 
non-official annual memorial service to commemorate the Taiyuan Incident 
discussed in the previous section, although they focus specifically on this 
incident rather than honouring all pro-independence victims of the White 
Terror. The latter two associations also refer to those they are 
commemorating as ‘martyrs’, evoking a revolutionary spirit. As survivors of 
the Taiyuan Incident recall: 
 
Of course, they sacrificed themselves in the name of 
independence. (Transcript of JL 2013, 12).188  
                                                
188 JL was convicted of treason in 1963 for pro-independence activities. He claims to have 
participated in the Taiyuan rebellion, and witnessed all the proceedings that followed. For 
further details see 高金郎（1991）泰源風雲-政治氾濫監獄革命事件。台北：前衛出版. 
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I do not want to talk about this, for too many people 
have reviewed the incident. […] It was a revolution, yet it failed. 
Those who sacrificed themselves were martyrs for Taiwanese 
independence. Apart from this, I do not want to say anything 
further (Transcript of JC 2012, 12). 
In fact, at the moment, I thought the chance of success 
was uncertain. It was too difficult to plot a revolution during 
our imprisonment. You see, it was not enough merely to rely on 
us political prisoners. We did not have a reliable backup force 
outside the prison. We had nothing. As we conspired and 
rehearsed our rebellion, the KMT troops and government 
gathered all of a sudden, so how could we fight against that? 
We did think we had to do it even if we had no chance. No one 
feared death. We all prepared our wills (Transcript of MO 2013, 
11).189  
 
Hitherto, the Taiyuan Incident has been perceived as a failed conspiracy 
since it was first publicly mentioned in the late 1990s, but the authorities 
have never officially recognised the five executed individuals, and rarely 
mention the incident within the official discourse. The five who were 
executed did not fit the definition of ‘political victim’ according to that 
discourse. Rather, they were classified as enemies of the state, for they 
conspired and carried out a rebellion. As stated, the TVCA failed to erect the 
monument for Taiyuan Incident at any National Human Rights park, but at 
the land funded by pro-independence organisation. On the one hand, we see 
the authorities continuing to apologise to, and commemorate, generic 
‘victims’ of the White Terror. On the other, we see Huzhuhui, TVCA, and 
WTVA commemorating their fallen comrades in ways that acknowledge the 
political struggle of the time and recognise them as martyrs for their 
resistance to the government. The pro-independence TVCA and WTVA have 
                                                
189 MO was born in 1940 and was a co-defendant with JL in 1963. Unlike JL, who has been 
aggressive in advocating independence after their release in the 1980s, MO has kept a low 
profile. He is strongly committed to the independence cause. Only after the DPP came to 
power in 2000 did MO begin to appear in public and advocate independence public.  
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in effect gained more space for commemorating their past comrades in the 
official discourse while pro-unification leftist Huzhuhui continues to be 
ignored by the official discourse for their political stances. 
To sustain the dominance of the official transitional justice discourse, 
the Taiwanese authorities continue to ignore the significant number of 
socialists who died in the White Terror, as well as those who survived. This 
political condition consolidates the collective hatred of socialists in present-
day Taiwan, and underpins the official discourse’s avoidance of legal 
responsibility for the past atrocities against them, in terms of the 
Compensation Act and Foundation. The non-official events organised by the 
survivors show that Taiwan’s transitional justice discourse does not tally 
with the survivors’ perspective on their past: a past defined by resistance to 
the KMT regime. 
 
The power of utterance in the official discourse matters 
From a political perspective, Huzhuhui may be the association that is least 
welcomed by the official discourse due to its insistence on characterising 
Taiwan’s pre-democracy past as a period of ‘political struggle’. The Autumn 
Worship makes it clear that Huzhuhui does not accept the government 
discourse and has substituted a discourse of its own.  
Nonetheless, while confronting the dominant official discourse, 
Huzhuhui appreciates the importance of cooperating with the government, 
as this is the primary path for achieving recognition from Taiwanese society. 
Its cooperation has extended to providing historical materials that conform to 
the perspective of persecution and suffering.190 For that matter, some of its 
members have applied for compensation under the Compensation Act and 
Foundation, and received it without difficulty. 191  Nonetheless, such co-
operation does not negate the requirement that officially recognised 
                                                
190 In 2010, Huzhuhui assisted the Jingmei Human Rights Park in curating an annual 
exhibition on the history of the Jingmei Prison under the White Terror. In 2014, Huzhuhui 
allowed the Taiwanese government to conduct interviews with its 30 members; their 
narratives focus on conditions of suffering.  
191 The exact number and names of those compensated are still unknown for the Foundation 
has not revealed the information; however, I am able to confirm that some of my informants 
and their associates did apply for compensation and received it without incident. 
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survivors be de-politicised. The official discourse retains its dominant 
position in the scheme of transitional justice. As BY and RJ stated, 
 
I fell much more secure to tell you my past is because I am pretty 
sure that it is okay for me to speak of those insurgent episodes at 
this moment (democracy). However, I still hesitate over speaking 
of these scene with those people (official-sponsored oral history 
projects interviewers) about these issues you asked (Transcript of 
BY 2013, 4). 
I am still angry with the governments (both DPP and the 
KMT after the 1990s) about their passive policies with respect to 
our memory and our rights. But what can I do? […] I need to 
seize the opportunity of speaking of my past with the 
government. Even though I am only able to speak of my life of 
imprisonment. I still need to fight for it (transcript of RJ 2013, 4). 
 
Each of survivors with whom I talked shared similar reflection stated 
here. Democracy does not guarantee the advent of ideal transitional justice. 
Although victim associations such as Huzhuhui compromises to a certain 
extent in the official discourse, the confrontational nature of its relationship 
with the authorities remains apparent. We are living in a time of relative 
liberalism, as the ROC government claims to safeguard each citizen’s basic 
human rights. Although there is still political repression, the fundamental 
democracy in Taiwan guarantees freedom of speech to its citizens, which 
affords the non-official discourses an opportunity to develop and promote an 
alternate point of view. Without overt repression of survivors, a basic 
ideological confrontation persists, and remains central to the contestation of 
the past by political victims and the government. 
 
 
‘Certainly, I am a political dissident still’ 
As noted above, the three associations were founded on the basis of explicit 
political causes and continue to influence survivors’ current political 
activities. Transitional justice has become one of the primary fields in which 
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survivors from different associations compete for the power to define the 
past and advocate their enduring political causes. White Terror survivors are 
the strongest representatives of the pro-unification and pro-independence 
causes in post-Cold War Taiwan.  
For instance, in 1989, Huzhuhui worked with other pro-unification 
forces in Taiwan, such as the China Tide Association (in Chinese, 夏潮聯合
會), to establish the Labour Party (in Chinese, 勞動黨), which is now the 
primary leftist pro-unification party in Taiwan. Meanwhile, pro-
independence survivors pursue their political aims by supporting pro-
independence candidates in parliamentary and presidential elections. In the 
democratic era, these actors retain their identity as members of the political 
opposition by actively engaging in political affairs. As JL describes it, “I am 
still an adversary as I am fighting for Taiwanese independence”.192  
For survivors of the White Terror, political ideal is intertwined with 
the demand for political recognition and their different political causes. JC 
considers his political ideal as Taiwan independence and a full recognition of 
his past, members of Huzhuhui consider their political ideal as a left-wing 
pro-unification and a full recognition. At this point, we observe a rather 
apparent of tension exists in the relations of different victim associations, for 
the different national identities and right or left political stances. Nonetheless, 
it is also irrefutable that a request for a full recognition and vindication of the 
formerly politically abused individuals has now been the very common 
platform shared by survivors from different associations. Transitional justice 
and a desire for reconciliation encourage these elderly continue to take a 
stance of advocate. Their political identity of ‘political dissident’ is therefore 
complicated by the past and the current political condition. That is, Taiwan’s 
limited transitional justice scheme motivates survivors continue to occupy 
the position of ‘political advocate’ or ‘political dissident’. As JC and HC 
emphasised, 
 
I will not surrender to the obstacle in front of me. I am old, but I 
am not a fool (Transcript of JC 2013, 11).  
                                                
192 Transcript of JL  2013, 12. 
 212	
 I… [sob]… I have to take care of myself, I have to live 
longer to welcome the day I have dreamed for years. I am a man 
persecuted by the KMT regime and Chiang Kai-Shek. I am a man 
who have fought for Taiwan independence since my early 
twenties (Transcript of HC 2013, 3).  
 
In any society emerging from a transformation of power relations, 
discrepancies among viewpoints of the past are typically encountered. In this 
regard, the official discourse concerning a nation’s past tends to be privileged 
but also controversial. As Huyssen states (2011: 615), ‘just as the nation once 
was, and still provides, the framework for rights, it also served as the 
privileged space for collective memory’. National or regional institutions 
retain their ability to articulate human rights standards and the content of the 
collective memory. The case of Taiwan corresponds to Huyssen’s observation. 
At the domestic level, it is the former perpetrators who initiated the scheme 
of transitional justice, which constrains the official discourse and precludes 
the KMT from being held legally responsible for its past atrocities. At the 
global level, as discussed in chapter 2, the continued hegemony of the 
Western powers in the post-Cold War era makes it difficult for their client 
nations to come to terms with government atrocities that took place with U.S. 
support. Accordingly, survivors of the White Terror in Taiwan are struggling 
for their own reconciliation with society, as transitional justice is not only 
about reconciliation between government and survivors of injustice. For 
survivors, the latter task may be the fundamental premise of the scheme in 
Taiwan, but earning recognition from present-day Taiwanese society is more 
crucial. And advocating their enduring political causes is a way of claiming 
for survivors an identity as political actors, or even as a political opposition.  
While the post-Cold War era has not been able to guarantee the 
universality of human rights, it has also seen the perpetuation of the Cold 
War’s ideological clashes. To my interviewees, the discourse on the past 
matters because it affects the extent to which a society will admit to past 
atrocities. They are concerned with what W. James Booth describes as ‘the 
intimacy of memory’s bond with justice, not as obsessional or as a syndrome, 
but as a face of justice itself’ (Booth, 2001). Thus, as socialists continue to be 
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viewed as a political threat in Taiwan, these persecuted elder socialists 
struggle over the debate around the past, and their determined political 
involvement reveals their current lives as a perpetuation of the past political 
conflict.  
 
 
Discussion: competing transitional justice discourses 
The identity of victim is developed within a specific social context. As 
Richard Quinney argues (1972: 314–23), a victim represents a conception of 
reality as well as an object of events, which means that the concept of a 
victim is a matter of social construction. During the White Terror, the 
government aimed to incite a pervasive antipathy towards the Chinese 
communists, insomuch as the latter posed the primary threat to the KMT 
regime in that era: 
 
We who are conscientious patriots should firm up our will and 
thoughts and be vigilant in combatting the traitors of Chinese 
communism. Everyone should be aware of the outcome of 
being beguiled by these traitors, as they not only jeopardise 
individuals but also endanger the country. Hence, people who 
are unaware of the existence of traitors can be said to commit 
suicide. In addition, we should notice that: the measures of 
anti-communism are not exclusive to Taiwan, but exist as 
emergency tools for all democracies. Our people should 
fearlessly report any potential traitors to protect our own 
interests and happiness, and the peace and safety of the world.193 
 
The statement above is the text of a bulletin issued in 1951 by the Taiwan 
Garrison Command, the primary institution in charge of the practice of the 
White Terror in Taiwan. The political threat of socialism was artificially 
manipulated by the KMT regime. As time passes, people may perceive that 
we are living in an era of emancipation, which, in Joan Scott’s words, denotes 
                                                
193 台灣省保安司令部公告： 1951.9.30. For Chinese version, see appendix VIII. 
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‘the lifting of restraints imposed by superior physical force or legal 
obligation’.194 As Scott puts it, ‘to be emancipated is to get out from under, to 
be able to press ahead with no obstacles in one’s path, to enjoy some measure 
of unencumbered thought or movement, from a situation of constraint to one 
of some kind of freedom’ (2012: 148–149). Yet this does not imply that a 
restriction no longer exists, as survivors, still in confrontation with the 
government, must recount their persecuted past within the framework of 
current power relations. 
Thus far, the Taiwanese government has claimed that the system of 
transitional justice is being conducted in accordance with the UDHR of 1948, 
as successive administrations have apologised for acts perpetrated in the past 
and recognised those who were persecuted. However, a claim of conformity 
to the global human rights discourse does not make survivors whole again, 
because socialism continues to be stigmatised in Taiwan. Whatever degree of 
democracy prevails in present-day Taiwan; the government nonetheless has 
its own political agenda. This means that the era of democratisation does not 
accord everyone an equal right to give voice to the past within the scheme of 
transitional justice. JC, for example, may be able to speak of his current pro-
independence agenda, but often feels reluctant to recount his socialist past. 
The liberalism on which Taiwan’s democracy is founded is still limited when 
it comes to reflections on the past. Any political cause or narrative that 
potentially runs counter to the interests of the current government faces 
being silenced in the official discourse because, to the Taiwanese authorities, 
whether KMT or DPP, socialism poses the primary political threat. 
Accordingly, the competing transitional justice discourses, as described in 
this chapter, point to lacunae in the scheme of transitional justice in Taiwan. 
Hence, the varying degrees to which my interviewees de-politicise 
themselves in the official discourse, and the way in which they narrate their 
past outside it, indicate the irreducibility of the two perspectives of survivors 
and the authorities. Ever since the concept of political victims was introduced 
in Taiwan after the Formosa Incident of 1979,195 survivors have seized the 
                                                
194 Scott, J. W. (2012). The Vexed Relationship of Emancipation and Equality. History of the 
Present, 2(2), pp. 148–168.  
195 See detailed discussion in chapter 1. 
 215	
opportunity to voice their past persecution in public. Claiming persecution 
became the first step in attracting public attention. At that time, no one could 
have predicted that Taiwan’s system of transitional justice would be so 
limited in scope. Confronting the limited official transitional justice discourse, 
survivors’ competing discourses focus on the present as a continuation of the 
past conflict. Given the field research discussed in this chapter, survivors, 
both socialists and non-socialists, still identify as political actors. They argue 
over the recognition of their past persecution and fight for their unfulfilled 
political ideals.  
Furthermore, as mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, some of my 
socialist interviewees have recalibrated their political orientation due to 
socialists having been the primary target of the KMT regime in Taiwan. For 
example, since the 1950s, JC has maintained his socialist beliefs but supports 
the cause of independence. As he explains, “my political goal is not to become 
Chinese but to make Taiwan a just nation”.196 Likewise, VC and VT, the other two 
former socialists of the 1950s, are advocating independence, rarely 
mentioning their left-wing stance. It is the official discourse that has silenced 
VC, VT and JC’s insurgent leftist past. Nonetheless, JC’s politics evolved in 
response to his life experience, especially his witnessing of the horrifying 228 
Incident. Meanwhile, VC and VT were intellectually inspired by books on 
Marxism that they read in Japanese when VC was working in the Taipei Post 
Office and VT was in his senior year of high school in the late 1940s.197 Thus, 
they followed different paths to socialism but now, Taiwan’s scheme of 
transitional justice coincidentally forces three of them to silence their 
insurgent past in Taiwan society.  
Based on my field research, it is clear that not every pro-independence 
activist of the 1960s was profoundly inspired by socialism. The left wing in 
Taiwan suffered the most severe political repression during the 1950s; more 
than 80 percent of the political convictions were against socialists.198 As AN, 
my pro-independence informant of the 1960s, explains, ‘of course we hated 
                                                
196 Transcript of JC 2012,12 and 2014,7. 
197 Transcript of VT 2011, 5. 
198人權之路小組 (2008)《人權之路 2008 年新版》。台北: 陳文成基金會. 
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the KMT regime, but we also lived under omnipresent anti-socialism’.199 AN 
says it was not until his captivity under the KMT regime that he learned 
‘socialism’ from fellow prisoners who were ‘political criminals of the 1950s’. 
As elaborated in chapter 1, the KMT marshalled all of Taiwanese society into 
a collective atmosphere of anti-socialism. However, the insurgency never 
disappeared, for the KMT’s harsh response continually inspired more 
‘political enemies’ among the citizens of Taiwan.200 
Meanwhile, one should not underestimate the importance of the 
identity of victims in the scheme of transitional justice. It is the de-
politicisation of that identity that points up the flaws in Taiwan’s transitional 
justice programme, which lacks the nuanced understanding of White Terror 
survivors that is needed. Reconsideration of their identity assists us in 
examining how the current power relations define the past. It shows how the 
identity of victims not only revisits the past repression, but evokes persistent 
mental suffering that colours the survivors’ present. Also, there are 
competing discourses, which present in various forms. Some seek from 
transitional justice an opportunity to pursue their still unrealised political 
ideals, some merely appeal for recognition of their past suffering, and others 
seek to set the record straight with regard to the nature of the political 
conflicts of the past.  
When it comes to the operation of transitional justice in new 
democracies, one of the basic requirements is that past abuses be recognised 
and steps be taken to address the harms that were suffered. Although, as the 
ICTJ suggests, systemic human rights violations affect not just the direct 
victims, but society as a whole, this chapter has focused only on the 
relationship and interactions between successive ROC governments and the 
survivors of the White Terror. As discussed, transitional justice is an 
umbrella term referring to various arrangements aimed at addressing 
systematic human rights violations; different nations have incorporated 
either retributive or restorative justice, or both, in their transitional justice 
projects. In terms of healing the victims’ psychological injuries and 
                                                
199 Transcript of AN 2013,12. 
200 I was told by every one of my informants that it was the KMT’s brutal tactics that fuelled 
their resistance and made it their life’s work. 
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preventing recurrence of systematic human rights violations, the ICTJ points 
to the validity of both approaches. Taiwan, however, has engaged in only a 
limited form of restorative justice.   
Thus, the term ‘competing discourse’ not only refers to a tension 
between divergent viewpoints of the past, but denotes a power struggle 
between successive Taiwanese governments and the White Terror survivors 
as each seeks to control the definition of the meaning of the past. This 
contestation of the past comes to exist as a conflict in Taiwan’s approach to 
transitional justice. 
The term ‘conflict’ refers to two aspects. First, the memory of the 
White Terror is inherently contentious with regard to the present politics that 
shape the construction of the past. How we define the past reveals how we 
act and expect to be recognised in the present, and this is reflected in the 
discrepancy between the official and non-official discourses relating to the 
White Terror. While reconciliation is usually deemed to be the primary goal 
and value of transitional justice in transitional countries, the goal may be out 
of reach for the people of Taiwan. The KMT regime has not only failed to 
vindicate former political criminals but also maintains its hostility towards 
its longstanding political enemies—mainly socialists and advocates of 
independence. Such reconciliation as has taken place has been only between 
the KMT authorities and those citizens not deemed to have committed 
treason. All of society has been invited to forgive the past atrocities 
committed by the state, but not to forgive those who challenged the 
oppressive state. Thus, it is hard to envisage a reconciliation between the 
authorities and the survivors of the White Terror until the former fully 
vindicate the latter, as well as those executed, of the crime of treason and 
erase the stigma associated with their past criminal status. In this context, the 
politics of constructing the past is certainly a battleground between the 
governments and survivors. 
Second, the term ’conflict’ references the ongoing political struggle in 
relation to various political causes. White Terror survivors whose ‘treason’ 
stemmed from advocacy of Taiwanese independence were recognised and 
rehabilitated in the official discourse once the DPP, which has not ruled out 
that option, came to power in 2000. However, survivors who had been 
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convicted of espousing left-wing causes—especially those who supported 
unification with the communist mainland, still have not been embraced by 
the official discourse. Survivors from different political stances experience 
official recognition at varying levels, and some have had to compromise their 
ideology at the direction of the government in order to receive a measure of 
relief. Meanwhile, the non-official transitional justice discourses of my 
research subjects are categorised as follows: seeking recognition of their 
persecution, affirming their dissident past, and embracing their immutable 
political identities. For them, the process of reconciliation implicates the 
present as well as the past. For many of these White Terror survivors, what 
matters most is the ability to assert the rightness of their unwavering political 
convictions. Without a full vindication of their ‘treasonous’ past, the causes 
they champion continue to be viewed as ‘unacceptable’ in the minds of the 
public. Notwithstanding the legal guarantees of freedom of political opinion 
and speech that have come with democracy, the spectre of the socialist threat 
continues to haunt citizens’ minds in Taiwan.  
Although White Terror victims are finding some measure of solace in 
the continued pursuit of their political causes, and notwithstanding the 
restorative justice some have obtained in the form of financial compensation 
and rehabilitation of individual reputations, it is clear that those interviewed 
for this research still suffer from anxiety and mental torment: 
 
I know it is all finished. Yet, I do sometimes feel as if I will be 
oppressed again when I see the government act like this 
(Transcript of SC 2013, 10). 
Only when the government starts to confess, will I start 
to believe that I will no longer be arrested or imprisoned 
(Transcript of TZ 2013, 11). 
The KMT was evil then, and it is still evil now! They 
oppressed us, and even now I cannot accuse the KMT of their 
atrocities. How can that be? (Transcript of RJ 2013, 4).201 
 
                                                
201 RJ was born in 1938 and was convicted of treason for pro-independence activities in 1962. 
He was also the co-defendant of SC. See more discussion about RJ in chapter 4. 
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Although a full recognition of my informants’ past persecution implies an 
alleviation of survivors’ trauma and shame, as discussed in chapter 4, the 
official discourse as currently constituted increases their mental burden. As a 
result, they may struggle for recognition of their past and present 
experiences, while also haunted by the potential recurrence of repression and 
the fear of further persecution.  
Survivors’ discourses not only concern how past conflicts are 
continued in the present; more profoundly, they concern the meaning of 
survivorhood. My interviewees are individuals who were persecuted and 
struggled in the past. Now, they negotiate, cooperate, and even compromise 
with the authorities, but also advocate and fight for their political ideals in 
the non-official domain. Hence, the uniqueness of the identity of victims in 
Taiwan has less to do with the evocation of their past repression by the 
government repression than with the challenge of reconciling Taiwanese 
society with their revolutionary past. White Terror survivors are not merely a 
living reminder of the past; they show that a newly democratic society may 
still silence some voices—in this case, the voices of socialists.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Democratisation never guarantees reconciliation, either within a nation or 
among nations. Conflict may persist in the form of discursive or ideological 
struggles, if not armed confrontation. Throughout the analysis herein, I have 
argued that the present is not a time of global reconciliation. As borne out by 
my field research and the work of other scholars, we are living instead in an 
era of continuing ideological conflict. Democracy and liberalism are 
ideologies, which, by virtue of the hegemony of the Western powers, are 
secured and realising an expansion. Ironically, against this background, the 
group of socialist survivors of the White Terror remains suppressed and their 
power to voice their past within the scheme of transitional justice remains 
limited. Thus, the memory of the past remains contentious.  
The fact that the memory of the White Terror is contested both by its 
survivors and by the authorities suggests that the essential conflict to which 
the White Terror responded has found a way to persist into the present. This 
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chapter has shown that there are two conflicts from the viewpoint of 
survivors—one over the acknowledgment of their persecution and the other 
over the reality of their ongoing political agitation. Survivors object to their 
de-politicisation within the official discourse because their identity is, itself, 
political, and they are struggling for the power to define the past. It is true 
that democratisation in Taiwan has served to provide survivors with more 
leeway for public expression. However, an incomplete recognition of 
survivors’ past persecution cannot compel the KMT authorities to take legal 
responsibility for the past atrocities, and constraints on their power to voice 
the past impedes survivors from being rehabilitated from their status as 
second-class citizens, especially if they espouse socialism, which is still 
regarded as a political threat in Taiwan. Accordingly, my interviewees’ 
competing discourses show that transitional justice projects do not 
necessarily reverse the injustices of the past, especially when persistent 
power relations remain in play.  Competing transitional justice discourse in 
this regard provides an approach for researchers to reconsider the pros and 
cons of Taiwan’s transitional justice. More profoundly, their stories lead us to 
reconsidering the meaning of reconciliation and the profound influence of 
past political condition.  
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Chapter 6  
Conclusion  
 
 
It is originary: life is survival. 
— Jacques Derrida202 
 
 
Over the last two decades, our relationship to the White Terror in Taiwan has 
changed. Once defensible, it has become controversial and anxious. In the 
words of Andrea Huyssen, we are living in an era of trauma and human 
rights. The transnational discourse of human rights may give us a better 
handle on such matters than the transfer of psychoanalysis into the world of 
politics and history (Huyssen 2003: 9). Arguably, the perspective of human 
rights and reconciliation has paved the way for rehabilitating the formerly 
abused and traumatised ‘political prisoners’, i.e., political victims, under the 
KMT regime in Taiwan. Nonetheless, the previously dominant perspective of 
political conflict remains defensible to a certain extent, continuing to prevent 
the former KMT party-state from acknowledging its accountability. In 
consequence, victims of the White Terror are still awaiting full vindication, 
insomuch as the identity of political victim remains restrictive and 
monotonous.   
 But humans are unique, each different from one another, and so are 
their life experiences and memories of the White Terror. As discussed 
throughout this study, the 24 survivors have experienced and recollected 
their memories of the past in different ways. We continue to learn about the 
confluence of the perspectives of political conflict and political violence in 
their ways of remembering and recognising their past. Their self-evaluation 
swings between the identity of political insurgent and political victim. 
However, only the ‘innocent’ political victims can be embraced by Taiwan’s 
                                                
202 From Derrida’s last interview in 2004, available at: http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/ 
~dclark/documents/rememberingJD/Derrida.I%20am%20at%20war%20with%20myself2.p
df.  
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official transitional justice scheme, insofar as the identity of insurgent 
remains excluded from the official discourse of transitional justice. In 
consequence, the 24 survivor victims with whom I talked continue to strive 
to create a space to utter the identity of insurgent and a rather more 
comprehensive identity of victim in the transitional justice scheme. This 
phenomenon expounds the meaning of the controversy and anxiety of our 
relationship to the memory of the White Terror. Taiwan’s scheme of 
reconciliation has not eased the painful memories, let alone dissolved the 
continuing tensions between survivors and the KMT party-state. 
 In short, this research focuses on the politics of constructing the past in 
the present in Taiwan, in terms of interactions between the survivors and 
successive governments on the scheme of transitional justice. It is research 
into the politics of memory that discerns the contestation of the past White 
Terror in the era of reconciliation. 
 
 
Reconciliation in the ongoing conflicted era  
As elaborated in chapter 2, to study memory is to study how past and 
present-day politics continue to interact with each other, framing and 
representing the past in our present-day lives. In other words, memory is not 
a product of the past, but a dynamic process in which individuals develop 
their knowledge of the past in terms of the power relations of the society to 
which he or she currently belongs. In the case of Taiwan, the country’s 
present political condition is profoundly influenced by the political framing 
of the Cold War and the White Terror; the legacies of these phenomena, 
which overlap to a certain extent, have inevitably complicated the 
transitional justice discourse in Taiwan. While the Cold War was a time of 
anti-socialism, the White Terror was an enduring state of political conflict 
between the KMT regime and its political opponents, including left-wing 
pro-unification advocates, pro-independence activists, anarchists and so 
forth. Given that the rivalry between the USA and the Sino-Soviet bloc 
spurred the USA to assist the KMT in consolidating its authority in Taiwan, 
the political configuration of the Cold War underpinned the occurrence of 
the White Terror, although the spectrum of political opposition that the 
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White Terror sought to suppress reveals a more complicated picture than an 
ideological battle between capitalism and socialism.  
The KMT regime was oppressive, as evidenced by the imprisonment, 
torture, and execution of its political opponents during the White Terror. It 
was not only people who had conspired against or expressed dissatisfaction 
with the government who were prosecuted as political criminals. Some of 
these former political prisoners were convicted of treason on no grounds 
whatsoever. The White Terror was a period in which the dictatorship loomed 
large in everyone’s lives. Arguably, the perspectives of political conflict and 
repression cannot be considered in isolation from one another, as there was a 
circular relationship between the two. Opposition to the government led to 
being targeted for persecution, which, in turn, gave rise to more popular 
resentment and insurgence. In Masuda’s words (2015: 269), “this designation 
made many ordinary people in Taiwan not just passive actors or victims of the terror 
as usually described but, to some extent, active participants”. The support 
rendered by the USA meant that the White Terror was not merely about 
clashes of ideology; it was a time when the KMT administration changed the 
logic of ordinary life in Taiwan. It was not only Chinese Communists who 
were the main political threat to the KMT regime. The term ‘political enemy’ 
did not merely refer to communists or socialists, because anyone who 
demonstrated interest in a political cause that was deemed to run counter to 
KMT interests could be viewed by the government as an ‘enemy’ to be 
eliminated. As my participants’ various political stances have shown, when 
socialists were the common political enemy that united the USA and the 
KMT in Taiwan, the diversity of political groups suppressed under the KMT 
shows how the political configuration of the Cold War became localised in 
legitimising the KMT’s authority in Taiwan.  
As Walter Benjamin (2009; originally published in 1942) says, “history 
is written by the victors”. The dominance of the Western powers in the post-
Cold War era has led to transitional justice being implemented in a narrow 
and biased manner. The USA and its allies effectively define which crimes 
should be redressed and which victims should be rehabilitated. First, it is the 
political conditions of the post-Cold War era that underpin the argument. 
The end of the Cold War marked the fall of socialism and the dominance of 
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capitalism and democracy, making the Western powers the victors and thus 
entitled to victors’ justice. But the post-Cold War era has not brought an end 
to war. The NATO bombing during the Kosovo war in 1998–1999 was carried 
out in the name of humanitarianism, which Atanasoski (2013) would call 
‘humanitarian violence’. However, the refusal of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to investigate alleged violations of 
international humanitarian law committed by NATO during its bombing 
campaign in Kosovo (Nagy 2008) suggests that it is, in Nagy’s words, victors’ 
justice that prevails in the ICTY. This suggests that any tribunals under 
Western dominance are liable to be skewed in favour of Western interests. 
Although the aim of tribunals related to transitional justice is to redress all 
past human-rights abuses, political conditions impose practical constraints. 
Confronted with the restrictive discourse of global transitional justice 
in the post-Cold War era, Taiwan’s political transition happened without 
removing the KMT regime and continues to delay a comprehensive 
reconciliation amongst the former political prisoners, the KMT regime, and 
the whole of society. In consequence, the former perpetrators have not been 
held accountable, and the former political prisoners remain stigmatised.  
Given the three-aspect analytical framework with a Foucauldian 
perspective of power relations, the implementation of the Compensation Act in 
1998 unprecedentedly defines the criteria for compensation and the identity 
of political victims. Justice was the primary aspect and institutional 
arrangement to be emphasised in the eyes of successive Taiwanese 
governments. Later, the Archives Act pictures the materials for producing the 
truth of the White Terror. However, the legal designation circumscribed 
survivors’ narrations of their own past and the formation of Taiwan’s scheme 
of transitional justice. As stated in the previous chapters, Taiwan’s official 
contrition discourse about the White Terror never focuses on the nature of 
the political agitation in which the survivors of the White Terror were 
engaged but, rather, always on their past suffering. Any survivor who 
strongly affirms his political convictions would not fit the criteria of the 
official discourse for ‘a surviving political victim’. Only those who assert 
their innocence of treasonous offences are officially identified as ‘survivors of 
past atrocities’, although the White Terror in Taiwan was more complicated 
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than the official discourse suggests. It was a time when any individual who 
was viewed as a threat to the KMT authorities could be accused of treason. 
People who had subversive thoughts or intentions, or who had committed 
subversive acts, as well as some who had nothing at all to do with subversion, 
were all at risk of persecution by the KMT regime. In consequence, the 
official representation of the past circumscribes Taiwanese citizens’ view of 
their own history. Conditioned by the incomplete political transition in the 
1990s and the restricted justice designation imposed on the survivors, the 
aspect of ethos, i.e., the cultural activates that seek to console the past 
wounds and secure democracy, in Taiwan’s transitional justice scheme thus 
continues to repeat the rhythm of de-politicisation. The Taiwanese 
government has a stake in de-politicising the identity of political victims in 
order to consolidate the idea that the communists and socialists posed a 
threat to the stability of political conditions during the White Terror. By 
doing so, the perpetrators can evade legal responsibility for their atrocities. 
Thus, we confirmed the unique journey of political transition has 
come to formulate particular power relations in terms of these institutional 
arrangement. Survivors, including each of my participants, has now 
remained unfree from the past conflict and wounds. Overall, these three 
aspects cannot be examined in isolation. Quite the reverse: a dialectical 
relation exists amongst them. The direction of the truth and cultural activities 
is underpinned by the legal designation; and these two aspects in turn 
strengthen the justification of the justice aspect. They only need to provide 
compensation and apologise for their past abuses to individuals who were 
‘political victims’ as defined by the official discourse. In this regard, the 
government assumes no legal responsibility in that discourse for the injuries 
suffered by former political prisoners who own their revolutionary past. The 
transitional justice scheme in Taiwan remains controversial as neither the 
global political sphere nor geopolitics in Taiwan have fully reconciled with 
the socialists or communists.   
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Survivors’ last resistance and unalleviated wounds  
As surviving former political enemies and political victims, my 24 
participants are witnesses to the ongoing controversial reconciliation scheme 
in Taiwan. Their non-official transitional justice discourses therefore enable 
us to explore how these men consider their past and present, and imagine 
their future, within the scheme of transitional justice, and, especially, how 
their response to the transitional justice scheme expounds upon the flaws 
and irony of the scheme. In this regard, a study of the power relations that 
surround my participants in the scheme of transitional justice is itself an 
investigation of the politics of memory. Based on my 10 months of field 
research with survivors in Taiwan, I argue that ‘silence’ is salient in 
deciphering the state of survivorhood, because it reflects how the official 
discourse suppresses the survivors’ narratives. In other words, studying 
these men’s silences could illuminate the power relations operating within 
the scheme of transitional justice. 
What is silenced cannot be understood as merely an effect of one’s 
traumatic experiences; rather, silence is itself a kind of testimony. While 
silence is often a tactic of the powerful, and also a weapon of dominated 
individuals (Bassett, 2013), it is also, as Sara Maitland insightfully argues, ‘a 
real, separate, actual thing, an ontological category of its own: not a lack of 
language but other than, different from language; not an absence of sound 
but the presence of something which is not sound’ (Maitland, 2008: 28). She 
sees silence as a form of oppression, as all silence is waiting to be broken. In 
this regard, White Terror survivors’ silence can be viewed both as an 
outcome of the official discourse in the scheme of transitional justice in 
Taiwan and as their resistance to that discourse. As I have argued, most of 
my interviewees use silence as a weapon to assert their freedom to choose 
what kind of past to articulate in the official discourse. While the government 
has limited their freedom to describe their past in the official discourse, they 
are empowered to remain silent about the parts that they may be reluctant to 
recount publicly. Silence, in this light, recalls their past as a time of mixed 
persecution and struggle, and survivors’ various manipulations of silence 
reveal that the state of survivorhood is complex. That is to say, silence not 
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only reflects psychological trauma, but can also shed light on the power 
relations affecting one’s social and political life.  
In the official discourse, they are encouraged to expose their shame 
about being oppressed individuals, but are not permitted to spell out their 
shame at having failed to effectively challenge the government. The official 
discourse deters citizens from exploring the meaning of survivorhood in 
terms of political conflict. To most people in Taiwan, the term ‘White Terror 
survivor’ implies an individual who has survived serious state repression 
without having harboured any specific subversive intent. However, these 
survivors are experiencing shame not only due to this acknowledged 
persecution but also due to their secret revolutionary past. While every 
survivor’s life experience is unique, they have in common a politically 
constructed identity created for them by the official discourse. Identified as 
surviving victims, but not as surviving political dissidents, their 
survivorhood is incomplete in the official discourse. Because they survived 
political struggle as well as systematic abuse, the meaning of their 
survivorhood is complicated. 
Certainly, the findings about the embedded meaning of survivors’ 
silence is central to the analysis of the power relations that survivors have 
been dealing with since the 1980s. Given the institutional arrangements that 
have been employed throughout the past three decades, survivors 
incorporate themselves into the scheme, yet also negotiate and resist, 
struggling over their power to raise voices that have been silenced for years. 
As a Foucauldian perspective would remind us, a study of subject and power 
relations is a question of ‘capacity’ (2000c: 336–348). Foucault has pointed out 
that the term ‘power relations’ refers to the assertion that power only exists 
as exercised by some over others (2000c: 340). Given the analysis stated in 
previous chapters, the condition of employing the transitional justice scheme 
in Taiwan is not fixed or stationary, but dynamic. The survivors continue to 
develop their tactics in response to the seemingly decisive and limited 
scheme. As stated, almost all of them have been cooperating with the official 
discourse since the 1990s. However, the situations with which my 
participants are confronted have changed slightly as some of them devote 
themselves in sparing the space of uttering the past, although the side of 
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persecution over lies the side of insurgence. At the same time, the pro-
independence cause is gradually being welcomed by Taiwanese society (Shih 
2014), insofar as pro-independence is now widely accepted by Taiwanese 
citizens. Take JC, who became a communist in the late 1940s and was 
sentenced to life imprisonment, but, while in prison, began to support 
Taiwan’s independence rather than unification with communist China. Then 
there was VC, who had once supported socialism but was then converted to 
pro-independence during his imprisonment. Both of them choose to 
demonstrate their past as a time of pro-independence insurgence. Their 
reticence about their socialist past is an outcome of the limited culture of 
contrition, but also evidence that attests to their ‘capacity’ in the face of the 
power relations.  
By the same token, pro-unification socialist survivors’ actions in 
Taiwan also envisage the intricate power relations. Take Huzhuhui, 
discussed in chapter 5. As the most representative pro-unification socialist 
survivor association, Huzhuhui holds its own annual commemorations on 
the site of former executions practised by the KMT regime in Taipei. On the 
occasion of the non-official commemoration, such as Autumn worship stated 
in chapter 5, the executed ones suffered and sacrificed for their glorious 
political ideal. In the official transitional justice discourse, we continue to 
observe some members having shared their past persecution as a form of 
cooperation. Nonetheless, the insurgent scenes and episodes remain outside 
the scheme. Even the unofficial commemoration for Taiyuan Incident hosted 
by the pro-independence TVCA and WTVA, is still waiting for the official 
recognition. Only on the occasion of non-official commemoration and in the 
oral histories published by friendly writers such as Lan Po-Cho (1997; 2011; 
2014), are these men viewed as insurgents, revolutionaries, and political 
activists. Despite the fact that political conditions have recently been 
smoother than during the 1990s, the tension left by the Cold War remains 
effective. The state of political struggle persists. The surviving political 
dissidents continue to live in a state of antipathy towards the KMT regime. 
Their lives continue to be a struggle over the terms of their belonging, and 
over their citizenship.  
 229	
In Taiwan, these men rarely join in the debate individually but, in 
order to publicly embrace their political identity, they have established 
political victim associations, such as Huzhuhui and TVCA, which are 
organised primarily around their political ideals. 203  Through these 
associations, survivors are able to engage collectively in the official discourse 
as well as their own. They are clearly aware of the importance of being 
recognised in the scheme of transitional justice, even though the official 
culture of contrition constrains the survivors from presenting themselves as 
‘former dissidents’. They remain political actors who propagate their political 
ideals outside the official discourse. Thus, on the one hand, they are de-
politicised victims although, on the other, they continue to advocate their 
political causes in contemporary Taiwan. By studying these men’s struggles 
at both individual and collective levels, no one’s experience can be reduced. 
Yet, ostensibly, my participants have in common the present-day life is a 
continuation of their past political conflict. 
Arguably, the picture of power relations nowadays is a co-
consequence of the legacy of the Cold War and Taiwan’s unique 
democratisation. Almost every survivor perceives the political conflicts of the 
past as continuing to resonate in his current life, including the scheme of 
transitional justice. For instance, the association of left-wing socialist 
survivors, Huzhuhui, continues to advocate the socialist political ideal. 
Accordingly, in their annual commemoration, oral history, and political 
events, they develop narratives that tie in with their contentious past. 
Nothing is more important to its members than advocating their enduring 
political cause. They have survived the era of government atrocities and, by 
the same token, have lived with the failure of their political struggle. The 
term ‘conflict’ thus does not imply a head-on collision of discourses but, 
rather, an ambiguous state in which White Terror survivors continue to 
cooperate with the authorities to a certain extent while still seeking to define 
their own place in the nation’s history. Hence, transitional justice is not 
merely a process of reconciliation between society and past systematic 
wrongdoing but, more profoundly, it is a scheme for constructing the past to 
reflect the current political reality. As survivors are in their eighties or 
                                                
203 See discussion in chapters 4 and 5. 
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nineties, the competing discourses are their own last resistance, striving to 
console their traumatised wounds, pursuing unaccomplished political ideals, 
and reconciling themselves with their beloved society of Taiwan. 
 
 
A study of survival 
No one’s persecution can be reducible to the knowledge of victimhood (Levi 
1990). The main contribution of this study is to scrutinise the so-called 
political victims of the White Terror using a person-centred approach. As 
sociological research, this analysis focuses on discovering a pattern in how 
survivors deal with their past. With the close-up observations of the 24 
survivor victims, the intention is not to evoke the reader’s sympathy by 
focusing on the misery this group has experienced. Rather, having 
acknowledged their collective oppression, the official discourse projects the 
identity of survivors. Inasmuch as the survivors have developed their own 
competing unofficial discourses within the scheme of transitional justice, it 
appears that, on the one hand, they consent to be represented as de-
politicised victims in the official discourse while, on the other, they remain 
engaged in a struggle with the government and society over their political 
ideals. In short, amongst institutional and legal analyses of the employment 
of transitional justice in Taiwan, this research seeks to address the 
interactions between survivors and the scheme, focusing on how the 
employment of reconciliation and transitional justice is inevitably political 
and becomes the primary political battlefield in Taiwan. Throughout a thick 
description of my participants, the meaning of the political is unravelled in 
terms of their survivorhood, and how they continue to live under the 
circumstance of otherness that is continuously imposed upon them by the 
authorities and the global political situation. By scrutinising the survivors’ 
lives from a collaborative perspective of global and domestic politics, the 
‘power relations’ do not merely emerge from Taiwan’s own political path. 
These power relations are the product of the co-consequence of Taiwan’s 
unique political history and global politics. Suffice it to say that Taiwan’s 
seemingly impossible reconciliation is, to a certain extent, a legacy of the 
Cold War. 
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Examining survivors’ accounts of their current political lives from an 
anthropological perspective, I necessarily became a witness, interpreter and 
critic of the transitional justice discourse. As a native of Taiwan, my 
awareness of current political conditions sensitised me to the need to reveal 
forbidden White Terror narratives, and to put forward an account of the 
political agenda embedded in these narratives. In this regard, details of 
survivors’ past insurgence is worthy of future research. In the past, 
researchers might have considered these men were persecuted merely with 
bad luck. Based on this research, it is noteworthy to examine how the KMT 
regime targeted these ‘former political dissidents’ in this effective way if the 
insurgences were true.  
The White Terror and the 228 Incident are not the only two cases 
deserving more attention in Taiwan. During Japanese rule from 1895 to 1945, 
Taiwan was marshalled to join World War II for the Japanese Empire. As 
former Japanese, the Taiwanese of 1945 were considered to be responsible for 
the war crimes committed by the Japanese Empire. It is known that 175 
Taiwanese-native Japanese soldiers were convicted and imprisoned as Class 
BC war criminals, and 26 of them were executed after the end of the war. 
After the end of WWII, Taiwan was no longer part of the Japanese Empire. 
The ever-changing geopolitics of the 1940s forced the Taiwanese people to 
face the transition of their political identity from the vanquished Japanese to 
the victorious Chinese. This marginalized the Taiwanese war criminals’ 
position, both in Taiwan and overseas. Without Japanese nationality, 
Taiwanese-native soldiers are excluded from Japan’s official compensation 
scheme. The same plight was inflicted on the Taiwanese comfort women. 
They confront tremendous challenges in their attempts to earn recognition 
from either the Taiwanese authorities or the Japanese government because, 
during WWII, they were Japanese, rather than citizens of the ROC. They are 
both war criminals and victims of war. 
Taiwan has shared specific historical relations with Japan and has been 
a political ally of the USA. Confronted with the threat of Sino-Soviet Union 
during the 1950s and the need for US support, the ROC government signed 
the Treaty of Peace with Japan of 1952, agreeing to officially give up calling for 
war compensation from Japan. It was East Asian politics that impeded 
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Taiwanese citizens from reconciling with their former coloniser. As a result, 
regardless of Taiwanese NGOs advocating their idea of reconciliation in 
terms of the global reconciliation discourse since the 1990s, the changing 
political conditions continue to complicate Taiwan’s path towards 
reconciliation with Japan.  
Reconciliation is thus the most challenging issue in current East Asia. 
Based on this research, I have elaborated a clear picture of how both global 
and regional geopolitics frame the idea and employment of reconciliation in 
Taiwan. Using this approach, the issues listed here have more potential to 
contribute to knowledge about survival.  
A study of survival means to question the continuing harm and 
unalleviated wounds. In this research, although I am one of very few 
individuals outside the community of survivors with whom they can share 
their revolutionary past, the deepest wounds remain too painful to probe. 
Not that I imagine that my role as a researcher is to heal my interviewees. On 
the contrary, I am always aware of the harm that my interviews could cause, 
especially when I raise questions with which they may feel uncomfortable. 
The ideal of global transitional justice encourages various groups in society 
to confess to their past, however shameful, controversial, traumatic, or 
otherwise vexed it may be. The advent of justice in Taiwan thus connotes an 
era of confession, in which we are obliged to expose such wounds; however, 
these confessions are limited by the authorities. The current political 
situation is overshadowed by the legacy of past political conflict, and limits 
our ability to define the past that we lived and the memories with which we 
are now living. The White Terror survivors, who personify the evidence of 
past atrocities and past struggle, are still fighting the authorities for 
recognition as they attempt to advance their varied political causes. In brief, 
their lives are characterised by enduring strife arising from these conflicts. 
These survivors are breathing their last, there is not much time for society to 
prepare to hear them. A profound re-consideration of the memory of the 
White Terror throughout this research thus evinces the plight of Taiwan’s 
transitional justice scheme, which needs to be surmounted. All in all, 
survivors who lived through the past horror are still expecting a genuine 
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reconciliation to occur to pacify their traumatised and oppressed souls. They 
are still waiting for their voice to be heard. 
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state-sponsored exhibition from 1997 to 2016 
 
Presidency The Published State-Sponsored Oral History Project 
 
 
The KMT 
government 
1996-2000 
五Ｏ年代⼯作⼩組 (1998) 《臺灣地區戒嚴時期五〇年代政治案
件史料彙編 (共五冊，five volumes) 》。台北：國史館 
台北市⽂獻會（1999）《戒嚴時期臺北地區政治案件相關⼈⼠⼜
述歷史：⽩⾊恐怖事件查訪 （上）（下） （two volumes）》。台
北：台北市⽂獻會 
呂芳上 主持（1999）《戒嚴時期臺北地區政治案件⼜述歷史 (共
三冊，three volumes) 》。台北：中央研究院近代史研究所 
藍 博 洲 （ 1997 ）《 ⾼ 雄 縣 ⼆ ⼆ 八 暨 五 〇 年 代 ⽩ ⾊ 恐 怖 民 眾
史》 。⾼雄縣：⾼雄縣政府 
台北市⽂獻會（1998）《五〇年代⽩⾊恐怖：臺北地區案件調查
與研究 (上)（下）（two volumes）》。台北：台北市⽂獻會 
 
 
The DPP 
government 
2000-2008 
臺灣省⽂獻委員會編印（2001）《臺灣地區戒嚴時期政治案件—
— 50–70 年代⽂獻專輯:臺灣省⽴師範學院「四六事件」》 南
投：臺灣省⽂獻委員會 
吳⽂星採編（2001）《臺灣地區戒嚴時期政治案件—— 50–70
年代⽂獻專輯:戒嚴時期臺灣政治事件⼜述歷史》南投：臺灣省
⽂獻委員會。 
中央研究院近代史研究所《⼜述歷史》編輯委員會(2002) 
泰源事件專輯。台北：中研院近代史研究所 
吳⽂星、許雪姬採編 （2001）《臺灣地區戒嚴時期政治案件—
— 50–70 年代⽂獻專輯:戒嚴時期臺灣政治事件檔案與⼜ 述 歷 
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史 》南投：臺灣省⽂獻委員會 
⿈ 富 三 採 編 （2001）《臺灣地區戒嚴時期政治案件—— 50–
70 年代⽂獻專輯:戒嚴時期臺灣政治事件檔案、出版資料、報紙
⼈名索引(上 )、(下 )》南投：臺灣省⽂獻委員會 
朱德蘭主編，許雪姬、吳⽂星、⿈富三共同編輯（2001）《臺灣
地區戒嚴時期政治案件—— 50–70 年代⽂獻專輯:崔⼩萍事
件》南投：臺灣省⽂獻委員會 
⿈富三採編（2001）《臺灣地區戒嚴時期政治案件—— 50–70
年代⽂獻專輯:美麗島事件》南投：臺灣省⽂獻委員會 
許雪姬採編（2001）《臺灣地區戒嚴時期政治案件—— 50–70
年代⽂獻專輯:林正亨的⽣與死》 南投：台灣省⽂獻委員會 
中央研究院近代史研究所《⼜述歷史》編輯委員會(2002) 《泰
源事件專輯》。台北：中研院近代史研究所 
 
 
 
The KMT 
government 
2008-2016 
陳儀深採編（2009）《海外台獨運動相關⼈物⼜述史》。台北：
中研院近代史研究所 
國家⼈權博物館籌備處（2011）《⽩⾊跫⾳》。台北：國家⼈權
博物館籌備處 
陳新吉 （2014）《⾺鞍藤的春天：⽩⾊恐怖政治受難者陳新吉
回憶錄》。台北：國家⼈權博物館籌備處 
國家⼈權博物館籌備處（2014）《遲來的愛—⽩⾊恐怖時期政治
受難者遺書 》。台北：國家⼈權博物館籌備處 
許雪姬 主編 (2015) 《獄外之囚：⽩⾊恐怖受難者女性家屬訪問
紀錄 (共三冊) 》。台北：國家⼈權博物館籌備處 
國家⼈權博物館籌備處 （2015）《⾛過長夜輯⼀： 秋蟬的悲
鳴  》。台北：⽟山社 
國家⼈權博物館籌備處 （2015）《⾛過長夜輯⼆：看⾒陽光的
時候 》。台北：⽟山社 
國家⼈權博物館籌備處 （2015）《⾛過長夜輯三：喚不回的青
春 》 。台北：⽟山社 
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藍博洲 主編（2016）《鍾浩東百年紀念專刊》。台北：國家⼈權
博物館籌備處 
國家⼈權博物館籌備處（2016）《冤獄、求⽣與揚名－政治受難
者歐陽劍華與張常美的⽣命故事特展專刊》。台北：國家⼈權
博物館籌備處 
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Appendix III 
 
The release of the formerly classified documentation that was published from 
2008 to 2016.  
 
All published by Academia Historica 
https://www.drnh.gov.tw/ 
 
Number Title of the Volume 
1. 周 琇 環 編 （2008）《 戰 後 臺 灣 政 治 案 件 — ⽩ 雅 燦 案 史 料 彙 
編 》台北：國史館。 
2. 蕭 李 居 編（2008）《 余 登 發 案 史 料 彙 編 ( ⼀ 、 ⼆ ) 》台北：國
史館。 *two volumes 
3. 葉 惠 芬 編（2008）《 戰 後 臺 灣 政 治 案 件 — — 李 武 忠 案 史 料 
彙 編 》台北：國史館。 
4. 王 正 華 編 （2008） 《 戰 後 臺 灣 政 治 案 件 — — 李 荊 蓀 案 史 
料 彙 編 ( ⼀ 、 ⼆ ) 》台北：國史館。 
5. 歐 素 瑛 編（2008）《 戰 後 臺 灣 政 治 案 件 — — 李 媽 兜 案 史 料 
彙 編 》台北：國史館。 
6. 程⽟凰 編（2008）《戰後臺灣政治案件——沈鎮南案史料彙編(⼀、
⼆ )》台北：國史館。*two volumes 
7. 張 炎 憲、 許 芳 庭 編（2008）《 戰 後 臺 灣 政 治 案 件 — — 林 ⽇ 
⾼ 案 史 料 彙 編 》台北：國史館。 
8. 蔡 盛 琦 編 （2008）《 戰 後 臺 灣 政 治 案 件 — — 張 化 民 案 史 料 
彙 編 》台北：國史館。 
9. 周 美 華 編 （2008）《 戰 後 臺 灣 政 治 案 件 — — 陳 中 統 案 史 料 
彙 編 》台北：國史館。 
10. 何 鳳 嬌 編 （2008）《 戰 後 臺 灣 政 治 案 件 — — 湯 守 仁 案 史 料 
彙 編 ( ⼀ 、 ⼆ ) 》台北：國史館。*two volumes 
11. 許 進 發 編（2008）《 戰 後 臺 灣 政 治 案 件 — — 學 ⽣ ⼯ 作 委 員 
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會 案 史 料 彙 編 》台北：國史館。 
12. ⾼ 素 蘭 編 （2008）《 戰 後 臺 灣 政 治 案 件 — — 駱 神 助 案 史 料 
彙 編 》台北：國史館。 
13. 許 進 發 編（2008）《 戰 後 臺 灣 政 治 案 件 — — 簡 吉 案 史 料 彙 
編 》台北：國史館。  
14. 歐素瑛、林正慧、⿈翔瑜 （2014）《戰後臺灣政治案件——簡國賢
案史料彙編(⼀ )、(⼆ )》台北：國史館。*two volumes 
15. 謝 培 屏 、 何 鳳 嬌 編 （2014）《 戰 後 臺 灣 政 治 案 件 — — 藍 明 
⾕ 案 史 料 彙 編 》台北：國史館。 
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Appendix IV 
 
Basic framework of interview with survivor victims of the White Terror 
*This is the only basic interview structure for the in-depth interview. 
Conditioned by the scene at interview, questions are often raised in different 
ways and wording. And I as the researcher usually have chances probe into 
the topic during my interviews. 
Coding Types Questions / Notes Index/ Content  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant’s 
information 
Year of birth Under Japanese rule / 
post-war 
Place of birth Mainlander /Taiwanese 
/Other 
Gender  M /F / Other 
Education None/ Primary school / 
Junior High School/ Senior 
High school/ Technology 
College / University / PhD 
/MD 
Place to stay after their 
release 
Taiwan: Rural Area / 
Metropolitan / County 
Overseas: which country 
Occupation prior to and after 
their persecution 
Business / serviceman / 
Physician /teacher / 
employee /student/  none 
/ other 
Marriage  Yes: Before / After 
conviction 
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 No 
 
 
Types of 
Conviction 
The year of conviction The 1950s / 1960s/ 1970s/ 
1980s 
Conviction of Crime Anarchism / Pro-
communist /Pro-
independence / Left-wing 
/ convicted with no 
specific political cause but 
in the name of treason / 
other 
Year of Sentence 5 / 7/ 10/ 15/ life sentence  
co-defendant Yes / No 
Place of imprisonment  Green island / Xindian 
Military Prison/ Jen-Ai 
prison (仁愛教育實驗所) / 
Garrison command  / Tai-
Yuan Prison 
 
 
 
 
 
Condition of 
Interview 
Location Survivor’s place/ The 
Human Rights Park / Café 
and Restaurant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Survivor’s 
place  
 
 
only two of us 
/ there are 
other family 
members at 
home yet 
stayed away 
from our talk 
/join the 
conversation 
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Number of interviewees at 
the scene 
straight away 
The 
Human 
Rights 
Park 
 
 
 
only two of us 
/ with other 
survivor 
victims / with 
staffs of the 
Human 
Rights Park 
Café and 
Restaurant 
only two of us 
/ with other 
survivor 
victims 
Frequency of interviews with 
a participant 
3 to 8 times for one 
participant 
Duration of each interview 2 hours to 8 hours 
(including participant 
observation) 
Anonymous  Yes/ No 
 
 
 
 
Political 
Engagement 
Had / have been elected as 
politician 
Yes / No  
Had / Have joined social or 
political movement after 
being released 
Yes: which one 
 
No 
Membership of political party Yes: KMT/ DPP/ Labour 
Party / other 
No 
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Membership of survivor 
association 
Yes: TVCA/ WTVA/ 
Huzhuhui /other 
NO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Engagement of 
official 
transitional 
discourse 
Receive Compensation Yes / No 
Receive vindication certificate Yes/No 
Have joined  state-sponsored 
oral history Project / 
documentary / exhibition or 
not 
Yes: how many times? 
No 
Have attended official annual 
commemoration of the White 
Terror since 2000 or not 
Yes: how many times? 
No 
Apart from the role above, 
have been a collaborator of 
the official oral history project 
/documentary/Exhibition  
Open answer   
Yes: volunteer of 
exhibition, human rights 
park/ Committee member 
of the annual oral history 
project / other 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
For you, what is transitional 
justice? 
Open answer 
Why join / not join state 
sponsored oral history project 
/documentary / exhibition 
Open answer 
Yes: desire recognition from 
public / other 
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Reflection on 
their own roles 
in the official 
discourse 
No: suspicious to the 
government / have 
completely different 
perspective with 
government  / other 
Why do/ don't you become a 
collaborator of the official 
sponsored project 
Open answer 
How do you think of your 
role in Taiwan’s memory 
project of the White Terror 
Open answer 
Positive /negative 
How do you think of the 
compensation Act 
Open answer 
Positive /negative 
How do you think of the 
vindication certificate 
Open answer 
Positive /negative 
Do you regard yourself as a 
political victim defined by the 
compensation act  
 Yes: how? 
No: Why? 
If no, then how do you 
consider the identity of 
political victim ? 
Open answer 
(Gap shown between one 
own answer rand the 
official discourse) 
How do you consider the 
meaning of innocence? 
Open answer 
(Gap shown between one 
own answer rand the 
official discourse) 
 Do you think of yourself a Yes: in what sense? 
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Reflection on 
their own past 
insurgence 
 
dissident, either for now or in 
the past? 
No: then why not?  
From your perspective, what 
is political dissident? 
Open answer 
Positive/ negative 
Between the identity of 
political victim and dissident, 
how do you regard yourself? 
Open answer 
 
Have you been regret for 
your past insurgence? 
Open answer 
Yes :further  elaboration 
No:  further elaboration 
The details of the past 
insurgence 
Open answer 
 (this part is one of the most 
challenging part, as 
questions are raised by the 
condition I encountered) 
The level of getting in touch 
with political affairs after 
one’s release during the 
White Terror  
Open Answer 
Positive to negative  
feel ashamed for past 
insurgence for not, and in 
what sense? 
Open answer 
Yes/ No 
Have you ever felt regret for 
the past insurgence, and in 
what sense? 
Open answer 
Yes /No 
 If you can live again, would 
you still choose to conspire a 
Open answer 
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revolution Yes/ No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reflection on 
their memory 
of persecution 
Please describe the conflictive  
incidents happened during 
your imprisonment 
The Patriotic incident 
(1954) /Taiyuan Incident 
(1970) 
other 
In your memory of the 
imprisonment, who 
impressed you the most 
Open answer 
In your memory of the 
imprisonment, who leaves 
you a sense of sorrow, why? 
Open answer 
The most unbearable part 
during the imprisonment 
Open answer 
The most cherished memory 
during the imprisonment  
Open answer 
How do you think of the 
logic of persecution under the 
KMT 
Open answer 
Economic and social life after 
one’s release 
Open answer 
The condition of the 
surveillance after being 
released 
Open answer 
None to serious 
Do you feel ashamed for your 
own persecution 
Open answer 
Yes/ No 
Have you revealed your past Open answer 
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to your family members? Yes/ No 
Do you feel sorry for your 
own family 
Open answer 
Yes / No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reflection on 
their 
Competing 
discourses 
Frequency of joining their 
own associations 
Positive to Negative  
(regular gatherings, 
organisation affair, and so 
forth) 
One’s role of the cooperation 
between associations and the 
government 
Positive to negative  
The duration of the 
cooperation between one’s 
association and the 
government 
10 to 20 (years)  
Viewpoint of the cooperation 
between associations and the 
government 
Open answer 
Reasons of remaining silent 
on one’s own past insurgence 
in the official discourse 
Open answer 
From past to hitherto, the 
primary political ideal  
Open answer 
Reconciliation / political 
cause / other 
Does reconciliation matter? Open answer 
Yes /No 
If it matters, who do you 
want to reconcile with? And 
Open answer  
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why? The KMT / Taiwanese 
society / yourself /your 
former fellow insurgents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reflection on 
the  interview  
Topics that silence my 
participants 
Open answer:  
Persecution under the 
KMT/ events related to 
past insurgence / other  
Topics that enthuse my 
participants 
Past insurgence/ Taiwan 
politics/ Taiwan history / 
personal political cause 
/personal plan in the 
transitional justice scheme 
/idea of reconciliation / 
other 
The timing when my 
participant started to narrate 
their emotion of shame  
 Past insurgence/ Past 
persecution / Family/ 
Current condition in the 
scheme of transitional 
justice / fellow victims / 
fellow comrades / other 
The timing when my 
participant started to narrate 
their emotion of trauma 
Past insurgence/ Past 
persecution / Family/ 
Current condition in the 
scheme of transitional 
justice / fellow victims / 
fellow comrades /other 
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Appendix V 
The Full Articles of the Compensation Act for Wrongful Trials on Charges of 
Sedition and Espionage during the Martial Law Period  
Article 1 The act herein is enacted to compensate the convicts, who were 
wrongfully tried on charges of sedition and espionage during 
the martial law period, but could not receive compensation or 
relief after the martial law period. 
Article 2 The term ‘martial law period’ as used in this act refers to the 
period of time from May 20, 1949 to July 14, 1987, if the case 
took place in the main island of Taiwan. But if the case took 
place in Kinmen, Matsu, Dongsha and Nansha, the term 
‘martial law period’ refers to the period of time from December 
10, 1948 to November 6, 1992. 
The term ‘convict’ as used in this act refers to the person 
convicted of sedition, treason, or breach of Espionage Act in the 
Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist 
Rebellion, or sent to the reformatory education in the martial 
law period.  
Unless otherwise prescribed by this act, the convict or convict’s 
relative may apply for compensation in accordance with this act 
within eight years from the date this act becomes effective. 
After the period of time prescribed by the preceding paragraph 
passes, should the convict or convict’s relative fail to apply for 
the compensation in time due to some reasons, the deadline of 
the application shall be extended for another four years. 
Article 3 The Executive Yuan may establish the Compensation 
Foundation for Wrongful Trials on Charges of Sedition and 
Espionage during the Martial Law Period (referred to as the 
foundation hereinafter) to identify qualified convicts and to 
review applications of compensation. The board of the 
foundation shall consist of scholars, righteous citizens from the 
community, judges, representatives of the government, and of 
convicts or convicts’ relatives. 
The number of representatives of convicts or convicts’ relatives 
shall not be less than one fourth of the board members of the 
foundation. 
If the applicant is not satisfied with the decision of the 
foundation, s/he may file administrative appeals and litigations 
according to relevant laws. 
Article 4 If the reputation of the convict and convict’s relatives were 
damaged, they may apply for restoration of their reputation. If 
the household registration of the convict and convict’s relative 
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has been mistaken, they may apply for correction. 
Article 5 The amount of compensation a convict may receive is 
calculated by units. Each unit equals to ten thousand NT 
Dollars. The amount of compensation one convict can receive 
shall not exceed sixty units. In the case where the convict has 
deceased, or has deceased after filing her/his application, and 
the compensation will be collected by convict’s relative residing 
in Mainland China, the total amount of compensation that 
relative can receive shall not exceed two million NT Dollars. 
Convict’s relative in Taiwan who has the same place in the 
inheritance order shall have the right to claim the remaining 
amount of the compensation. If there is no such relative in 
Taiwan, convict’s other relative in Taiwan who has the next 
place in the inheritance order shall have the right to claim the 
remaining compensation. 
The regulations regarding the standard, application, review and 
grant procedures of the compensation in the preceding 
paragraph shall be drafted by the foundation, and approved by 
the Executive Yuan. 
Article 6 The candidates of compensation are as follows: 
1. Convicts who were executed; 
2. Convicts who were imprisoned; 
3. Convicts who were sent to the reformatory education; 
4. Convicts whose properties were confiscated. 
Article 7 The convict or convict’s relative may provide the foundation 
concrete materials in written for being identified as a qualified 
convict. 
The foundation shall exercise its power independently to 
identify convicts, to process applications, and to grant 
compensation based on facts and materials from its own 
investigation. 
The foundation shall finish the application of identification 
mentioned in the first paragraph within six months after 
accepting the application. 
Article 8 One may not apply for compensation in any of the following 
circumstances: 
1. One has already received compensation according to the 
Wrongful Imprisonment Compensation or the Compensation 
for the 228-Incident based on the same facts;  
2. The conviction for sedition or treason survives reviews 
according to the current laws or the current evidence laws. 
The review mentioned in the second subparagraph of the 
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preceding paragraph shall be done case-by-case by a reviewing 
committee set up by the foundation. 
The reviewing committee mentioned in the second paragraph 
shall consist of scholars, righteous citizens from the community, 
judges, and representatives of the government. Members of the 
reviewing committee do not necessarily come from the board of 
the foundation, but at least a half of them shall have the 
experiences or currently working as judges, prosecutors, or 
lawyers. The procedure and the result of the selection of the 
members of the reviewing committee shall be reported to the 
Executive Yuan by the foundation for review and approval. 
The foundation may not nullify or modify the decision of the 
reviewing committee without the approval of two third of the 
attending board members in a formal board meeting. In this 
meeting, at least half of all board members must attend. But if 
the modification to the decision of the reviewing committee by 
the foundation has a negative effect on the applicant, the case 
shall be remanded to the reviewing committee. The foundation 
may remand the case to the committee only once. 
Article 9 In order to investigate the circumstances under which the 
formal judgments were made, the foundation may invite 
relevant people to the foundation to make explanation. It may 
request documents and files kept by the government or private 
organizations. The government or private organizations may 
not refuse such request. 
The files mentioned in the preceding paragraph include records 
related to trials of people accused of sedition, treason, or breach 
of Espionage Act in the Period of Mobilization for the 
Suppression of Communist Rebellion. 
The foundation shall return the documents and files it has 
requested according to the first paragraph as soon as the 
investigation is done. The documents and files may not be used 
for purposes other than the investigation. 
Article 10 Once this act and relevant regulations thereof shall apply to all 
convicts identified by the foundation after investigation. But if 
the investigation shows that the circumstance is one of those 
listed in the first paragraph of Article 8, the convict shall receive 
no compensation, and shall not enjoy the rights provided for by 
Article 4. 
The foundation shall deliver its decisions prescribed in the 
preceding paragraph to the applicant and the responsible 
governmental agencies. 
Article 11 The fund of the foundation shall be utilized for the following 
purposes: 
1. Granting compensation; 
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2. Subsidizing teaching materials or works on cases of wrongful 
conviction of sedition and espionage during the martial law 
period; 
3. Subsidizing investigations and research projects on wrongful 
trials of charges of sedition and espionage during the martial 
law period; 
4. Organizing memorial and academic activities for wrongful 
trials of charges of sedition and espionage during the martial 
law period; 
5. Subsidizing any other works or activities that can facilitate 
the restoration of reputation of convicts in wrongful trials of 
charges of sedition and espionage during the martial law 
period, and can promote democracy in Taiwanese society. 
Article 12 The funds of the foundation come from the following sources: 
1. Donations from the government through its annual budget; 
2. Donations from domestic or international companies, 
organizations, or individuals; 
3. The interest of the funds and the profit from investments of 
the funds; 
4. Other sources of income. 
In case of insufficient funds, the government shall make 
donations through its budget allocation. 
The compensation granted in accordance with this act is 
exempted from the income tax. 
Article 13 The term “convict’s relative” as used in this act refers to the 
spouse of the deceased or the missing convict, and the statutory 
heirs of such convicts according to the paragraphs one to three 
of Article 1138 of the Civil Code. 
Article 14 The payment of the compensation shall be made completely 
within two months from the date on which the foundation 
approves the application. The compensation shall be assigned 
to the Treasury if the payment is not collected within five years 
after the recipient is notified, unless there is a good cause for 
not collecting the compensation. 
People residing in mainland China who are eligible for claiming 
the compensation may either collect the payment by themselves 
or delegate people in the Taiwan to do so. Those who wish to 
collect the payment by themselves may apply for entering 
Taiwan. If there are more than two people eligible for the same 
compensation, they shall authorize one of them to collect the 
payment on behalf of the other(s). 
Article 15 The rights to collect compensation prescribed in this act may 
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not be seized or transferred, or served as bond. 
Article 15-1 Those who fit in one of the following circumstances may apply 
compensation within the period of time prescribed in the fourth 
paragraph of Article 2 of this act. The application shall apply 
mutatis mutandis of this act: 
1. Where people were involved in the activities during the 
martial law period, in which other participants were deemed as 
convicts as prescribed in the second paragraph of Article 2 of 
this act, but were convicted of offences other than sedition, 
treason, or breach of Espionage Act in the Period of 
Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion;  
2. Where people were convicted of sedition, treason, or breach 
of Espionage Act in the Period of Mobilization for the 
Suppression of Communist Rebellion, or sent to the 
reformatory education during the period of time from 
December 10, 1948 to May 20, 1949, before the martial law was 
declared; 
3. Where people were deprived of personal freedom by the law 
enforcement or the military based on suspicion of sedition, 
treason, or breach of Espionage Act in the Period of 
Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion, but 
were not indicted, tried, or received or not an official decision 
not to prosecute during the period from December 10, 1948 to 
the end of the Mobilizing Sedition-Suppressing Period; 
4. Where people were deprived of personal freedom by the law 
enforcement or the military for breach of the War Crime Trials 
Act in Taiwan, but were acquitted later during the period of 
time from October 25, 1946 to May 20, 1949, before the martial 
law was declared. 
Article 15-2 People who were killed by the law enforcement or the military 
or died as a result of the official pursuit on suspicion of 
sedition, treason, or breach of Espionage Act in the Period of 
Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion 
during the period of time from December 10, 1948 to the end of 
the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist 
Rebellion, may be granted for compensation according to the 
circumstances. The application shall apply this act mutatis 
mutandis. 
Article 16 This act becomes effective after six months from the date this 
act is promulgated. 
The amendments to this act become effective on the dates of 
their promulgation. 
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Appendix VI 
 
The complete text of the Autumn Worship 2009 
http://chinatide.net/?p=180 
 
2009 年 10 ⽉中秋，台灣地區政治受難⼈互助會、台灣地區戒嚴時期政治事件
處理協會的同志們、烈⼠遺族以及各界代表，謹備鮮花素果祭獻五○年代⽩⾊
恐怖犧牲者的英靈。我們懷著無比崇敬的⼼情，從全島各地齊聚在⾺場町，來
緬懷先烈們英雄的事蹟，是你們⽤⽣命⾒證了民族分離對峙的痛苦，是你們的
意志凝聚了中華兒女的愛國⼼，是你們的社會主義理想開啟了我們前進的道路，
是你們的偉⼤抱負構建了⼀個民主統⼀、繁榮昌盛的民族願景。 
今年是新中國建政六⼗週年，也是兩岸隔海對峙的六⼗週年。回想六⼗年前的
歷史場景，在那個交織著戰爭與⾰命、⿊暗與光明的歷史轉折點，你們繼承了
⽇據時期在台灣從事反帝民族解放運動的先輩們光榮的愛國主義傳統，⾃願⾃
覺的承擔了中國⼈民解放運動的時代使命，為了終結國家內戰，完成民族統⼀，
義無反顧的投入新民主主義⾰命的歷史洪流，最終獻出了⾃⼰寶貴的⽣命。 
你們的苦難集中表現了海峽兩岸中國⼈民的苦難，是百年來民族解放運動中無
數的民族苦難的組成部份。你們的⼈⽣是如此的短暫，⽽它的價值卻是那麼的
光明燦爛︔你們燃盡⾃⼰的身軀，為我們照亮前進的⽅向︔ 你們⽤鮮⾎灌溉
⼟壤，讓草兒長得更綠，讓花兒開得更紅，讓海峽兩岸的年輕⼀代更加成長、
茁壯。同志們，安息吧！通過你們的犧牲、通過你們的鮮⾎、通過你們的抱負
和理想，喚起了⼀代又⼀代知識青年的覺悟，也鍛鍊出⼀個⽇漸茁壯的隊伍，
你們尚未完成的⼀切事業，就由我們年輕的⼀代來承擔。 
今天，我們在這裡要告慰我們的先烈們：偉⼤的中國⼈民解放運動，雖然⾛過
了許多迂迴曲折的道路，但在祖國⼈民的共同努⼒下，正⼀年又⼀年的朝向繁
榮富強的道路前進。如今，⼀個⾯向現代化、⾯向世界、⾯向未來的社會主義
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新中國，已經取得了百年未有的國際地位，相信再經過⼀代⼈，至多是兩代⼈
的努⼒，⼀個富強、民主、⽂明、和諧的社會主義現代化中國，將巍然屹⽴在
世界東⽅。另⼀⽅⾯，冷戰結束，特別是晚近的伊拉克侵略戰爭和⾦融風暴，
在在暴露了美國霸權主義已經是強弩之末，過去因為帝國主義的操弄⽽長期分
離對峙的兩岸歷史，也終將⾛完它的最後⼀⾴。如今，兩岸關係已從「分離對
峙」轉移到「和平發展」，為最終實現祖國的和平統⼀奠定基礎的階段︔台灣
⼈民也在歷經了數⼗年的痛苦磨難，⾃覺的⾛向與「台獨」狂想相互對⽴的⽅
向。當然，歷史的經驗告訴我們，黎明來臨前總還有⿊暗，我們⾯前的道路還
很漫長，也不平坦。我們會繼承前輩們的遺志和教訓，保持謙虛、謹慎、不驕、
不躁的作風，加強團結，艱苦奮⾾，在你們⽤鮮⾎照亮的道路上繼續前進，為
建設⼀個真正的獨⽴、⾃由、民主、統⼀與富強的新中國做出應有貢獻。 
安息吧！死難的同志，別再為祖國擔憂！ 
你流著⾎照亮著路，我們繼續往前⾛。 
  
台灣地區政治受難⼈互助會全體同志暨家屬 
2009/10/18 
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Appendix VII 
 
The complete text of the Autumn Worship 2012 
《犇報》第 45 期( Chia Wan Ben Post Issue/ number: 45) 
 
2012 年 10 ⽉ 27 ⽇，秋風颯颯的時節，台灣地區政治受難⼈互助會、台灣地
區戒嚴時期政治事件處理協會的會員同志、烈⼠遺族以及兩岸和平發展論壇相
關團體的各界代表，齊聚⾺場町，以最沉痛肅穆的⼼情，致祭無數在⽩⾊恐怖
所犧牲的⼈民英雄。 
 
從⽇據時代開始，台灣就有無數的先烈前輩投入反帝、反殖民、反壓迫的民族
解放⾾爭，與⼤陸⼈民共同譜寫了近代中國最為堅苦，卻無比豪壯的英雄贊歌。
1940 年代，當中國⼈民迎來了反法西斯戰爭的偉⼤勝利，內戰與冷戰的陰霾
卻隨之籠罩在海峽兩岸的上空。1950 年代初，美國第七艦隊強⾏駛入台灣海
峽，在違反中國⼈民的意志之下，公然介入中國內戰。帝國主義的幽靈披了⼀
件邪惡的新衣，徘徊在美麗的寶島，陰魂不散。⾯對接踵⽽來的獨裁與壓迫，
英勇的台灣⼈民繼承了⽇據時代以來愛國主義的光榮傳統，懷抱著社會主義與
民族統⼀的崇⾼理想，前仆後繼，將⼀⽣只許綻放⼀次的青春，澆灌給他們摯
愛的、包含台灣在內廣袤的中國⼟地。 
 
魯迅先⽣說：「什麼是路︖就是從沒路的地⽅踐踏出來的，從只有荊棘的地⽅
開闢出來的。」我們的先烈前輩與⼈民英雄⽤他們的雙⼿，披荊斬棘，為我們
開闢出了⼀條康莊⼤道。「中國的春天⽣長在戰⾾裡，在戰⾾裡⿎舞著全⼈
類」，先烈前輩英勇的戰⾾，⿎舞著我們，讓我們充滿無比的勇氣與信⼼迎接
海峽兩岸遲來的春天。 
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⼀百餘年來，中國⼈民遭受著恥辱、⾎淚和酸⾟，多少英雄烈⼠為之流⾎獻身。
終於，⾰命激流沖垮了重重障礙，改換了天地，兩岸中國⼈民頭上升起了⼀輪
紅⽇！中華民族任⼈欺凌的時代已經⼀去不復返了！2012 年我們在台灣歡欣
⿎舞地⾒證了中國⼈「上九天攬⽉，下五洋捉鱉」，「神⾈九號」與「天宮⼀
號」成功進⾏了⼿控對接，中國的女性也航向了浩瀚的太空︔我國深海載⼈潛
艇「蛟龍號」，成功下潛海底超過七千⽶，突破了世界紀錄。我國獨⽴發展、
⾃主運⾏的「北⽃衛星導航系統」，已經在今年覆蓋了亞太地區，即將在 2020
年覆蓋全球。雖然先烈前輩無法親歷祖國的壯盛與強⼤，但是你們的理想與精
神還活著──追求民族的獨⽴與尊嚴，不願再受⼈挨打，為著亞洲與世界的和平
充實著⾃⼰。 
  
兩岸雖然被迫隔絕超過了六⼗年，但形勢變動快速，尤其是 2008 年之後，兩
岸終於露現了久違的黎明與曙光。先烈前輩們是國共內戰的⾒證⼈，⽽今天我
們代替先烈前輩們⾒證兩岸的和平發展。兩岸民間的交流逐漸步入常軌，民眾
穿梭於兩岸求學就業。在和平的局勢之下，兩岸攜⼿合作，共同實現中華民族
偉⼤的復興！ 
  
雖然外在形勢仍然險惡，帝國主義勢⼒仍虎視耽耽地掣肘中國。但是從近來南
海與釣⿂島的局勢來看，中國⼈民展現出了勇氣與信⼼──中國的事情，必須由
中國⼈⾃⼰解決。先烈前輩們，請不要再為祖國擔憂，我們謹記著你們的遺志，
我們堅信民族的和解與團結將會有更進步的發展，繼續為《兩岸和平協議》的
落實⽽努⼒。民族的和平統⼀、兩岸中國⼈民的親切聚⾸，也指⽇可待。 
  
今天我們嚴肅的站在這裡，⼼情已不再悲傷，甚至懷抱著些許破曉之際的喜悅。
但是，沒有先烈前輩們的犧牲與奉獻，不會有現在。舊世界的⾦城，是你們沉
重的屍骨壓垮的，是你們洶湧的⾎衝倒的。你們⽤⾃⼰的身軀，點燃了青春的
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⽕燄，「星星之⽕，可以燎原」。我們還要⾾爭，還要前進，讓你們的理想，
開更多鮮豔的花，結更多的果。 
  
安息吧，尊敬的烈⼠！別擔憂，⼈民的同志！我們將踏著你們指引的路，⽤我
們的眼淚，⽤我們的歌，⽤我們的腳印，持續著未完的兩岸和平發展與和平統
⼀之路！願你們的英靈永遠和我們同在！ 
  
「為了反對內外敵⼈、爭取民族獨⽴和⼈民⾃由幸福，在歷次⾾爭中犧牲的⼈
民英雄們永垂不朽！」 
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Appendix VIII 
 
The complete version of the Taiwan Garrison Command announcement on 3rd 
September 1951 
 
Provided by National Central Library 
https://www.ncl.edu.tw/ 
  
台灣省政府與台灣省保安司令部，昨（廿九）⽇書告我愛國同胞，促請⼤家檢
舉匪諜，玆錄誌原⽂如后： 
 
親愛的同胞們：  
政府當局為了⿎勵檢舉匪諜。特地在報上公怖了⼀項獎賞辦法，并規定⾃九⽉
廿⼀⽇起至⼗⼆⽉〺⼀⽇⽌為告發匪諜及嫌疑份⼦的期限。我們凡是有良⼼⾎
性的愛國者，每個⼈都應提⾼警覺，澄清思想，堅定意志，勿受匪諜的欺騙利
⽤，⼤家應知道受匪諜欺騙利⽤的後果，不但厄害了個⼈也同時危害了國家，
因此凡是不注意防諜的⼈，就等於⽢⼼⾃殺，其次，我們應當注意的是：檢肅
匪諜不僅是今⽇台灣的措施，也是所有⾃由民主國家當前特別注重的⼀個緊急
措施，所以同胞們為了⾃身的利益，⼤家的幸福，國家世界的安危，都應該趕
快勇敢地檢舉匪諜。  
 
後⾯就是「檢舉匪諜獎勵辦法」的摘要，請嚴密注意這個關係⼤家禍福的事情，
⼤家通⼒合作，排除這些壞⼈。  
 
台灣省政府 台灣省保安司令部同啟 民國四⼗年九⽉ 
 
